

Editor's note: *The Committee to Protect Journalists' amicus brief begins on page 7 in English.*

Committee to Protect Journalists

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המבקשת להצטרף כידיד בית המשפט

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המשיבים

בקשה להצטרף כידיד בית המשפט

בית המשפט הנכבד מתבקש להתיר ל-Committee to Protect Journalists להצטרף לעתירה שבכותרת במעמד של 'ידיד בית המשפט' כדי שהמבקשת תוכל להביא בפניו את עמדתה בסוגיות הנדונות בעתירה, המפורטת בתזכיר המצורף כחלק בלתי נפרד של בקשה זו (להלן – "התזכיר").

כן מתבקש בית המשפט הנכבד לאפשר לבא-כוח המבקשת להביא את עיקרי טענות המבקשת, כמו גם ליתן מענה לשאלות ההרכב, במסגרת הדיון שנקבע בעתירה שבנדון.

ואלו נימוקי הבקשה:

המבקשת

1. Committee to Protect Journalists (להלן – "CPJ") היא ארגון עצמאי, שלא למטרות רווח שנוסדה (במדינת ניו יורק בארה"ב) על ידי עיתונאים בשנת 1981 לקידום חופש העיתונות ולשם הגנה על זכויות עיתונאים לדווח על חדשות ללא מורא וחשש לפגיעה בהם.

2. ל-CPJ ניסיון עשיר ומשמעותי בהופעה כידיד בית המשפט בבתי משפט ברחבי העולם בנושאים הקשורים לעיתונות. CPJ השתתף כידיד בית המשפט בהליכים בפני בתי משפט פדרליים בארה"ב, בית המשפט העליון של גואטמלה, בית המשפט העליון של הפיליפינים, בית המשפט הגבוה של פרטוריה בדרום אפריקה, בית המשפט האינטר-אמריקאי לזכויות אדם ובית המשפט האירופי לזכויות אדם, כמפורט בתזכיר.

3. CPJ יכול לסייע לבית המשפט הנכבד באמצעות הצגת נקודת ראייה בינלאומית ומשווה ייחודית לגבי זכויות הגישה של עיתונאים לאזורי לחימה.
4. למבקשת מומחיות, ידע, יכולות ניתוח, ראייה רחבה וארוכה טווח, וניסיון ארגוני עיתונאי ייחודי וארוך שנים.
5. מעמדה המקצועי והציבורי של המבקשת, ובפרט מומחיותה בסוגיות שבנדון, מאפשר לה – להביא את עמדתה ביחס לשאלות היסוד המתעוררות בעתירה שבכותרת ולהביאה בפני בית המשפט בדרך של הצטרפות לעתירה במעמד של ידיד בית המשפט. ר' בג"ץ 3809/08 האגודה לזכויות האזרח בישראל נ' משטרת ישראל (28.5.2012) והשוו: ע"א 751/10 פלוני נ' ד"ר אילנה דיין-אורבך (8.2.2012).
6. בית משפט זה הכיר במוסד "ידיד בית המשפט" בפסיקתו כבר לפני שנים רבות וקבע מבחנים להפעלת שיקול דעתו בעניין "ידיד בית-המשפט" (Amicus Curiae) בהלכת קוזלי, שם נפסק בין היתר, כדלקמן:

"ידיד בית-המשפט" (Amicus Curiae)

42. המוסד "ידיד בית-המשפט" מוכר בשיטות משפט שונות זה מאות בשנים (ראו S. Krislov "The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy" 29)). עיקרו הוא סיוע לבית-המשפט בסוגיה כלשהי, על-ידי מי שאינו צד ישיר לסכסוך הנדון. במקור היה מוסד זה כלי להצגת עמדה ניטרלית בלבד בהליכים, תוך סיוע אובייקטיבי לבית-המשפט. אך בהמשך התפתח המוסד "ידיד בית-המשפט" כצד להליך, שאינו דווקא ניטרלי ואובייקטיבי, אלא שהוא מייצג – מתוקף תפקידו או עיסוקו – אינטרס או מומחיות שמן הראוי שישמעו בפני בית-המשפט בסכסוך ספציפי. כך, באותם המקרים שבהם קיים גורם שלישי – שאינו מעורב בסכסוך עצמו – ניתן יהיה לצרפו כ"ידיד בית-המשפט", אם יהא בנוכחותו בהליך כדי לתרום לגיבושה של ההלכה בעניין מסוים, זאת על יסוד הצגת מלוא העמדות הרלוונטיות בעניין הנדון ותוך מתן ייצוג ופתחון פה ודעת לגופים מייצגים ומקצועיים (ראה Krislov, במאמרו הנ"ל [29], בעמ' 695-709).

מ"ח 7929/96 קוזלי נ' מדינת ישראל, פ"ד נג(1) 529, 553.

7. בקשת זו עומדת בגדר מבחני הפסיקה במובהק: המבקשת הינה צד שאיננו מעורב בסכסוך עצמו ונוכחותה בהליך תסייע לגיבושה של הלכה בעניין המונח בפני בית המשפט הנכבד. למבקשת הידע, המומחיות והניסיון הארגוני ארוך השנים הנחוצים בדיוק לשם גיבוש ומתן הכרעה כאמור. ר' דנ"פ 5387/20 רפי רותם נ' מדינת ישראל (15.12.2021), בש"פ 5105/20 יואל יולי שמעון נ' מדינת ישראל (25.5.2021) והשוו: בג"ץ 413/13 מוחמד מוסא שחאדה אבו עראם ו-107 אח' נ' שר הבטחון (4.5.2022), בג"ץ 5794/22 דניאל זמטב נ' הוועדה לבחינת השעיית ראשי רשויות בשל הגשת כתבי אישום לפי חוק הרשויות המקומיות (בחירת ראש הרשות וסגניו וכהונתם), התשל"ה-1975 (6.2.2023), בג"ץ 3030/23 לוחמים לשלום נ' שר הביטחון (23.4.2023).

העתירה והתזכיר

8. הבקשה והתזכיר נסמכים על העובדות שבעתירה.
9. המבקשת מעוניינת להצטרף לדיון המתמקד בשאלות עקרוניות הנוגעות לשתי סוגיות מרכזיות: עצם הטלת וקיום המגבלות המונעות כניסת עיתונאים זרים לשטח רצועת עזה וכן הסוגייה של התרת הכניסה כפוף למגבלות מידתיות וסבירות שאינן מסכלות את הכיסוי והדווח העיתונאי.
10. סוגיות אלו לא זכו עד עתה לבחינה יסודית ושלמה בפני בית משפט זה וכן בשים לב לכך שההגבלות המוטלות על כניסת עיתונאים לשטח רצועת עזה מאז 7 באוקטובר 2023 הן חסרות תקדים בישראל ובעולם.
11. העתירה שבפני בית המשפט הנכבד היא מקרה מובהק שבו נכון ויש צורך חיוני להמשיך ולפתח את ההלכה השיפוטית בנושא זה. מטעם זה, סבורה המבקשת כי העתירה מעלה הצדקה למעורבות מיוחדת של המבקשת בדרך של הצטרפות במעמד 'ידיד בית המשפט'.
12. העתירה שבכותרת המונחת בפני בית משפט נכבד זה מעוררת כאמור שורה של סוגיות עקרוניות מן המעלה הראשונה, אשר כל אחת מהן בנפרד ראויה לדיון נרחב, יסודי ומעמיק. כמפורט בתזכיר ולהלן.

כניסה וגישת עצמאית של עיתונאים היא מרכיב מרכזי וחיוני לשם קיום כיסוי ודווח עיתונאי של מאזורי לחימה וקונפליקט

13. כאמור בתזכיר :
- "10. Independent access by journalists to conflict zones without restrictions imposed by parties to the conflict is widely recognized as the central tenet for conflict coverage. Independent access ensures that the public receives unfiltered, independent accounts of events on the ground, and that journalists can exercise their rights to investigate events and gather information from the local population without undue restriction."
14. גם כאשר כניסת העיתונאים כרוכה בסיכון, אותו הם נוטלים על עצמם, על המדינה לאפשר את כניסתם העצמאית :
- "15. To ensure free and effective reporting, journalists should have the option to access conflict zones independently, and it is common practice for journalists to enter countries experiencing conflict without military support or approval. The risk—both physical and legal—is borne by journalists, their editors, and media organizations. Foreign journalists have independently reported from many recent, high-casualty wars, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Ukraine. Moreover, local journalists consistently report from every conflict zone, including from Gaza, and take on the risk of doing so to ensure the public, which funds governments and militaries

that engage in security action, is informed about the consequences of those actions. In Sudan, for instance, despite the collapse of 90% of the country's media infrastructure and the killing and mass displacement of journalists, reporters continue to document the war and humanitarian crisis immense personal risk. Even during embeds—which should exist only as a complement to independent access and never as a substitute—journalists understand and accept responsibility for the risks inherent in reporting from dangerous places.

ההגבלות שהוטלו על ידי מדינת ישראל הן לא מידתיות, לא סבירות ואינן מקדמות תכלית ראויה

15. סוגיה נוספת בה עוסק התזכיר היא בניתוח השאלה האם ההגבלות שהטילה מדינת ישראל עומדות באמות מידה של מידתיות, סבירות והאם הם נעשו לתכלית ראויה, ר' פרקים III ו-IV לתזכיר, בהם הסוגייה מנותחת באופן מקיף.

16. חוסר הסבירות נובע גם מכך שמדינת ישראל איננה מקיימת ואף איננה נותנת משקל נאות להתחייבויותיה במסגרת אמנות בינלאומיות שהיא צד להן.

ההגבלות המופרזות שמטילה ישראל על עיתונאים זרים עולות כדי צנזורה אסורה ופוגעות בחופש הביטוי של אותם עיתונאים

17. התזכיר מראה כי ההגבלות המופרזות שמטילה ישראל על עיתונאים זרים עולות כדי צנזורה אסורה ופוגעות בחופש הביטוי של אותם עיתונאים, ר' פרק V לתזכיר.

מסקנות התזכיר

18. מסקנות התזכיר כמפורט בסופו הן כדלקמן:

1. Israel's restrictions on journalists' access into Gaza are unnecessary and disproportionate to Israel's stated aims of preserving national security and journalist safety. They are more intrusive than restrictions adopted by peer nations in other conflict zones. Further, these restrictions are not applied to local journalists reporting from Gaza, which undermines IDF's claim that restrictions are necessary for the purpose of protecting national security and military operations.
2. Israel's blanket prohibition on independent access rather than accepted practice of adopting zoning or other tailored measures designed to enable press freedom in times of war or conflict, is akin to measures adopted by autocratic or repressive regimes. These restrictions violate Israel's commitments to protect journalists' [freedom of expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR](#).

19. הסכמת העותרים: ב"כ העותרים, עו"ד גלעד שר נתן את הסכמתו האדיבה לבקשה זו. הבקשה איננה טעונה תגובות הצדדים.

סוף דבר

נוכח כל האמור לעיל בית משפט נכבד זה מתבקש להתיר את צירופה של Committee to Protect Journalists כ'ידיד בית המשפט' התומכת בעתירה בהיבטיה העקרוניים, ולאשר ל-CPJ להשמיע טיעוניה במהלך הדיון בעתירה.

מן הדין ומן הצדק להיעתר למבוקש.

היום, 5 אוקטובר, 2025



גלעד ברנע, עו"ד
ב"כ המבקשת

Motion to join as amicus curiae

The Honorable Court is requested to allow the petitioner to join the petition in the above-referenced case as a “friend of the court” so that the petitioner may present its position on the issues discussed in the petition. The petitioner meets the criteria to be added as a friend of the court.¹ As addressed below, the petitioner is an international organization with relevant expertise in promoting press freedom and with significant previous experience acting as a “friend of the court” before numerous courts globally. The petitioner’s submissions seek to inform the court of international norms and principles on freedom of expression and journalistic access to war zones as well the approaches of states in balancing those interests against the safety of journalists and national security considerations, derived from first-hand experience, interviews with practitioners, and extensive review of primary and secondary sources.

The Honorable Court is also requested to allow the petitioner’s representative to present the main arguments of the petitioner, as well as to respond to the questions of the panel, within the framework of the hearing to be set in the petition in question.

The grounds for the petition are as follows:

The petitioner

1. The Committee to Protect Journalists (“**CPJ**”) is an independent, nonprofit organization established by journalists in 1981 to promote press freedom worldwide and to defend the rights of journalists to report the news without fear of danger.
2. CPJ operates globally, with staff in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. In 2024 alone, CPJ provided assistance to 583 journalists in 59 countries.²
3. CPJ has extensive experience appearing as amicus curiae in courts across the globe on issues relating to journalism. CPJ has participated as amicus curiae in proceedings before U.S. federal courts, the Guatemala Supreme Court, the Philippines Supreme Court, the Pretoria High Court in South Africa, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights.³ CPJ submits that it can offer this Honorable Court a unique international and comparative perspective on journalist access rights.

I. Introduction

4. Journalists occupy an important role in any theater of armed conflict. Indeed, “[f]reedom of expression and freedom of the press, as well as the public’s right to know, remain in force even during times of war, *and are even more important during such times.*”⁴ In recognition of

¹ See *Kozli v. State of Israel* (M.C. 7929/96), P.D. 53(1) 529, 554 (1999).

² See Committee to Protect Journalists, “Our Impact,” available [here](#).

³ Selected cases in which CPJ has intervened as a third party or an amicus include: *Widakuswara v. Lake* (25-2390), United States Southern District of New York (2025); *Guatemala v. Zamora Marroquín*, Corte Suprema de Justicia de Guatemala (2025); *People of the Philippines v. Maria Ressa and Reynaldo Santos Jr.* (G.R. No. 263584), Supreme Court of the Philippines (2024); *Motsepe v. S* (A816/2013), Pretoria High Court (2014); *Fontevicchia and D’Amico v. Argentina* (IACHR Series C No. 238), Inter-American Court on Human Rights (2011); *Huseynov v. Azerbaijan*, European Court of Human Rights (“**ECtHR**”) (2018).

⁴ *Association of Foreign Correspondents in Israel v. Commander of the Southern Command* (Case 9910/08), Judgment of the High Court of Justice (Jan. 2, 2009) (emphasis added). See, also, *Foreign* (continued...)

this principle, Israel committed itself to protecting the right to freedom of expression when it signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“**ICCPR**”).⁵ This right includes the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,”⁶ and encompasses both the rights of journalists to freely obtain and communicate information, and the public’s right to receive information.⁷ Further, international courts have recognized that the work of war correspondents serves a public interest,⁸ and that the “transmission of that information is essential to keeping the international public informed about matters of life and death.”⁹ It is imperative, then, that the ability of journalists to carry out their functions is protected as “vigorous investigation and reporting by war correspondents enables citizens of the international community to receive vital information from war zones,”¹⁰ and governments must have sufficient regard to the public’s right to be informed of multiple perspectives of a situation.¹¹

5. It is “normally incompatible” with the protections provided by the ICCPR for states to restrict the freedom of journalists “to travel outside the State party, to restrict entry into the State party of foreign journalists to those from specified countries or to restrict freedom of movement of journalists and human rights investigators within the State party (including to conflict-affected locations, the sites of natural disasters and locations where there are allegations of human rights abuses).”¹² Only in the rarest of circumstances, then, may Israel restrict journalists’ right to seek and impart information “for the protection of national security.”¹³ However, this national security exception must never be invoked as a justification for the muzzling of advocacy of “democratic tenets and human rights,”¹⁴ and should not be invoked “unless there is a real risk of harm to a legitimate interest and there is a close causal link between the risk of harm and the expression.”¹⁵
6. To prevent such abuse, restrictions on freedom of expression must conform to “strict tests of necessity and proportionality.”¹⁶ Restrictions “must be appropriate to achieve their protective function,” “must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their

Press Association in Israel v. Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories and others (Case 8884/23), Judgment of the High Court of Justice (Jan. 8, 2024).

⁵ UN Treaty Body Database, Ratification Status for ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, available [here](#).

⁶ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ICCPR, Article 19(2), available [here](#); See, also, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A., Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948), Art. 19.

⁷ See *Fressoz and Roire v. France* (App. No. 29183/95), Judgment ECtHR, (Jan. 21, 1999): “Not only does the press have the task of imparting information and ideas on matters of public interest: the public also has a right to receive them”, para. 51, available [here](#).

⁸ *Prosecutor v. Brđanin (Radoslav) and Talić (Momir)* (Case No IT-99-36-AR73(9), ICL 200), Decision on Interlocutory Appeal (Dec. 11, 2002), United Nations, para. 35, available [here](#).

⁹ *Id.*, para. 36.

¹⁰ *Id.*, para. 38.

¹¹ See *Gözel and Özer v. Turkey* (Application Nos. 43453/04 and 31098/05), Judgment ECtHR (Jul. 6, 2010), para. 56, available [here](#).

¹² Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 (“**General Comment No. 34**”), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sep. 12, 2011), para. 45, available [here](#).

¹³ ICCPR, Article 19(3)(b).

¹⁴ General Comment No. 34, para. 23.

¹⁵ See, e.g., the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights’ balancing of national security interests with freedom of expression in the context of imposing criminal measures by: Declaration on Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, Principle 22(5), available [here](#).

¹⁶ General Comment No. 34, para. 22.

protective function,” and “must be proportionate to the interest to be protected.”¹⁷ The United Nations has clarified that, with regards to measuring proportionality, “[s]ometimes discussion of a certain subject poses risks to society, but the discussion is so important that it should take place anyway.”¹⁸

7. Israel bears the burden of demonstrating that its restrictions on press access to Gaza are necessary for legitimate aims and that its restrictions are proportionate.¹⁹ To meet its burden, Israel must demonstrate in a “specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat. . . that is causing it to restrict freedom of expression, as well as the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat.”²⁰
8. Israel’s restrictions on journalist access into Gaza fail to meet these necessity and proportionality requirements. Since October 7, 2023, Israel has sealed access to Gaza and prohibited foreign journalists from independent access.²¹ Nor does Israel allow journalists to attach to an Israeli military unit and travel with them for a meaningful period of time, such as in a traditional embed program. Rather, Israel only allows journalists to partake in infrequent, heavily-escorted, and short trips to the Gaza strip. During these sporadic trips, Israel places journalists under strict supervision and requires them to submit their footage to military censors.²² Israel prohibits these journalists entirely from broadcasting live, and Israel also retains the right to disqualify any footage taken even after the operation or war has ended, further limiting the release of independent reporting from the territory.²³ Critically, under Israel’s rules, journalist access to Palestinian residents has been nonexistent during these trips. Israel specifically prohibits media interviews from being “held on the ground unless the interviewee has specifically agreed to said interview in advance,”²⁴ which is effectively not possible given the limited number and frequency of escorted trips to the territory. Israel also prohibits journalists from directing the destination of their travels,²⁵ and from remaining in Gaza beyond a few hours.²⁶ Israel does not allow journalists to travel with its escorts until several days after the start of a ground operation, when the commanders have already formed a defense line.²⁷ Even escorted entry is rare and from October 7, 2023 to September

¹⁷ *Id.*, para. 34.

¹⁸ United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, “Freedom of Expression and Public Order: Training Manual” (“**UNESCO Public Order Training Manual**”), p. 24, available [here](#).

¹⁹ *Liubou Pranevich v. Belarus* (CCPR/C/124/D/2251/2013), para. 6.5, available [here](#); *Baydildayeva v. Kazakhstan* (CCPR/C/137/2545/2015), para. 8.3, available [here](#).

²⁰ *Baydildayeva v. Kazakhstan* (CCPR/C/137/2545/2015), para. 8.3, available [here](#); *Viktor Parfenenka v. Belarus* (CCPR/C/134/D/2737/2016), para. 7.4, available [here](#).

²¹ Stav Levaton and Toi Staff (May 19, 2025), “High Court delays Gaza press access hearing for sixth time amid escalating offensive,” *The Times of Israel*, available [here](#).

²² *Id.*; see also Israeli Defense Force Spokesperson’s Unit, “Subject: Embedding journalists to operational activities” (“**IDF registration form**”), para. 4 and para. titled commitment of publication and para. titled operations security subpart Y-AA.

²³ *Id.*, para. titled commitment in case of a pool, subpart G and para. titled commitment of publication, subpart J.

²⁴ IDF registration form, paragraph titled “*Commitment in case of a pool*,” subpart G.

²⁵ Based on testimony by foreign correspondents affiliated with the Foreign Press Association in Israel who embedded with the IDF in Gaza.

²⁶ Jerry Felsenthal (Jun. 27, 2025), “The Blogs: Israel’s ban on foreign journalists in Gaza fuels antisemitism,” *The Times of Israel*, available [here](#).

²⁷ IDF registration form, para. 2.

2025, Israel has only allowed select foreign media organizations to enter Gaza a reported total of 36 times.²⁸

9. Israel has identified two interests that its restrictions on journalist access are seeking to protect: 1) the integrity of Israel's national security and military operations, and 2) journalist safety. Yet, as examined below, the restrictions imposed by Israel are unnecessary and disproportionate to protect these interests. They are significantly more intrusive than restrictions adopted by peer nations in other conflict zones.

II. Independent access is the central tenet for journalists reporting on current conflicts across the globe.

a. Independent access is essential for ensuring broad and balanced coverage of a conflict.

10. Independent access by journalists to conflict zones without restrictions imposed by parties to the conflict is widely recognized as the central tenet for conflict coverage. Independent access ensures that the public receives unfiltered, independent accounts of events on the ground, and that journalists can exercise their rights to investigate events and gather information from the local population without undue restriction.²⁹
11. Israel itself has “urged all parties involved in situations of armed conflict to respect the *professional independence and rights of journalists*, media professionals and associated personnel as civilians.”³⁰ And it has joined the call “to create and maintain, in law and in practice, a safe and enabling environment for journalists, media professionals and associated personnel to perform their work independently and *without undue interference* in situations of armed conflict.”³¹
12. Building on this principle, democratic states have increasingly incorporated protections for independent media access into their military doctrine. National Law of War Manuals explicitly affirm the role of the independent press. As an example, New Zealand’s Manual recognizes that “journalists play a dangerous and vital role in reporting on war,” while the U.S. Manual emphasizes that the “*proactive* release of information to domestic and international audiences” is consistent with the objectives of U.S. military operations.”³²

²⁸ Toi Staff (Sep. 25, 2025), “Major outlets demand free press access to Gaza: ‘History is told by those who report it’,” The Times of Israel, available [here](#).

²⁹ The right to research and gather information is recognized as an essential preparatory step in journalism and is protected under humanitarian law. See, relevant case law on Article 10 ECHR, such as *Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland* (App. No. 931/13), Judgment (ECtHR), (Jun. 27, 2017), para. 128, available [here](#).

³⁰ UN Security Council Draft Resolution on Protection of Journalists and Associated Media Personnel in Armed Conflict (May 27, 2015), S/2015/375, available [here](#) (emphasis added). Israel was an author of this draft resolution.

³¹ *Id.* (emphasis added).

³² See, New Zealand Manual of Armed Forces, Section 14.7.1, available [here](#); U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual (Jul. 2023), Section 4.24, p. 173. available [here](#) (emphasis added); U.S. Joint Publication 3-61 (November 17, 2015), Public Affairs, p. I-1, point b, available [here](#).

13. The U.S. Department of War designates *open and independent reporting* as the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.³³ The U.S. military also acknowledges that the suppression of “unfavorable information or failing to acknowledge its existence leads to media speculation, the perception of a cover-up, and the loss of public trust.”³⁴ Israel currently claims such a loss of trust and alleges that the foreign media is relying on Hamas-created narratives.³⁵ These claims only reinforce the case for allowing international journalists to access Gaza to offer an independent perspective.
14. In further recognition of the importance of independent journalist access, 29 democratic member states of the Media Freedom Coalition have flatly “oppose[d] all attempts to restrict press freedom and block entry to journalists during conflicts,” and specifically called for “Israel to allow immediate independent foreign media access and afford protection for journalists operating in Gaza.”³⁶ So too have over 200 global media figures, who have called Israel’s ban on independent access “a situation that is without precedent in modern warfare.”³⁷
- b. While independent access may entail risk, international law imposes obligations on states to ensure the safety of all civilians, including journalists.
15. To ensure free and effective reporting, journalists should have the option to access conflict zones independently, and it is common practice for journalists to enter countries experiencing conflict without military support or approval. The risk—both physical and legal—is borne by journalists, their editors, and media organizations. Foreign journalists have independently reported from many recent, high-casualty wars, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Ukraine. Moreover, local journalists consistently report from every conflict zone, including from Gaza, and take on the risk of doing so to ensure the public, which funds governments and militaries that engage in security action, is informed about the consequences of those actions. In Sudan, for instance, despite the collapse of 90% of the country’s media infrastructure and the killing and mass displacement of journalists, reporters continue to document the war and humanitarian crisis immense personal risk.³⁸ Even during embeds—which should exist only as a complement to independent access and never as a substitute—journalists understand and accept responsibility for the risks inherent in reporting from dangerous places.

³³ U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5122.05 (Aug. 7, 2017), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (“**DoD Directive 5122.05**”), Section 6: Statement of DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations, available [here](#); U.S. Army (Feb. 25, 2022), “Field Manual 3-61: Communication Strategy and Public Affairs Operations” (“**U.S. Field Manual 3-61**”), p. 1-9, para. 1-47, available [here](#).

³⁴ U.S. Field Manual 3-61, p. 1-9, para. 1-48.

³⁵ Benjamin Netanyahu (Aug. 10, 2025), “PM Netanyahu at a press conference for foreign media,” Prime Minister’s Office, available [here](#).

³⁶ Media Freedom Coalition (Aug. 21, 2025), “Statement on Foreign Media Access to Gaza” (“**Media Freedom Coalition Statement**”), available [here](#); French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (Sep. 24, 2025), “Joint statement on protection of journalists,” available [here](#).

³⁷ Committee to Protect Journalists (Jun. 5 2025), “CPJ and global media readers call for urgent, unrestricted access for Gaza for journalist” (“**CPJ petition**”), available [here](#); see, also Freedom to Report, “Gaza Mission,” available [here](#).

³⁸ UNESCO (Jun. 2, 2025), “Despite the dire circumstances, journalists in Sudan continue their work with remarkable resilience,” available [here](#); The Japan Times (Apr. 24, 2025), “‘No one else will’: Sudan’s journalists risk all to report the war,” available [here](#).

16. Independent access is meaningful only if paired with governments' commitments to comply with international law obligations and avoid indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including journalists, or the targeting of journalists. The United Nations Security Council has sought to address the protection of journalists in conflict zones, by calling on all states to comply with their obligations towards civilians (including journalists) and to "respect the professional independence and rights of journalists, media professionals and associated personnel as civilians."³⁹ According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "training should also be provided to members of the armed forces and journalists and media organizations regarding . . . the legitimacy of the presence of journalists during situations of armed conflict, and practices and procedures to minimize risks to journalists."⁴⁰ It follows that the IDF is obligated to allocate resources to meet these obligations. Further, as discussed in part V.b, attacks intentionally targeting journalists are illegal under international law.

c. By contrast, autocratic or repressive regimes routinely impose severe restrictions or outright bans on access.

17. While rights-respecting states recognize the value of independent media access to conflict zones and have enshrined this in their practices, disproportionate restrictions—like those imposed by the Israeli government in Gaza—are more often imposed by autocratic regimes, or by governments that engage in repression in a specific region. These aim to "monopolize outgoing information, silence whistle-blowers, cover up human rights abuses and control public opinion."⁴¹ For instance:

- a. In Myanmar, there is an effective ban on all independent media, both national and international.⁴² As a result, only state outlets, covert local reporters working at great risk,⁴³ or foreign journalists confined to regime-approved topics can operate.
- b. In Indonesia, nearly all foreign journalists have been barred from West Papua since 1963. Applications are routinely denied,⁴⁴ and those allowed entry face "surveillance, harassment, and at times, arbitrary arrest by Indonesian security forces."⁴⁵
- c. In Russia, access to Russian or Russian-held territories is permitted only under heavy constraint, while sweeping laws criminalizing "fake news" or "discrediting" the military (punishable by up to 15 years) have significantly chilled reporting.⁴⁶ The result is that "almost all independent media" are banned or branded "foreign agents."⁴⁷

³⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1738 (Dec. 23, 2006), para. 8, available [here](#).

⁴⁰ HRC, "The Safety of Journalists."

⁴¹ European Parliament, Resolution on the protection of journalists around the world and the European Union's policy on the matter (2022/2057(INI)) (Jun. 11, 2023), para. F.

⁴² See, for instance: the imprisonment of two Reuters reporters in 2017 for reporting on the Rohingya massacre ([here](#)); the imprisonment of Danny Fenster, an American journalist, in 2021 ([here](#)); and the imprisonment of two Japanese journalists in 2021 and 2022 ([here](#)).

⁴³ According to Reporters Without Borders, Myanmar imprisons more journalists than any country in the world other than China. See RSF, Myanmar Country Report, available [here](#).

⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch Report (Nov. 10, 2015), "Something to Hide? Indonesia's Restrictions on Media Freedom and Rights Monitoring in Papua," available [here](#).

⁴⁵ *Id.*, p. 3.

⁴⁶ Reuters (Mar. 4, 2022), "Russia fights back in information war with jail warning," available [here](#).

⁴⁷ Reporters Without Borders, Country Report, Russia, available [here](#).

- d. In India, access to Kashmir and along the Pakistan border is heavily restricted and controlled by the army's publicity wing (ADGPI), which excludes most foreign and Kashmiri journalists in favor of self-censored Delhi-based reporters.⁴⁸ When access does occur, it is typically limited to "guided tours" at preapproved sites under close control.⁴⁹

III. Israel's access rules are unnecessary and disproportionate.

- 18. Despite open and independent reporting being the most rights-consistent and least restrictive standard for conflict coverage, journalistic access in practice does vary.⁵⁰ Democratic countries tend to facilitate access, while autocratic governments more commonly impose outright bans on independent reporting.⁵¹ In exceptional cases where independent access is restricted by the military of a democratic country, such as to a high-risk front line, there are forms of managed access that still facilitate meaningful reporting in these situations and thereby comply with international law. However, these should be "introduced *only to the extent necessary*."⁵²
 - a. *Embedding*: Embedding is the practice of attaching journalists to military units to cover operations from within. It can serve as a secondary mechanism for access but does not serve as a substitute for independent access. It should only be implemented in a way that is genuinely proportionate, transparent, and facilitative of journalistic freedom, rather than a tool of control. Embedding arrangements are designed to provide "long-term, minimally restrictive access."⁵³ To align with international human rights standards, embedding must not reduce journalists to extensions of military messaging, but instead ensure they retain their independence, can report without censorship or intimidation, and have equal access regardless of media group or nationality.
 - b. *Tiered access zones*: Structured access systems balance operational security with journalistic freedom. The U.K. Ministry of Defence ("**U.K. MOD**") deploys a specialist Media Ops staff to ensure journalists receive "sufficient information, access and facilities to enable the media to develop a coherent understanding of the key issues involved *and*

⁴⁸ See, for example, Reporters Without Borders (Sep. 30, 2025), "India: Jammu and Kashmir, an entire region turned into a black hole for information", available [here](#); Kashmir Times (Sep. 16, 2024), "Disappeared: Media Freedom in Jammu and Kashmir 2019-24 – A Status Report By FSC," available [here](#).

⁴⁹ See, also, examples of foreign correspondents who report facing visa revocation for creating "biased negative perception" of India: Committee to Protect Journalists (Feb. 16, 2025), "French journalist Vanessa Dougnac leaves India after journalism permit revoked," available [here](#).

⁵⁰ DoD Directive 5122.05, para. 6.1; U.S. Field Manual 3-61, p. 1-9.

⁵¹ For example, this is evidenced by comparing the rights-respecting approach adopted by Ukraine versus the rights-infringing approach taken by Russia when regulating journalist access to the front lines. See, parts II.c and III.18.

⁵² Council of Europe Journalism Standards, p. 2 (emphasis added).

⁵³ U.S. Central Command (Feb. 2003), Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding News Media During Possible Future Operations (CENTCOM / OASD(PA)) ("**CENTCOM Ground Rules**"), § 2.A, available [here](#); NATO ACO/ACT Public Affairs Handbook (May 2020) ("**NATO Handbook**"), Chapter 4, § 2(e)–(f), p. 67, available [here](#); see, *similarly*, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Order No. 73 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (March 3, 2022) ("**Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73**"), Annex 1, § 1 and 2, requiring commanders to assign public affairs officers "for organizing the work of accredited media representatives" and to "be polite to the media representatives and assist them in carrying out their duties in every possible way."

*to pursue storylines as required.*⁵⁴ The U.K. MOD operates tiered risk levels, with requirements for training and fitness tied to the degree of access.⁵⁵ Similarly, the Ukrainian Armed Forces currently operate a three-zone model: GREEN zones allow independent reporting; YELLOW zones require escorts or approved routes; and RED zones are generally restricted but may permit access for compelling public interest reporting, such as documenting war crimes, with advance permission and material review.⁵⁶

- c. *Contextual escort rules that facilitate access:* Public affairs officers should act as facilitators, not censors—U.S. and NATO guidance provides that escorts intervene only for operational security or ground rules violations.⁵⁷ Ukraine calibrates escort rules by risk: no escorts in GREEN zones; escorts in YELLOW except in public areas, and the option for unescorted movement along approved routes.⁵⁸ Properly applied, escorts support safety and logistics while preserving independent reporting.
- d. *Clear ground rules with defined consequences:* Embedding systems should set transparent ground rules in advance, with defined criteria and consequences for violations. Journalists typically sign agreements before entering operational environments establishing that militaries are not legally responsible for their risk, and covering interview requests, safety rules for media protection, and operational security limits.⁵⁹ U.S., U.K., and NATO guidance stress that these rules must never suppress reporting that is merely embarrassing or politically inconvenient.⁶⁰ Ukraine similarly requires commanders to define media zones with clear criteria and ensure journalists are briefed.⁶¹ NATO also integrates rule-setting into the registration process, with agreements exchanged for access and logistical support.⁶²

⁵⁴ U.K. Ministry of Defence Green Book: MOD Working Arrangements with the Media for Use Throughout the Full Spectrum of Conflict, Joint Service Publication 580 v.8 (Jan. 31, 2013) (“**U.K. MOD Green Book**”), para. 9, available [here](#) (emphasis added). Note the U.K. MOD Green Book was welcomed by the International News Safety Institute as best practice for militaries in ensuring journalist safety and the right of correspondents to move freely in the battle space (see “Killing the Messenger: Report of the Global Inquiry by the International News Safety Institute into the Protection of Journalists,” March 2007, p. 11).

⁵⁵ U.K. MOD Green Book, paras. 77 and 79.

⁵⁶ Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73, Annex I, § 1 (establishing three-zone framework and permitting RED zone access “for the purpose of objectively informing the public and the world community about war crimes committed by the Russian Federation”).

⁵⁷ U.S. Field Manual 3-61, p. 6-3, para. 6-13; NATO Handbook, Ch. 4, § 11.

⁵⁸ Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73, Annex 1, § 1.

⁵⁹ CENTCOM Ground Rules, § 4. See, also, U.K. MOD Green Book, paras. 43 – 73, setting out the U.K. Ministry of Defence’s policy on restrictions on reporting.

⁶⁰ CENTCOM Ground Rules, § 4; U.S. Field Manual 3-61, p. 6-6, para. 6-35. See, also, U.K. MOD Green Book, para. 46 (“The purpose of security checking material is to ensure that no information is inadvertently made public which might be of benefit to an enemy, or would endanger an operation, or the lives of British or allied Service personnel or civilians. It is not to constrain journalistic freedom of expression.”)

⁶¹ Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73, Annex 1, § 1–2 (establishing three-zone framework: defining RED zone as including “control points of troops...areas of concentration of general military reserves...air defense forces...missile forces...Special Operations Forces,” YELLOW zone as “permanent bases...areas of concentration of military units in defense areas,” and GREEN zone as “all other objects.”)

⁶² NATO Handbook, Ch. 4, § 10(b)(v)(2) and Annex 4-R on Ground Rules for Embedded Media on NATO Operations (p. 108-113).

- e. *Accreditation, registration, or credentialing as management tools, not exclusionary mechanisms*: Accreditation, registration, or credentialing requirements should facilitate access, not restrict it.⁶³ Accreditation should not distinguish between local and international journalists.⁶⁴ Under international law, accreditation schemes “shall be applied in a manner that is non-discriminatory and compatible with Article 19 and other provisions of the Covenant based on objective criteria.”⁶⁵ The “relevant criteria shall be specific, fair and reasonable, and their application shall be transparent.”⁶⁶ Furthermore, governments cannot discriminate and deny such accreditations to journalists for their criticism of public figures.⁶⁷ In complying with international law, the U.K. MOD requires accreditation for operational media assignments—yet it emphasizes the “importance of accrediting a broad range of media reflecting a variety of opinions” and it aims to “ensur[e] fair and balanced representation from each category of media.”⁶⁸ Ukrainian procedures similarly require journalists to undergo accreditation but treat this as a prerequisite for the military to facilitate access in combat areas.⁶⁹

IV. Israel’s current restrictions are unnecessary and disproportionate to protect national security and operational security.

19. While security concerns can justify certain limits on reporting, international standards and UN resolutions stress that these measures must not “arbitrarily or unduly hinder the work and safety of journalists.”⁷⁰ Courts and experts warn that concepts like national security must not be defined too broadly,⁷¹ must have a clear intent requirement,⁷² and must show a close causal link between the expression and risk of harm.⁷³ Israel’s continued prohibition on independent access and failure to establish zoning or other tailored mechanisms during the period of ceasefire in 2024, demonstrate the restrictions are arbitrary and overbroad, and are inconsistent with international standards.

20. International law does allow states to protect sensitive information (e.g., numbers of military personnel, types of on-hand equipment, unit locations, and plans for future operations),⁷⁴ but

⁶³ See, also, Committee of Ministers Recommendation, Principle 11: “Systems for the accreditation of journalists should be introduced *only to the extent necessary* in particular situations. When accreditation systems are in place, accreditation should normally be granted,” (emphasis added).

⁶⁴ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Nov. 1997), Provisional Guidelines for Public Information Components in United Nations Peacekeeping and Other Field Missions, Ch. 6, p. 41, available [here](#).

⁶⁵ *Parfeneka v. Belarus* (CCPR/C/134/2737/2016), para. 7.4, available [here](#).

⁶⁶ *Id.*

⁶⁷ *Djakupova and Idinov v. Kyrgyzstan* (CCPR/C/143/D/3195/2018) para. 7.5. (“[I]n circumstances of public debate concerning public figures in the political domain and public institutions, the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high. Moreover, all public figures, including those exercising the highest political authority, such as Heads of State, are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition”).

⁶⁸ U.K. MOD Green Book, para. 16.

⁶⁹ Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73, Annex 3: requiring accreditation process for media representatives.

⁷⁰ UN General Assembly Resolution (Dec. 16, 2021), The Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, A/RES/76/173, para. 14, available [here](#).

⁷¹ UNESCO (2015), Freedom of Expression and Public Order Training Manual, p. 24, available [here](#).

⁷² *Id.*, p. 43.

⁷³ *Id.*

⁷⁴ JOINT PUBLICATION 3-61, Public Affairs, C-3 (Nov. 17, 2015) (“In more general terms, information in the following categories should not be revealed because of potential jeopardy to future operations, the (continued...)”).

such measures should not be used as a pretext for invasive or arbitrary restrictions on press freedom or operate as a form of censorship.⁷⁵

21. Militaries adopt rules and strategies to protect both operational security and journalists while still permitting meaningful reporting from the field. The following practices are examples of security measures that balance safeguarding military operations while ensuring freedom of speech and expression.

- a. *Accreditation as a means of protecting operational security*: Accreditation systems establish clear procedures and accountability for journalists to report responsibly from conflict zones, including by respecting operational security. For instance, NATO's registration process serves multiple purposes: identifying which media have requested military assistance, facilitating logistical support and transportation, and establishing that journalists have formally agreed to ground rules.⁷⁶ And, the U.S. Army Field Manual provides a specific credentialing system in order to safely grant journalists more access to otherwise restricted areas.⁷⁷
- b. *Interview access under "security at the source" principles*: Democratic militaries generally permit interviews, relying on training military personnel rather than prohibiting interaction. The U.S. military follows a "security at the source" policy, training personnel not to disclose sensitive information rather than restricting interviews.⁷⁸ The U.K. MOD allows interviews but issues extra guidance for interviewees "prone to capture," such as Special Forces, Reconnaissance teams, or local interpreters.⁷⁹ NATO stresses transparency, stating "off-the-record interactions should be the exception, not the norm."⁸⁰ Ukraine requires commander approval but does not ban interviews or require escorts to be present during them.⁸¹
- c. *Specific content categories rather than subject-matter bans*: Ground rules can distinguish which information should be released rather than wholesale banning disclosure. U.S. CENTCOM rules, which became a model for embed programs, allowed release of certain predefined information⁸² but prohibited the disclosure of exact troop numbers below certain unit levels, future operation plans, intelligence collection methods, rules of engagement, and precise weapons positions during ongoing

risk to human life, possible violation of HN and/or allied sensitivities, or the possible disclosure of intelligence methods and sources. ... (1) For US (or allied) units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies available for support of combat units. General terms should be used to describe units, equipment, and/or supplies. (2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations. (3) Information and VI [visual information] that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments.").

⁷⁵ Council of Europe (Mar. 7, 2022), Journalism in situations of conflict and aggression. Principles extracted from the relevant Council of Europe and other international standards ("**Council of Europe Journalism Standards**"), p. 1-2.

⁷⁶ NATO Handbook, Ch. 4, § 10(b)(ii).

⁷⁷ U.S. Field Manual 3-61, p. 6-5, para. 6-25.

⁷⁸ CENTCOM Ground Rules, § 4.A; U.S. Field Manual 3-61, p. 1-9, para. 1-50.

⁷⁹ U.K. MOD Green Book, para. 68.

⁸⁰ NATO Handbook, Ch. 4, § 2(f), § 1(d).

⁸¹ Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73, Annex 1, § 3 (requiring officials to "give interviews (comments) only with the permission of the relevant heads, commanders (chiefs)").

⁸² CENTCOM Ground Rules, § 4.F.1–4.F.14.

operations.⁸³ This approach recognizes that security concerns relate to tactical details, not editorial judgments about how military actions are portrayed. NATO reinforces this principle, instructing public affairs officers not to pressure journalists over editorial choices.⁸⁴ The U.K. MOD's policy is to "establish a relationship with the media based on openness and co-operation, leading to understanding of what is and what is not genuinely operationally sensitive."⁸⁵

- d. *Limited security review focused on operational protection*: Where permitted, review should be confined to genuine security concerns, not editorial control. Ukrainian procedures allow for review of photos or video, on request, to remove material "not subject to disclosure," with additional checks only in RED zone war-crimes documentation.⁸⁶ U.K. MOD policy requires staff to explain refusals to disclose or publication delays and to consult with the media disagree with such assessments.⁸⁷ NATO doctrine embargoes be used sparingly and "kept to the minimum necessary for [operational security],"⁸⁸ while U.K. MOD states that embargoes will not be applied "unnecessarily or for other than operational reasons."⁸⁹

22. As well as diverging from the practices of peer nations, Israel's restrictions are applied inconsistently. By contrast to the severe access and reporting restrictions placed on foreign journalists, the IDF does not enforce any restrictions or requirements on local journalists operating in Gaza. This raises the question of whether the restrictions placed on other journalists are necessary or proportionate to protect operational security. Further, this inconsistent position is an indication that Israel is not complying with its obligations to protect the right to freedom of expression of journalists and the public, nor the safety of local Palestinian journalists.

V. Israel's unnecessarily excessive protection of journalists serves as a form of censorship and violates journalists' freedom of expression.

- a. The risk of harm to journalists is not a valid ground under international law to justify Israel's restrictions on journalists' right to freedom of expression.

23. Under international law, freedom of expression may be restricted by states only on limited, prescribed grounds and subject to a strict test of necessity and proportionality—as set out in

⁸³ CENTCOM Ground Rules, § 4.G.1–4.G.19: "the following categories of information are not releasable since their publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives." See, also, U.S. Army Regulation 360-1 (Oct. 8, 2020), p. 27-28, available [here](#); and U.K. MOD Green Book, para. 43.

⁸⁴ NATO Handbook, Ch. 4, § 2(l).

⁸⁵ U.K. MOD Green Book, para. 47.

⁸⁶ Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73, Annex 1, § 1 and Annex 4: RULES of the work of a mass media representative in the area of hostilities, § 3-4.

⁸⁷ U.K. MOD Green Book, paras. 48-49.

⁸⁸ NATO Handbook, § 9(a)–(b).

⁸⁹ U.K. MOD Green Book, para. 52.

Article 19(3)⁹⁰ and Article 4 of the ICCPR.⁹¹ Concern for the safety of journalists cannot justify Israel's impingement on the right to freedom of expression—it is not recognized as a basis under either Article 19(3) or Article 4 to derogate from the right and would not satisfy a test of necessity and proportionality. Indeed, “when a State party imposes restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself.”⁹²

24. Furthermore, Israel's reliance on journalist safety as a purported justification to restrict freedom of expression must be rejected by this Court because: (i) journalists are both expert at, and responsible for, identifying, managing, and accepting the risks of reporting on the front lines, and (ii) Israel is subject to obligations under international law for the protection of journalists—with which it is not complying with respect to journalists reporting from Gaza—calling into question the validity of this justification.
25. There are inherent risks in reporting on any conflict. However, war correspondents have navigated these risks throughout the last century. For instance, during World War II, journalists traveled to provide eyewitness reports on Germany's firebombing of London, the Allied campaigns in North Africa, the D-Day landings at Normandy, and the liberation of Holocaust survivors from Nazi concentration camps.⁹³ 238 war correspondents from 24 countries covered the Korean War on the Korean Peninsula,⁹⁴ while at least 600 journalists from across the globe reported—with independent, unrestricted access—on the Vietnam War.⁹⁵ The fact that Israel claims the situation in Gaza is different is inconsistent with reality and fails to recognize the decades of experience of war correspondents.
26. Foreign journalists and media organizations are aware of the risks of accessing Gaza and many have already been forced to navigate the dangers presented to their staff during this war. International outlets have had their offices in Gaza destroyed,⁹⁶ and their staff killed. Israel has not protected local Palestinian journalists, including those working with, or directly for, international outlets. More journalists have been killed in this war than in the U.S. Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the wars in Yugoslavia, and the Afghanistan War combined.⁹⁷ Further, Israel requires journalists participating in escorted trips to sign a waiver confirming that they journalists “have been forewarned and [are] aware

⁹⁰ See ICCPR, Art. 19(3)(b) providing that freedom of expression may be subject to certain restrictions “for the protection of national security or public order,” but only as “provided by law” and “as necessary.” See *also* General Comment No. 34, para. 22.

⁹¹ ICCPR, Art. 4(1) (States may derogate from their obligations “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”). Israel has not complied, in any event, with the communication procedure under Article 4(3) required for a State to avail itself of the right of derogation.

⁹² General Comment No. 34, para. 21.

⁹³ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “American Foreign and War Correspondents,” available [here](#).

⁹⁴ The Donga-A Ilbo (May 16, 2020), “238 foreign reporters were dispatched during Korean War,” available [here](#).

⁹⁵ Ronald Spector, “The Vietnam War and the media,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, available [here](#).

⁹⁶ See, e.g., CPJ (Nov. 3, 2023), “CPJ condemns strike on AFP bureau in Gaza,” available [here](#), noting the strike on a building housing the Gaza City bureau of Agence France-Presse.

⁹⁷ Nick Turse (Apr. 1, 2025), “New Graveyards: How Dangers to War Reporters Endanger the World” (“**Turse, “New Graveyards”**”), Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs, p. 2, available [here](#).

that in the area of the Gaza Strip there are ongoing combat activities, as well as security and safety risks for everyone present at any moment, which might cause me bodily harm.”⁹⁸

27. Despite these risks to journalist safety, international journalists continue to call for international press access into Gaza.⁹⁹ They do so because, “[w]hen journalists [on the ground] are killed in such unprecedented numbers and independent international media is barred from entering, the world loses its ability to see clearly, to understand fully, and to respond effectively to what is happening.”¹⁰⁰
- b. Instead of disproportionately restricting journalists’ behavior, Israel should change its current practices to align with the standards set by international law.
28. While militaries can and should adopt necessary and proportionate policies and procedures for managing and facilitating press access to conflict zones, the current restrictions on access to the war in Gaza are disproportionate to the risks to journalists’ safety, and Israel should ensure that its military operations align with international law and practice.
29. Journalists are treated as civilians under international law. Journalists therefore receive all the protections that civilians receive under international law. This means that attacks intentionally targeting “[t]he media, its personnel and its equipment” are illegal.¹⁰¹ Further, international law prohibits indiscriminate “attack[s] which may be expected to cause incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”¹⁰² As of 26 March 2025, CPJ had verified that at least 165 journalists and media workers had been killed in Gaza (an average of 6 journalists per month), while other organizations reported higher figures of 13 journalists killed per month on average during that period.¹⁰³ As of September 2025, CPJ had verified up to 237 journalists and media workers had been killed.¹⁰⁴ By comparison, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 up to March 2025, 19 reporters were killed in Ukraine,¹⁰⁵ and throughout the U.S. invasion of Iraq, 13 reporters were killed per year.¹⁰⁶
30. Security Council Resolution 2222—which Israel assisted in drafting—affirms the importance of conforming to international law standards in order to protect journalists.¹⁰⁷ That resolution specifically identified that “there are existing prohibitions under international humanitarian law against attacks intentionally directed against civilians,”¹⁰⁸ and that “media equipment

⁹⁸ IDF registration form, para. titled I hereby confirm and declare, subpart B and para. titled security and insurance and appendix B.

⁹⁹ *E.g.*, CPJ petition; Media Freedom Coalition Statement; Freedom to Report, “Gaza Mission,” available [here](#); Joint statement on protection of journalists (Sep. 24, 2025), available [here](#).

¹⁰⁰ CPJ petition; see, also Richard Engel (Feb. 22, 2023), “How to Report in a War Zone,” NBCU Academy, available [here](#).

¹⁰¹ United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (A/HRC/11/4), para. 49, available [here](#).

¹⁰² Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention (Jan. 23, 1979), available [here](#).

¹⁰³ Turse, “News Graveyards,” p. 6.

¹⁰⁴ See CPJ’s figures to-date on war-related killings of journalists and media workers in Gaza, Yemen, Lebanon, Iran, and Israel, available [here](#).

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*, p. 2, fn. 3.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution (May 27, 2015), S/RES/2222, para. 3, available [here](#).

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*

and installations constitute civilian objects, and in this respect shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals, unless they are military objectives.”¹⁰⁹

31. Of note, Israel—as an author and signatory to this Resolution—has also called for states to create “a safe and enabling environment for journalists. . . to perform their work *independently and without undue interference* in situations of armed conflict.”¹¹⁰ Israel has also “reaffirm[ed] that parties to an armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of affected civilians, including those who *exercise their right to freedom of expression* by seeking, receiving and disseminating information.”¹¹¹ This language makes clear that states should take action to protect journalists to further their abilities to collect information independently, not the reverse—restricting journalists’ abilities to collect information independently to further their safety. It is thus incumbent on states to evaluate their own war tactics and ensure that these tactics align with protecting journalists’ right to collect information independently as much as is feasible.
32. Israel’s current escorted trips—which are not considered a substitute for independent access—do not meet the necessity and proportionality standards set in the ICCPR. This is made evident by comparing Israel’s current practices to those of peer nations.
33. Peer nations have imposed lesser requirements in the name of journalist safety. For instance, peer nations have reasonably required as part of the accreditation process that members of the media must wear personal protective equipment, bring medical equipment, and train to use that equipment in order to be accredited.¹¹² News organizations recognize the wisdom of this restraint and have themselves adopted extensive measures to identify, evaluate, and mitigate safety risks. They provide to their war correspondents “training, protective equipment, post-traumatic counseling and insurance” in recognition of these risks.¹¹³ Such outlets regularly employ security personnel to protect their staff and assets,¹¹⁴ and provide life insurance.¹¹⁵ These measures represent the internationally accepted principles concerning the protection of journalists in situations of conflict,¹¹⁶ and have been adopted as best practice by respected stakeholders.¹¹⁷

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*, para. 10.

¹¹⁰ *Id.*, para. 14.

¹¹¹ *Id.*

¹¹² Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73, p. 12, para. 3; NATO Handbook, p. 105, para. 14(a); U.K. MOD Green Book, para. 14. The British Ministry of Defense may also issue journalists accredited as war correspondents with “appropriate clothing and equipment for the operational environment” and “recommended packing lists.” See U.K. MOD Green Book, p. B-1.

¹¹³ Greg McLaughlin (2016), Chapter 2: The War Correspondent: Risk, Motivation and Tradition, *The War Correspondent*, p. 17, available [here](#).

¹¹⁴ British Red Cross (July 2017), Field Guide: Media professionals and armed conflict (“**British Red Cross, Field Guide**”), p. 51.

¹¹⁵ *E.g.*, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73, p. 13-14; International News Safety Institute, “Safety Code,” para. 8, available [here](#).

¹¹⁶ See Committee of Minister Recommendation, Principle 1 (*Prevention*), Principle 2 (*Insurance*), and Principle 3 (*Hotlines*).

¹¹⁷ See, for example, International News Safety Institute, “Safety Code”; British Red Cross, Field Guide; International Federation of Journalists (Apr. 13, 2003), International Code of Practice for the Safe Conduct of Journalism, available [here](#); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Safety Guide for Journalists,” available [here](#); UNESCO, Public Order Training Manual, p. 73.

34. In certain circumstances, governments have agreed to provide protection, emergency medical assistance, and evacuation, if possible, to protect members of the media.¹¹⁸ In order to prevent accidental attacks on journalists, governments have also reasonably required war correspondents to communicate the period and route of their travels.¹¹⁹ In prior wars in Gaza, the IDF cooperated with international media to accept such notifications, and ensure the safety of the press when engaging in military action. In the present war, Israel has already implemented such deconfliction reporting systems for humanitarian workers inside Gaza. The IDF has established an entire Humanitarian Coordination and Deconfliction Cell specifically to coordinate actions taken by humanitarian workers and Israeli forces to “ensur[e] the security of aid workers.”¹²⁰ This system could equally be expanded to facilitate access by journalists, and to secure the protection of local journalists reporting from Gaza. The IDF’s compliance with its Standard Operating Procedures would also reduce the risk to journalists traveling in Gaza.¹²¹
35. Peer nations that provide military escorts to journalists have done so through less restrictive embed programs. Such peer nations have allowed much higher numbers of embedded journalists to regularly visit the front lines.¹²² For instance, at the start of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, more than 700 journalists embedded with American forces and another 100 journalists embedded with British forces.¹²³ This is in addition to the estimated 2,500 journalists that covered the invasion *independently*.¹²⁴ Peer nations have also allowed these embedded journalists to remain on the frontlines for far longer periods of time—typically several months—than Israel’s current escorted trips of several hours.¹²⁵

¹¹⁸ NATO Handbook, p. 105, para. 14(b); see, also, United Nations Department of Peace (Dec. 16, 2024), Policy on Information Integrity in Peacekeeping Settings, para. 28.4.

¹¹⁹ Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Order No. 73, p. 12, para. 3.

¹²⁰ The Times of Israel (Apr. 7, 2024), “Gallant: Gaza aid is important while we work to destroy Hamas and release the hostages,” available [here](#).

¹²¹ The IDF has acknowledged that certain attacks on humanitarian workers in Gaza were the result of military officials failing to follow the IDF’s Standard Operating Procedures. See, IDF (Apr. 5, 2024), “Conclusion of the Investigation Into the Incident in Which 7 WCK Employees Were Killed During a Humanitarian Operation in Gaza,” available [here](#).

¹²² In addition to the numbers we cite in the body of this brief, we also note that over 90 journalists embedded with U.S., British, and Iraqi troops and traveled with them to the frontlines in Fallujah during Operation Phantom Fury, widely considered the deadliest and most intense battle of the Iraq War. See John Hollis (Nov. 7, 2014), “Fallujah Recalled 10 Years Later,” U.S. Marines, available [here](#). During the Afghanistan war, journalists regularly embedded with U.S. troops in the Korengal Valley, considered one of the U.S. military’s most dangerous postings at the time. See, Genevieve Belmaker, “‘Restrepo’ A Must See Film on the War in Afghanistan” (“**Belmaker, Restrepo article**”), Foreign Policy Association, available [here](#); Aryn Baker (Apr. 11, 2009), “Ambushed in Afghanistan: A Reporter Under Fire,” TIME, available [here](#).

¹²³ Naina Bajekal (Apr. 2, 2018), “Embedding in Iraq,” Magnum, available [here](#).

¹²⁴ Catriona Pennell, Chris Kempshall and Gabriel Kupper (2025), “The Iraq War at 20: Anniversary Journalism, British Cultural Memory, and the Politics of Closure,” Journal of War & Culture Studies, 1-21, p. 2, available [here](#).

¹²⁵ For instance, the U.S. military allowed journalists to embed with one U.S. platoon of soldiers for their entire 15-month deployment in Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley. Belmaker, Restrepo article. The U.S. military also allowed a journalist to embed with American soldiers in Korengal Valley for two months in 2007. PBS Frontline (Nov. 24, 2009), “Conflict Zones: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq,” available [here](#). The U.S. military allowed a journalist to embed for 8 months during the Battle of Fallujah. Dexter Filkins (Nov. 11, 2004), “Embedded in Fallujah,” NPR, available [here](#).

VI. Conclusion

36. Israel's restrictions on journalists' access into Gaza are unnecessary and disproportionate to Israel's stated aims of preserving national security and journalist safety. They are more intrusive than restrictions adopted by peer nations in other conflict zones. Further, these restrictions are not applied to local journalists reporting from Gaza, which undermines IDF's claim that restrictions are necessary for the purpose of protecting national security and military operations.
37. Israel's blanket prohibition on independent access rather than accepted practice of adopting zoning or other tailored measures designed to enable press freedom in times of war or conflict, is akin to measures adopted by autocratic or repressive regimes. These restrictions violate Israel's commitments to protect journalists' freedom of expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR.
38. In light of all of the above, this Honorable Court is requested to allow CPJ to join as a "friend of the court" supporting the petition in its fundamental aspects and to allow CPJ to present its arguments and add supporting evidence (including comparative law) during the proceedings.
39. It is right and just to grant the request.

Today, 5 October, 2025

Gilad Barnea, Attorney

Attorney for the petitioner

ORDER
OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

03.03.2022

Kyiv

No.73

On the organization of interaction between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defense forces and representatives of the mass media during the legal regime of martial law (With changes made in accordance with the order №196 dated 12.07.2022; the order №266 dated 03.10.2022; the order №49 dated 27.02.2023; the order №51 dated 03.02.2024, the order №31 dated 17.01.2025)

In accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated February 24, 2022 No. 64/2022 "On the introduction of martial law in Ukraine", approved by the Law of Ukraine of February 24, 2022 No. 2102-IX, laws of Ukraine "On the legal regime of martial law", "On information", "On media", to provide objective coverage of events, to inform the public and the world community about military actions in the course of the large-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, as well as to prevent leakage of restricted information, and information, the disclosure of which may lead to the enemy's awareness of the actions of the Armed Forces Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defense forces, to negatively affect the performance of the assigned tasks during the legal regime of martial law, and for the proper organization of work with representatives of the media (including foreign ones) **I order:**

1. To approve the Algorithm of working with accredited representatives of the media during the legal regime of martial law (Annex 1), the List of information, the disclosure of which may lead to the enemy's awareness of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defense forces, and negatively affect the performance of the assigned tasks during the legal regime of martial law (Annex 2), the Procedure of accreditation of media representatives during the legal regime of martial law (Annex 3), the Rules of work of a media representative around the area of hostilities (Annex 4), the Accreditation form (Annex 5), the Press card's form (Annex 6), the Procedure of processing requests and admission of media representatives to the facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the legal regime of martial law (Annex 7), which are attached.

2. To commanders of branches, operational-strategic (operational-tactical) groups of troops, separate types of troops (forces), heads of military management

bodies that are not related to branches, and heads of other components of the defense forces during the of legal regime of martial law:

- to ensure compliance of the subordinate personnel with the Algorithm of working with accredited representatives of the media during the legal regime of martial law;

- to inform the subordinate personnel about the List of information, the disclosure of which may lead to the enemy's awareness of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defense forces, and negatively affect the performance of the assigned tasks during the legal regime of martial law;

- to prevent media representatives (including accredited ones) from entering military and other facilities, the disclosure of which endangers the performance of assigned (special) tasks;

- to ensure the work of accredited representatives of the media (including foreign ones) who have received a press card of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the areas of hostilities;

- to hold accountable responsible (official) persons for violating the requirements established in this order in accordance with the law;

- not to allow the use of other, additional accreditations for media representatives, except those specified in this order.

3. Officials (service workers) during communication with media representatives to prevent the dissemination of summary (information) with limited access, falling under the Code of information constituting a state secret, approved by the order of the Central Office of the Security Service of Ukraine of December 23, 2020 No. 383, registered with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on January 14, 2021 under No. 52/35674 (with amendments), the List of information of the Armed Forces of Ukraine constituting proprietary information, approved by the order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of January 30, 2023 No. 12, and the List of information, the disclosure of which may lead to the enemy's awareness of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defense forces, and negatively affect the performance of the assigned tasks during the legal regime of martial law.

4. The control over the implementation of the order is entrusted to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in accordance with the division of responsibilities.

5. Order loses its validity with the termination or cancellation of the state of martial law in Ukraine.

6. Order is to be brought to all personnel in the relevant part.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
General

Valerii ZALUZHNYI

Annex 1
to the order of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
dated 03.03.2022 No. 73

ALGORITHM
of working with accredited representatives of the media during the legal regime of
martial law

1. Corresponding heads, commanders (chiefs) of military organizational structures are obliged to:

- check the accreditation of media representatives;
- assign the public affairs officer (press officer) or another official for organizing the work of accredited media representatives at specified military facilities;
- assign and instruct officials (service workers) who will be interviewed (asked for comments) on the prevention of dissemination of information with limited access and the requirements of Ukrainian legislation in this area;
- identify places for a serviceman to give an interview (comments), take photos and videos of weapons and military equipment;
- organize the movement of media representatives to the designated place of photo and video shooting, taking into account the security requirements of the use of weapons (forces);
- ensure the immediate removal of a media representative from work at a military facility in case of information about his violation of the Rules of work of the media representative in the area of hostilities (Annex 4);
- interact with media representatives in compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law;
- determine the zones for the presence of media representatives within the area of responsibility. Commanders of operational-strategic military units establish the following zones: GREEN (accredited media representatives are allowed to work without a public affairs officer or other official designated by the commander), YELLOW (accredited media representatives are allowed to work only if they are accompanied by a public affairs officer or other official designated by the commander, except for the cases specified by this Annex), and RED (media representatives are prohibited from working, except for the cases specified by this Annex);
- as an exception, for the purpose of objectively informing the public and the world community about war crimes committed by the Russian Federation, at the request of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine or the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or the relevant commander (chief) of a group of troops may be allowed the work of accredited media representatives in the RED zone exclusively accompanied by designated officials. Permission is granted taking into account the possibility of providing support to relevant media representatives and compliance with security measures for the use of troops (forces);

while working in the RED zone, the media representatives undertake to provide the collected photo and video materials for verification regarding the presence of information with limited access, to consent on their distribution and publication with the official responsible for the security direction of the use of troops (forces) of the military unit (division), in the area of responsibility of which photo and video shooting was carried out;

the work of accredited media representatives in public places in the YELLOW zone, to which the civilian population has free access, is allowed without the accompaniment of a public affairs officer or other official designated by the commander, within the limits of the route agreed by the commander (chief) of the troop group based on the application of an accredited media representative. Such an application of an accredited media representative is reviewed within three days from the moment of its submission;

when determining zones for the presence of media representatives, to be guided by the following criteria:

RED zone — control points of troops (forces) of all types and units of troops from battalion (division) and above; areas of concentration (maintenance) of general military reserves; areas (positions) of deployment of air defense forces and means; areas (positions) of concentration and deployment of units of missile forces; base (operational) military airfields; base points of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; areas of concentration (performance of combat tasks) of units of the Special Operations Forces and Intelligence Forces; arsenals, bases, warehouses for storing weapons and military equipment, logistics (missiles, ammunition, fuel and lubricants), international logistical support; stations for loading and unloading weapons and military equipment (during their use by the troops);

YELLOW zone – permanent bases, areas of regaining of combat capability of military units (divisions) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; areas of concentration (performance of combat tasks) of military units in defense areas, platoon and company strongholds; areas of concentration (performance of combat tasks) of general military units and artillery units (especially those, armed with the latest models of military equipment, provided by partner states as part of international material assistance); industrial enterprises of all forms of ownership which produce products for military purposes; training centers for troops (forces); the places designated by the combat order for the implementation of measures to transfer enemy prisoners of war to the aggressor state and release defenders of Ukraine who are in captivity of the aggressor state;

GREEN zone – all other objects in the area of responsibility of the operational groups of troops, which are not included in the RED and YELLOW zones.

2. The public affairs officer (press officer) or another designated person shall: accompany media representatives directly at military facilities;

be polite to the media representatives and assist them in carrying out their duties in every possible way;

before starting the work process, inform media representatives about the possibility of reviewing the photo and video materials taken by them for checking out the presence of information with limited access, information that constitutes a state

secret, the disclosure of which may harm national security (national interests) or other state interests, create threat to the life and health of military personnel and media representatives directly. If such information is discovered, it must be deleted;

based on the results of the work, immediately report to the superior, commander (chief) on the results of the work of media representatives, and, if there are grounds, warn him of the possibility of distorted and negative information in the media;

immediately report to the superior, commander (chief) on the facts of violation by the media of the Rules of the work of a mass media representative in the combat zones.

3. Officials (service workers) who perform combat (special) tasks are obliged to:
give interviews (comments) only with the permission of the relevant heads, commanders (chiefs);

prevent distribution of information with limited access, as well as information specified in Annex 2 to this order;

not to allow (remove from work) media representatives who violate the requirements of this order from working at the military facility;

if necessary, provide audio-visual materials to media representatives exclusively through the public affairs bodies (press services) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the prior approval of the relevant security unit for the use of troops (forces) and the commander (chief).

Head of the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Colonel

Bohdan SENYK

Annex 2
to the order of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
dated 03.03.2022 No. 73

LIST

of information, the disclosure of which may lead to the enemy's awareness of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defense forces, negatively affecting the performance of tasks assigned during the legal regime of martial law

1. Actual names of military units (divisions) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defense forces of Ukraine, personal data of servicemen performing combat (special) tasks and geographical coordinates of their locations and concentration.
2. Combat and numerical composition of military units (divisions) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, available quantity, type of combat (special) equipment and its technical composition.
3. Places (districts) of concentration, deployment and restoration of combat capability of military units (divisions) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with reference to settlements (geographical objects).
4. Data on current and future plans (designs) of commanders (chiefs), combat (special) tasks and the progress of their performance by military units (divisions) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
5. Usage effectiveness (experience) of means of destruction, test (special) equipment, as well as methods of conducting combat (tactical) actions by military units (divisions) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the Defense Forces of Ukraine.
6. Locations (deployment points) of fire start positions of air defense units and the results of their combat missions.
7. Results of operations and conduct of combat actions by military units (divisions) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defense forces of Ukraine if such information has not been made public by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or other components of the defense forces of Ukraine.
8. Results of operations carried out by units of the Special Operations Forces and intelligence units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine if such information has not been made public by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and (or) other management bodies of the Defense Forces of Ukraine.

9. Information on losses of combat (special) equipment (tanks, self-propelled artillery installations, airplanes, helicopters, anti-aircraft missile systems, ships (boats), especially of foreign production) and personnel if such information has not been made public by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and (or) other management bodies of the defense forces of Ukraine.

10. Results of enemy missile and air strikes on military objects (targets), critical infrastructure objects, if such information has not been made public by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other management bodies of the defense forces of Ukraine and (or) state authorities of Ukraine.

11. Information on movement (forward motion) of military (special) equipment, routes of their movement, their types and quantity.

12. Conduct of security measures for the use of troops (forces) (information on measures to mislead, conceal the activities of troops (forces) and military facilities), forces and means that were involved in their implementation, as well as photo and video materials taken from the image of models and means of imitation used by military units (divisions) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defense forces of Ukraine.

13. Information on completed, current and planned informational and psychological operations (promotions, influence measures).

14. Information on servicemen of reconnaissance, missile, artillery units, radio-electronic warfare units, unmanned aerial vehicle units, flight and engineering-technical staff of airplanes and helicopters, as well as the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

15. Photo and video materials depicting mutual recognition signs, tail numbers and state license plates on combat (special) vehicles, means of targeting, combat control and intelligence, and structural features of combat (special) vehicles.

16. Photos and video materials inside tanks, self-propelled artillery installations, anti-aircraft missile systems, armored combat vehicles and tactical aircraft, especially foreign-made ones.

17. Information on delivery terms, types, quantity, material and technical support, current and future places of concentration (storage) of weapons and military equipment, which are provided as part of material and technical assistance from partner countries, especially missiles, ammunition, means of air destruction, if such information has not been posted on the official pages (representatives) of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or by departments of partner countries.

18. Information on awareness of the enemy, tactics of his actions, places (areas) of concentration (location) of important military objects.

Head of the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Colonel

Bohdan SENYK

PROCEDURE
of accreditation of media representatives during the legal regime of martial law

1. This Procedure defines the mechanism for accreditation of media representatives during the legal regime of martial law in order to cover events objectively, ensure that the population and the international community are informed about the war crimes committed by the Russian Federation during its large-scale armed aggression against Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, as well as assist in ensuring the performance of professional tasks in the area of hostilities.

2. To pass the accreditation, media representatives are required to fill out the form (Annex 5) and send it to the email address. The following documents are attached to this form:

- a scanned copy of a passport (1-3 pages) or ID card;
- a scanned copy of a media representative's certificate (not mandatory for persons who provide informational support to the work of foreign journalists);
- a submission of a person in the media field with a request to grant accreditation;
- a high-resolution photo of the person.

A person who regularly distributes mass information under his editorial control through his own accounts on information sharing platforms and has voluntarily registered as an entity in the field of online media in accordance with the procedure provided by the Law of Ukraine "On media" instead of a scanned copy of a media representative's certificate provides a scanned copy of the corresponding confirming document issued by the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting.

3. Accreditation is granted for a period up to 12 months.

4. The Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine organizes accreditation. Within this process the department:

- verifies the person's affiliation to the entity in the media field;
- sends an application to the representative of the Security Service of Ukraine to obtain the corresponding conclusion;
- keeps records of issued press cards and information provided by media representatives for accreditation;
- makes decisions on granting (cancelling or suspension) accreditation to media representatives;
- informs media representatives about the results of accreditation;

provides access to the list of accredited media representatives upon request to representatives of the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the National Police of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the State Migration Service of Ukraine, the State Guard Department of Ukraine;

facilitates the organization of work for accredited media representatives.

5. In case of successful completion of accreditation, the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine produces and sends an electronic press card to the media representative's email address (Annex 6).

Press card is a personalized document that certifies the accreditation of media representatives and their rights to perform editorial tasks in the combat areas.

In case of inconsistency of the information provided, presence of grounds to consider the accreditation granted to a media representative inappropriate, accreditation cancellation cases in the past, including those issued on the recommendation of the Security Service of Ukraine, the applicant's accreditation is denied.

6. When applying for accreditation, the media representative personally gets acquainted with the Rules of the media representative's work in the area of hostilities (Annex 4 to the order), which are posted on the official website of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and agrees to abide by them.

Refusal to comply with these Rules or their violation, transfer of the press card to other persons are grounds for canceling the accreditation of the media representative or suspending its validity for the period of clarification of the circumstances of the violation.

7. A request to cancel the accreditation of a media representative is submitted by subordination to the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

8. The appeal of the decision on refusal (cancellation, suspension) of accreditation is carried out by sending an official letter from the head (editor) of the media to the address of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

9. The relevant units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, whose functions and tasks include monitoring and analyzing the informational space, shall provide the results of monitoring and analysis of materials by media representatives (Ukrainian and foreign) on the activities of the defense forces of Ukraine to the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for further generalization in the shortest possible time.

10. Ensuring the work of the hotline for checking the status of accreditation of media representatives is carried out by the relevant divisions of the National Police of Ukraine.

Head of the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Colonel

Bohdan SENYK

RULES of the work of a mass media representative in the area of hostilities

1. Rights of a media representative.

A representative of the mass media has the right to lawfully obtain, store, use, disseminate:

- general information about the preparation and use of defense forces;
- general information about the participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of defense forces in repelling and countering the large-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022;
- general information about the results of completed operations (actions) (only by agreement with the relevant commander (superior)), except for information that is not subject to disclosure.

2. Duties of a media representative.

3. A media representative is obliged to:

- present a press card at the request of representatives of the Armed Forces, other components of the defense forces;
- carry and show the identity documents of a media representative;
- move within the combat zones solely within the terms and along the route determined and agreed upon following the established procedure with the relevant heads, commanders (superiors), the head of the public affairs department (press service) of the military unit in the area of its responsibility;
- inform the head of the public affairs department (press service) about the period of the trip, the route to be taken, the purpose of the editorial assignment by email or telephone before moving to the area of combat operations;
- wear (put on) the press identification signs (markings) of media representatives (media vehicles) in a visible place throughout the entire period of stay in the area of combat operations, except for situations when it may pose a threat to the life and health of the media representatives;
- have personal protective equipment, including at least a protective helmet and a bullet-proof vest with the appropriate "PRESS" marking (except for situations described in the previous paragraph);
- have a medical kit (it must contain the first aid kit) and know how to use it;
- not to commit acts incompatible with the status of civilians, i.e., not to wear uniforms and insignia of the Armed Forces and other components of the defense forces, and not to handle weapons and ammunition;

hand over electronic and physical records of photographs and video footage, upon request, to a specified person upon completion of their work at military facilities to check if there is any information that is not subject to disclosure;

if there is any information that is not subject to disclosure, it must be deleted from the electronic storage device at the request of the representative of the public affairs service (press service).

4. Information that is not subject to disclosure by a media representative.

Information that may become known to a media representative while working in the areas of combat operations and is defined in the following documents:

the Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism”;

the Code of information constituting state secrets, as approved by order No. 383 of the Security Service of Ukraine of December 23, 2020, and registered at the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on January 14, 2021 under No. 52/35674 (as amended);

the List of information of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine containing proprietary information, approved by order of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine No. 605 of October 17, 2023;

the List of information of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, constituting proprietary information, approved by order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine No. 12 of January 30, 2023;

the List of information, the disclosure of which may lead to the enemy's awareness of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defense forces, negatively affecting the performance of assigned tasks during the legal regime of martial law (Annex 2 to this order).

5. Safety of a media representative and some other issues.

In case of a situation that may endanger the life and health of a media representative, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defense forces may provide protection, emergency medical assistance and evacuation to a medical facility if there is a real possibility.

In case of injury (trauma, illness, death) of a media representative, representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defense forces will provide the relevant information to the editorial office of such a media representative if there is a real possibility.

Ensuring the return of a media representative from the area of combat operations (including to the country he/she came from or is a citizen of) is the responsibility of the editorial office that sent him/her to perform editorial tasks.

The issue of life, health, and property insurance of a media representative is the sole responsibility of the editorial office whose tasks he/she performs.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defense forces, commanders of military units or their authorized representatives for working with the media are not responsible for the safety, life, and health, ensuring the return, as well as issues of life, health and property insurance of media representatives.

Head of the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Colonel

Bohdan SENYK





1. In case of violation of the conditions, disclosure of confidential information (operational security violation) or transfer of the card to other persons, you may be deprived of accreditation without the right to renew.

2. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are not responsible for your life and health while in the combat zone.

3. By filling up and sending this application form, you give the permission for the processing of your personal data.

Annex 6
to the order of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
dated 03.03.2022 No. 73

The press card`s form

<div>Збройні Сили України Armed Forces of Ukraine</div> <div>ПРЕСКАРТА / PRESS CARD</div> <div></div> <div>№ 19333 Дійсна до / Date of expiry 31.12.2024</div> <div>Назва медіа Name of the media</div> <div>Прізвище, ім'я, по батькові First name, last name</div> <div>Країна Country</div> <div><small>Folding line / Лінія згину / Folding line / Лінія згину / Folding line / Лінія згину</small></div> <div><p>1. Прескарта дає право виконувати професійні завдання в районах ведення бойових дій та у комендантську годину відповідно до Правил роботи представника медіа у районі ведення бойових дій (додаток 4).</p><p>2. У разі порушення умов журналістської діяльності, розголошення конфіденційної інформації чи передачі карти іншим особам, Вас може бути позбавлено акредитації без права відновлення.</p><p>3. Збройні Сили України не несуть відповідальності за Ваші життя та здоров'я під час перебування у районі ведення бойових дій.</p></div> <div><p>Наказ Головнокомандувача ЗС України №73 від 03.03.22 р.</p></div> <div><p>Order of The Commander-in-Chief of The Armed Forces of Ukraine #73</p></div>	<p>The front side of the press card</p> <p>The back side of the press card</p>
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Head of the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Colonel

Bohdan SENYK

PROCEDURE

of processing requests and admissions of media representatives to the facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the legal regime of martial law

1. This Procedure defines the order for organizing the processing of requests and the admission of journalists, mass media workers (hereinafter referred to as mass media representatives) to the facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for carrying out their professional activities.

2. Procedure for processing requests from media representatives.

2.1. In order to obtain permission to carry out professional journalistic and other information and communication activities during the legal regime of martial law, media representatives shall submit an official written request in printed or electronic form (by email, which indicated on the official information sources of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine) to the name of the relevant commander (chief) through the public relations unit (press service).

2.2. A request from the mass media can be submitted by:
an individual journalist, a citizen of Ukraine, who works full-time, out of the staff or under a contract in the mass media;
a foreign citizen who works as a journalist for a media outlet as a staff member, freelancer, or under contract;
a legal entity/head of a media outlet registered in Ukraine;
a legal entity/head of a foreign media outlet registered outside Ukraine, which has the appropriate accreditation in Ukraine.

Also, public affairs services may receive requests for documenting facts, shooting films, collecting information materials for books and carrying out other informational and communicative activities not related to mass media from organizations and individuals who carry out relevant activities on legal grounds. Such requests are processed similarly to media requests.

2.3. In the conditions of the legal regime of martial law, the request is sent no later than three working days before the planned events.

2.4. The media request states:
surname, first name and patronymic (if any) of the media representative and the number of the accreditation press card of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
full media name, location, phone number, email address;

the purpose of the planned activities;
the desired date and terms of the planned events;
if necessary – make and registration number of the vehicle;
the official (officials) with whom it is planned to conduct the interview (get comments), indicating whether prior consent for the interview (getting comments) has been obtained from the aforementioned official(s);
the topics and indicative questions for the interview (comment) of the official (officials);
an approximate list of samples of weapons and military equipment, buildings or individual premises where photo and video shooting is planned.

2.5. Requests for interviews and comments of officials are sent to the military units, institutions and military administration bodies of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through their public affairs unit (press service).

Upon receipt of the request, the public affairs service (press service) is obliged to inform the media representative who sent the request about the acceptance of the request for processing or its rejection in the way determined by him/her.

The military unit, institution or body of the military administration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine informs the applicant about the result of the consideration of the request no later than five working days from the date of receipt of the request.

2.6. Requests for the preparation of informational materials on the use of foreign military aid and samples of weapons and military equipment are sent to the command of the group of troops (forces) through the public affairs service (press service).

The decision to grant permission is taken by the commander of the group of troops (forces), considering operational security measures and recommendations of international military cooperation bodies regarding relevant agreements with the partner country that provided the relevant assistance and samples of weapons and military equipment.

Bodies of international military cooperation or other officials, in accordance with their competence, inform commanders (chiefs) and public affairs services (press services) about the list of samples of weapons and military equipment that are prohibited or allowed to be covered in the mass media.

2.7. Written requests that do not contain the information specified in clause 2.4 of this section will not be considered, and the public affairs units will notify the relevant media within one day of receiving the request in writing, by telephone or by email.

2.8. Upon receiving a request containing all the necessary information specified in section 2.4 of this chapter, the public affairs unit sends the request to the relevant

official authorized to make a decision on the conduct of the events as soon as possible, considering the operational situation.

Based on the results of the review of the request, the relevant official makes a decision, about which the public affairs unit informs the relevant mass media.

The organization of the work of media representatives at the facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine shall be guided by the requirements of the terms set in the Annex 1 of this order.

2.9. Permission to give interviews (comments) is provided by:

the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, deputies of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, heads of structural units of the Apparatus of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, commanders of types, separate branches of troops (forces) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, operational-strategic groups of troops, others directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief military administration bodies of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – to the deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, heads of structural units of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and commanders (chiefs) of military units (institutions) directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

commanders of types, separate branches of troops (forces) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – to subordinate commanders of operational, air-military commands, commanders of military units (institutions), heads of military schools;

commanders of operational-strategic troop groups – to subordinate commanders of operational-tactical troop groups and commanders (chiefs) of forces and means under his operational control;

commanders (chiefs) of military units (institutions) – to all subordinate personnel.

Permission to give interviews (comments) by military personnel who are in training or serving abroad is granted by the senior military representative (or senior group) in the host state after approval by the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

3. The procedure for granting access to representatives of the mass media to the facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

3.1. Organization of the process of admission of media representatives to the facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and interaction with them is carried out by their structural divisions, which, in accordance with the functions and assigned tasks, interact with the media.

3.2. Permission for the admission of media representatives to the facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is granted by:

- the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, deputies of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – to visit all facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

- the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and his deputies – to visit the structural divisions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military administration bodies, units, military units;

- the Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – to visit facilities in the places where the national contingent is based, as well as facilities in the places of execution of tasks by units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which are under the operational control of the Command of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

- commanders of types, separate branches of troops (forces), groups of troops (forces) – for visits to commands and subordinate organizational structures;

- commanders of military units – to visit structural divisions and subordinate organizational structures.

The permission for the admission of delegations to the places of training events for servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine abroad is granted by the host party.

3.3. The admission of mass media representatives to the facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is carried out by the heads (commanders, chiefs) of the relevant facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine based on a decision (order) issued by the relevant official of the highest military management body.

It is prohibited for a media representative to access the assigned mission area or the facility of the Armed Forces of Ukraine unaccompanied by an official designated for this purpose.

3.4. To obtain permission to visit the facility of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, media representatives submit an official written request to the relevant public affairs unit in printed or electronic form in accordance with Section 2 of this Procedure.

Head of the Department of Public Affairs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Colonel

Bohdan SENYK



Subject: Embedding journalists to operational activities

1. General:

As part of the advocacy effort in the war, we would like to embed reporters with IDF soldiers and commanders fighting in the field. The purpose of the embedding is to guide the media coverage from the military point of view and emphasize the activities of the IDF, in the closest way to reality.

2. Timing:

The embedding will begin several days after the start of the ground operation, when the relevant commanders in the field confirm that the forces have positioned themselves on a defense line and there is the ability to join them (Q+48 onwards).

The reasons why we do not find it appropriate to embed journalists during the first few days of ground operations are:

- A) Difficulties in contacting commanders at this stage of ground operations, which might lead to further objection later on.
- B) Main journalists would rather broadcast live at this stage and not be disconnected from what is happening.
- C) Lack of media control in regards to what is happening operationally.

3. Overview:

A) Exclusive: when a specific journalist is joining an operational activity in order to cover it in details. Usually it is agreed with the journalist and with the media outlet that he represents that in case of an occurrence of a significant event during the operation – they will be required to share the material with other outlets.

B) Pooling materials: Embedding one media outlet from each category will occur during a military operation, when at the end of such operational activity the outlet is required to share all of the materials in its possession with every additional media outlet requesting it. The pooling of materials is done when there is an operational activity generating high media interest, but the conditions on the ground do not



permit for a large number of journalists to join said operation. The decision regarding the choice of the journalist and outlet will be made internally between the outlets without the involvement of the IDF Press Office. The outlets will let the IDF press office know of their final decision, at which point the IDF press office will become involved.

4. Method:

- A) The IDF Spokesperson's Representative of the IDF Division in question will be responsible for passing on the number of potential embedded journalists and the names of IDF officials who will be interviewed for the following day by 13:00 the day before.
- B) The number of embedded journalists will be divided between Israeli and international media in accordance with the decision of the head of the situation room, or the head the IDF Spokesperson's unit.
- C) In line with the number of embedded journalists and in accordance with the International Spokesperson's recommendation it will be decided which outlets/journalists will be passed to the IDF Spokesperson representative at the southern command.

Publication:

- A. To be agreed by the IDF - an embargo on the broadcast of the article, including promotional materials.
- B. Operational security - permission will not be given to publish materials that have not been approved by the IDF's security of information office. Also, there is an obligation to comply with additional military requirements, including the blurring of maps, classified persons and secret operational orders.
- C. Censorship - the media commits to submitting all materials for military censorship examination and not to make any use of them before approval has been received.

Appendix A – Journalist

Letter of commitment for media outlets to enter the Gaza Strip territory

Inasmuch as the undersigned has asked to embed with IDF units on the ground in order to cover the operational activity taking place in the Gaza strip.

Inasmuch as the undersigned is entering the Gaza strip out of his good and free will and for the sake of media coverage in the name of _____ where the undersigned is employed.

Inasmuch as the undersigned has accepted the conditions mentioned in this document signed on the date of _____

I hereby confirm and declare:

- A. I am the undersigned _____ Passport no. _____, international media personnel working for the _____ organization, requesting the authorization by the Commander of the Southern Command, or his subordinates, to enter the Gaza Strip and the surrounding restricted combat zone, escorted by IDF soldiers, in order to fulfill my role as a journalist and in accordance with all the rules and guidelines included in this document in its entirety.
- B. I hereby declare by my signature that I have been forewarned and am aware that in the area of the Gaza Strip there are ongoing combat activities, as well as security and safety risks for everyone present at any given moment, which might cause me bodily harm or damage to my property. Despite that, I am still interested in being permitted to enter the Gaza Strip.

Embedding forces:

- C. I hereby commit to act with the utmost care, follow all the rules that will be enforced upon me by the IDF and by the commander of the force and act in accordance with their instructions on our way into, while inside of, and on our way out of the Gaza Strip. These rules include:
 - 1. To be embedded within IDF units and fully and unconditionally obey the instruction given by commanders in the field.

2. To not act independently and to not move around the area by myself.
3. To clear the area, without any delay, as soon as I am told by any IDF personnel.
4. I know that I must acquire any protective gear needed in advance, and to keep said gear on my person at all times.

Commitment in case of a pool:

- D.** I hereby commit to pass on all raw materials taken, recorded or covered by me, to all the outlets who request access to said information, from both international and Israeli media, and will provide said materials within a reasonable time frame from the moment of request and my leaving of the Gaza Strip. This will be made in a way that will not create preference of publicity to the company I work for and no later than _____ hours after I completed my embedding.
- E.** The raw material passed to media outlets and/or will be published by my hiring company will not include any mark of my hiring company or any other media company, including any company logo, "cube" or identification on a microphone or the face of a journalist associated with the company.
- F.** TV and online correspondences will not be doing "stand-ups" during the embedding unless their counterparts are also embedded to other forces at the same time. In case it is just one correspondent, no "stand-up" will be possible. If the correspondent will be interviewing forces on the ground, he will be doing so without being in the frame (so that all media outlets can use the materials equally).
- G.** No media interviews will be held on the ground unless the interviewee has specifically agreed to said interview in advance.

Commitment of publication:

- H.** I hereby commit to not broadcast live any visual, sound or any other materials, in any way during my embedding with IDF forces.

- I. I hereby commit to pass all the materials and footage to be examined by the military censor and not to use any of said materials until official approval has been given to me by the military censor.
- J. The IDF Spokesperson, the Information Security representative and the Military Censorship personnel has the right to disqualify any footage taken even after the operation/war have ended, without any claim or lawsuit against the IDF.
- K. I hereby commit to publicize the footage and content I've been exposed to during the activity, **only after** the embargo given to me by the IDF Spokesperson. The IDF Spokesperson has the right to postpone the embargo even after the assignment, in accordance with the operational need, without any claim or lawsuit against the IDF.

Security and Insurance:

- L. I have been warned and I am aware that in the area of the Gaza strip there are ongoing combat activities, as well as security and safety risks for everyone present at any given moment, which might cause me bodily harm or damage to my property. Despite that, I am interested in being given the permission to enter the Gaza strip. . In addition, I am aware and acknowledge that I may be transported by military vehicle, aircraft, or naval vessel, and that I am aware of the security and safety risks entailed, and as a result I may sustain harm to my person or property.
- M. In knowing these risks, and after evaluating the risks expected for me in the Gaza Strip territory, I am aware that the State of Israel and/or the IDF is not responsible for my security in the Gaza Strip and cannot guarantee my safety in the Gaza Strip, I assume responsibility for all these dangers of my own free will and volition, and hereby waive the liability of the State of Israel/Israeli Ministry of Defense and/or their employees and/or its soldiers and/or its agents and/or anyone who operates for or on their behalf with respect to any suit and/or claim and/or damage or loss to my person or property, of any kind or degree sustained, including death, as a result of my entry or presence in the Gaza Strip.



- N.** In addition, I am aware and acknowledge that if I sustain any damage to person or property while being transported in a military vehicle, aircraft, or naval vessel, or while I am located on any military vehicle, aircraft, or naval vessel, or during any military operations, or as a result of a defective briefing prior to being transported or the lack of a briefing prior to being transported, the Ministry of Defense and/or the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are not liable for any and all damages caused to me.
- O.** Without taking away from my commitment according to this document or by any law, I am aware that as long as I am permitted to enter and stay in the Gaza Strip, I will be forced to have and present a valid insurance policy that is valid and covers all the responsibility mentioned above in any case of a claim or demand regarding my activity in the Gaza Strip as explained in this document.
- P.** I hereby commit that the said insurance will be valid as long as I am allowed in or near the area, which will be determined before my entrance to said area.
- Q.** It will be made clear that as long as such policy will be provided by the company I am hired by, that meets all the demands mentioned, I will not be required to show any additional policy.
- R.** It is clear to me that in a case in which I will not act in accordance with the terms set by this agreement, I understand and agree to any sanctions imposed upon me or my media outlet, including the cease of any cooperation between the IDF and the media outlet I am representing.

Operations Security

- S.** You will be exposed to sensitive and confidential information. Including: the numbers and mappings of our forces, operational intelligence, operational plans, classified weapons, combat means and more. Thereby, you are assuming the responsibility for keeping all secret or sensitive materials/information I hear/see/am exposed to, and to act in accordance with the security restrictions which are intended to keep IDF personnel safe.
- T.** Entrance with a cellular phone will only be permitted as long as said device is on "airplane mode". This mode will not be turned off for any reason until you have exited the Gaza Strip and re-entered Israeli territory.



- U.** All the recording equipment which is brought with you must not transmit or receive any location or information in any way.
- V.** You must avoid as much as possible from filming classified information. Including: commanders' briefings which include operational orders, intelligence briefings, maps, combat means and screens of control and monitoring systems.
- W.** Do not "check in" from any combat zones or areas of operation.
- X.** Avoid capturing any footage which may reveal the location of IDF forces or personnel. Specifically, any unique views or signs that might reveal the location of IDF personnel operating on the ground or the area.
- Y.** Upon exiting the field/combat area/zone, you must access to a representative from IDF Operations Security to review all initial materials.
- Z.** As the footage taken presumed classified, in order to minimize damage, it is recommended to edit all materials on a device on "offline mode".
- AA.** After editing the materials, you must delete the memory card immediately in order to avoid any potential leak of classified materials. The only materials that can be saved are those approved by and/or blurred by the military censor or IDF Operations Security personnel.

As evidence, undersigned by:

(First/Last Name)

Signature: _____

ID/Passport number: _____

Role/Position: _____

Signature of Outlet Manager: _____

Address: _____

Phone number: _____



IDF Spokesperson's Unit

בלמ"ס

המטה

הכללי

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2023

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Date: _____



Appendix B - Letter of Warning, Undertaking and Waiver (Entry to Combat Area)

1. We the undersigned,

Name: _____

Bearer of ID/Passport No. _____

Name: _____

Bearer of ID/Passport No. _____

Working for and acting on behalf of: _____

1. I have been warned and am aware of various combat activities taking place in the Gaza Strip and of the risks to the security and safety of those present in the Gaza Strip, in general, and to Israeli civilians and residents specifically, and that as a result I may sustain damage or harm to my person or property. In addition, I am aware and acknowledge that I may be transported by military vehicle, aircraft, or naval vessel, and that I am aware of the security and safety risks entailed, and as a result I may sustain harm to my person or property.

Notwithstanding this, I am still interested in receiving permission to enter the Gaza Strip.

2. I acknowledge all the aforementioned dangers and after evaluating all of the risks that may cause me harm in the Gaza Strip, I am aware that the State of Israel and the IDF are not responsible for my safety in the Gaza Strip and cannot guarantee my safety, I assume responsibility for all these dangers of my own free will and volition, and I hereby waive the liability of the State of Israel/Israeli Ministry of Defense and/or their employees and/or its soldiers and/or its agents and/or anyone who operates for or on their behalf with respect to any suit and/or claim and/or damage or loss to my person or property, of any kind or degree sustained, including death, as a result of my entry or presence in the Gaza Strip.
3. In addition, I am aware and acknowledge that if I sustain any damage to person or property while being transported in a military vehicle, aircraft, or naval vessel, or while I am located on any military vehicle, aircraft, or naval vessel, or during any military operations, or as a result of a defective briefing prior to being transported or the lack of a briefing prior to being transported, the Ministry of Defense and/or the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are not liable for any and all damages caused to me.



4. Furthermore, I acknowledge that if I fail to comply with the above and elect to commence legal proceedings against the Ministry of Defense and/or the IDF and/or anyone acting on their behalf, I and/or my Employer, will be subject to a countersuit in which I and/or my Employer, will be liable for all costs incurred by the Ministry of Defense and/or the IDF. I agree to compensate or indemnify the Israeli Ministry of Defense and/or the IDF and/or anyone acting on their behalf, against any suit or legal demand that I might serve, lodge or present against them, or that is served, lodged or presented by any other person or legal entity due to any damage or loss to my person or property, of any kind or degree sustained, including death, as a result of my entry or presence in the Gaza Strip.

In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hand,

Name: _____

Signature: _____

I.D. No./Passport No.: _____

Position: _____

Address: _____

Telephone: _____

Mobile Phone: _____

Date: _____

GPO No.: _____