Falling Short

As the 2008 Olympics Approach, China Falters on Press Freedom

A special report of the Committee to Protect Journalists
Issued August 2007
Founded in 1981, the Committee to Protect Journalists responds to attacks on the press worldwide. CPJ documents hundreds of cases every year and takes action on behalf of journalists and news organizations without regard to political ideology. To maintain its independence, CPJ accepts no government funding. CPJ is funded entirely by private contributions from individuals, foundations, and corporations.

Falling Short: As the 2008 Olympics Approach, China Falters on Press Freedom
Editorial Director: Bill Sweeney
Designer: Justin Goldberg
Copy Editor: Barbara Ross
Proofreader: Joe Sullivan

Cover photo credits:
Clockwise from top left: soldiers (Reuters); Hu Jintao (Agence France-Presse); stadium construction (Reuters); camera operator (Agence France-Presse); reporters (Associated Press). Back cover: photographers (Associated Press).

© 2007 Committee to Protect Journalists, New York
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
The bulk of this report was researched and written by Kristin Jones, senior Asia research associate for the Committee to Protect Journalists, and Bob Dietz, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. The reporting is based on interviews with Chinese journalists, lawyers, and academics conducted during Jones’ research trips to China in March 2006 and April 2007, along with research and interviews conducted from CPJ’s New York offices.

The report follows a November 2006 meeting between representatives of CPJ and the International Olympic Committee at IOC headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland. CPJ board member Jane Kramer and Jones met with Olympic Games Executive Director Gilbert Felli and IOC Communications Director Giselle Davies to urge them to do more to ensure that Chinese authorities fulfill their promises of media freedom in the run-up to the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008. CPJ research shows that domestic journalists continue to face severe threats and restrictions. This report is a further attempt to describe these conditions in detail and to make known our recommendations for change.

CPJ gratefully acknowledges the vital work of several contributing writers. Chapter 3, “Commerce and Control: The Media’s Evolution,” was written by David Bandurski, a freelance writer and media expert based in Hong Kong. Ashley Esarey, a political science professor at Middlebury College in Vermont who has written extensively about the Chinese media, wrote the Chapter 5 sidebar, “The Media Managers.” Esarey also provided guidance for Chapter 5, “Censorship at Work: The Newsroom in China.”


CPJ research assistant May Yang compiled the Chapter 2 quotations, “What They Said,” and the Chapter 3 timeline, “Politics and the Press.” CPJ also wishes to acknowledge the important research by Benjamin Liebman of the Columbia University School of Law and Chen Zhiwu of the Yale University School of Management, which is cited in Chapter 7, “The Libel Card: Suits That Inhibit.” For information about China’s Internet policies, CPJ drew from research conducted by OpenNet Initiative, a collaborative partnership of four academic institutions. Particularly valuable was OpenNet’s 2005 study of Internet filtering in China.

We are grateful to Li Datong for allowing us to reprint excerpts of his May 2007 address to the Society of Publishers in Asia, and to Pu Zhiqiang for allowing use of his letter in defense of clients Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao.

Translations of many Chinese laws and regulations were provided by the firm TransAsia Lawyers, the firm TransPerfect, and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. We are also grateful to Roland Soong, New Century Net, and TransPerfect for other translations used in this report. New Century Net graciously granted reprint rights to Cheng Yizhong’s 2005 remarks in acceptance of the 2005 Guillermo Cano Award. Soong’s blog, EastSouthWestNorth, was an important source throughout.
## Table of Contents

**Preface**

1. **Summary**

2. **Words and Deeds: Confronting the Contradictions**
   - What They Said

3. **Commerce and Control: The Media’s Evolution**
   - Politics and the Press: A Timeline

4. **Inwardly Restricted: Domestic Repression Remains**
   - An Editor’s View: Tunneling Through Stone

5. **Censorship at Work: The Newsroom in China**
   - The Media Managers
   - Directing the News

6. **Local Threats: The Bureaucrat’s Tyranny**
   - Common Sense as a Weapon

7. **The Libel Card: Suits That Inhibit**
   - Waiting for a Verdict

8. **‘Secrets’ and Subversion: The Limits of Expression**
   - The Spy Trap

9. **Online Rules: A Study in Paradox**
   - Writing (Ethical) Code

10. **An Opening: Foreign Journalists See Gains**
    - Guidelines for Reporters on the Ground

11. **Recommendations**
Appendix I: Constitutional and International Guarantees

Article 35 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Appendix II: Media Law in China

Excerpts of the Regulations for the Administration of Publishing
Excerpts of the Regulations for the Administration of Radio and Television
Excerpts of the Provisional Rules for the Administration of Online Publishing
Excerpts of the Provisions on Administration of Internet News Information Services
Excerpts of the Secrecy Rules in Respect of News Publishing
Full Text of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets
Excerpts of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China
Full Text of the Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and their Preparatory Period
Full Text of the Rules for Taiwan Reporters Reporting in the Mainland During the Beijing Olympic Games and their Preparatory Period
Full Text of the Rules for Hong Kong and Macau Reporters Reporting Inland During the Beijing Olympic Games and their Preparatory Period

Appendix III: Journalists Imprisoned in China
Despite explosive economic growth and more Internet users than any country besides the United States, China remains backward in allowing its people access to news. Deep concern about China’s lack of press freedom and scant regard for the rights of journalists prompted the Committee to Protect Journalists to write this report as China prepares to host the 2008 Olympic Games.

Just one year before the world’s finest athletes fill Beijing, China is holding at least 29 reporters and editors behind bars because of their work. Most are imprisoned on vague security-related charges such as revealing state secrets or inciting subversion of state power. Relying on such catchall accusations, China has led the world in the number of jailed journalists since 1999.

Despite knowing this record, the International Olympic Committee in 2001 awarded the August 2008 Games to China. The negotiations and agreement between China and the IOC have not been made public, but both sides assured skeptics that all journalists would have unrestricted freedom to cover the Games. More broadly, the scenario put forward by friends of the IOC and of the Chinese government was that, buoyed by Olympic ideals, China would grow away from its insistence on tight government control of the flow of information and its harsh punishment of those who dare to work outside that system. Under this scenario, the media, unfettered for the Games, would continue to be freer after the world’s attention moved on.

That broad opening has not happened, although China lifted some restrictions on foreign journalists in January 2007. In fact, since the Games were awarded, media restrictions ordered by the government and the Communist Party have grown. Censors still issue day-to-day “guidance” on exactly what can be reported in print, on the air, and on the Internet in all its manifestations—Web sites, blogs, message boards, discussion groups, and even instant messaging and texting. Prolonged detentions and closed-door trials of journalists have continued as well.

That China so far has failed to fulfill its pledges on press freedom is not news to local reporters. But visiting journalists, caught up in the media machine of the world’s premier sporting event, may not be fully aware of the restrictions and pressures placed on their Chinese colleagues. Unless things change, and soon, reporters who venture beyond the Olympic Village should be prepared to work in an environment where official interference and detentions of journalists are common and sources are at risk.

Journalists in China and around the world hope that the world’s most populous nation will match its great economic and technical advances by taking similar strides toward a freer media. It would be a splendid way to honor the Games.

Paul E. Steiger
Chairman, Committee to Protect Journalists
China jails journalists, imposes vast censorship, and allows harassment, attacks, and threats to occur with impunity. It needs to do much more to meet its promises to the world.

The Committee to Protect Journalists prepared this report to illustrate the yawning gap between China’s poor press freedom record and the promises made in 2001 when Beijing was awarded the Olympic Games. The International Olympic Committee awarded the 2008 Games to the Chinese capital based on assurances that authorities would allow the media “complete freedom,” and that they would apply “no restrictions” to coverage. While the government has eased some travel and interview rules that apply to foreign journalists, it continues to impose severe constraints on the domestic press. Chinese journalists are in jail. Vast censorship rules are in place. Harassment, attacks, and threats occur with impunity.

China has fallen short thus far in its pledge to the international community. It should do much more to honor its promises and to foster a truly free press. Here is an overview:

Domestic Censorship in Full Force

Domestic censorship remains in force across all regions and types of media. All news outlets are subject to orders from the Central Propaganda Department. Provincial officials cooperate with their counterparts in other regions to shut down coverage of sensitive local issues.

Journalists face blanket coverage bans. They must avoid stories about the military, ethnic conflict, religion (particularly the outlawed spiritual movement Falun Gong), and the internal workings of the party and government. Coverage directives are issued regularly on issues large and small. Authorities close publications and reassign personnel as penalties for violating censorship orders.

By law, all news outlets must be overseen by some state body, which in turn is responsible for ensuring that party propaganda orders are followed. At the national level, the Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International, China Central Television, the Guangming Daily, and the People’s Daily are under the control of central government and party leadership. Provincial and municipal authorities oversee regional and local newspapers and television stations.

Chinese Media, Past and Present

Starting in 1979, the Chinese media enjoyed a general revitalization, with serious efforts made to safeguard press freedom and to protect journalists. That trend was abruptly reversed when the government cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in 1989.

While Communist Party “guidance” of the news remained tight after 1989, media were swept up in the country's economic growth. The result: media conglomerates with party and government ties, producing modern, commercially savvy products for an increasingly sophisticated audience.

The salary system for journalists is a principal means of regulating content. Reporters are paid a low base salary, supplemented by bonuses when articles are published. Reporters typically pursue stories sure to make it into print or broadcast, reporting them in a way that will satisfy the censors. In awarding pay, many news outlets also apply a ratings system that judges the political merits of a reporter’s coverage.

Journalists say these controls are generally effective at quashing investigative reporting. Economic and government controls have also led to breaches of journalistic ethics, including extortion, bribery, and the manufacturing of news stories.
Despite the restrictive climate, many Chinese reporters pursue difficult stories and post their work on blogs or online message boards.

**Threats to Chinese Journalists**

At least 29 journalists are in Chinese prisons as a direct result of their work, 24 of them on vague “antistate” charges. These cases typically involve reporting and commentary that promote democracy or embarrass party leaders. China is the world’s leading jailer of journalists, a notorious distinction it has held for eight consecutive years.

Violent attacks on the press, though uncommon in Beijing, occur with frequency in the rest of the country. Local officials and businesspeople suppress coverage by using brute force, hiring thugs to threaten or attack journalists. These local figures also use civil defamation lawsuits to silence critical coverage. Since the local courts do the bidding of local party bosses, such cases are usually decided against journalists. Truth is not a defense.

Chinese journalists do not have the right to organize to protect their interests. The officially sanctioned All-China Journalists Association has failed to address their needs, and Chinese journalists lack an official venue for making specific recommendations for reform.

**Controlling Cyberspace**

China’s efforts to control the Internet have met with success, but its many thousands of censors are struggling to stay ahead of its Web-using citizens. An estimated 137 million people are online in China, about 10 percent of the mainland population. Subscription rates are accelerating.

Internet censorship is both technological and regulatory. The government demands that individual service providers monitor content. These providers filter searches, block Web sites, delete content, and monitor e-mail traffic. A 2005 study of China’s e-mail filtering system conducted by the Internet censorship research organization OpenNet Initiative found that messages with politically offensive subject lines or text had been blocked.

International service providers have proved susceptible to Chinese government pressure. Yahoo turned over e-mail account information that led to the arrest and imprisonment of a journalist and several other dissidents. Microsoft came under fire for deleting a well-regarded reporter’s blog. And Google launched a self-censoring Chinese search engine.

**Risks and Rules for Foreign Reporters**

As of January 1, 2007, foreign correspondents have been allowed to travel more freely and conduct interviews more easily. The relaxed rules, however, expire in October 2008. Foreign journalists report less harassment under the new regulations, although most still operate under the assumption that their phones are tapped and their e-mail is monitored.

Foreign news organizations are instructed to hire local assistants through authorized service organizations only. The rules do not allow Chinese assistants to work as reporters for foreign media. Sources and assistants remain vulnerable to government pressure. Chinese citizens who speak to the media about sensitive issues or help reporters cover such matters can be subject to reprisal.
Words and Deeds: Confronting the Contradictions

As part of the Olympic bid process, Beijing pledged complete freedom for all accredited journalists. Yet just one year before the Games are to begin, China has fallen far short in allowing free and unfettered news coverage.

The 2008 Olympic Games are China’s opportunity to step forward on the world stage and present itself as a country ready to take on global responsibilities, one whose place among modern nations is indisputable.

That sort of confirmation is not without historic precedent. The successful 1964 Games in Tokyo firmly re-established Japan as a modern, democratic nation, one that had moved irrevocably beyond its World War II history and postwar economic collapse. The 1988 Games in Seoul proved to the world that South Korea was no longer saddled with the heritage of the military governments that had held sway throughout the Cold War years; clearly the country was ready to assume its role as an international partner. In both nations economic growth was dynamic and well established. Awarding them the Games was the world’s recognition of not only their economic progress, but also their political and social development.

Now it is China’s chance. The Games were awarded to China in July 2001 after an exhaustive selection process carried out by the Evaluation Commission of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The commission, using a long list of criteria, compared bids from a short list of five cities: Beijing, Istanbul, Osaka, Paris, and Toronto. The Chinese government and its people are now using their amazing economic growth of the past decades to undertake a vast effort to ensure that the Games meet the exacting standards of a global audience.

But there is a problem. Unlike Tokyo in 1964 and Seoul in 1988, where economic growth was matched by social and democratic development, Beijing in 2007 continues to fall short on human rights issues, notably, the assurance of free and unfettered media—a fact not lost on the IOC. As part of the competitive bidding process, China pledged full media access for all accredited journalists, without distinguishing between Chinese and foreign reporters. Among the other four candidates—with the possible exception of Istanbul—questions of media freedom had not been a significant issue. The IOC does not make its contracts with host cities public, so to quell fears that China’s longstanding policies of media control would not be up to global standards for the Games, the IOC’s Evaluation Commission, in a report issued on April 3, 2001, specifically noted the government’s promise that “there will be no restrictions on media reporting and movement of journalists up to and including the Olympic Games.”

During the IOC’s decision-making process, the Chinese government repeated that commitment to free and open media whenever the question arose. “By allowing Beijing to host the Games you will help the development of human rights,” Liu Jingmin, vice president of the Beijing 2008 bid committee, told Agence France-Presse in an April 2001 interview. “China and the outside world need to integrate. China’s opening up is irreversible. The Olympic Games is a good opportunity to promote understanding.”

Others offered broad assurances. “We will give the media complete freedom to report when they come to China,” Wang Wei, secretary-general of the Beijing bid committee, told reporters when China was awarded the Games. “We are confident that the Games’ coming to China not only promotes our economy but also enhances all social conditions, including education, health, and human rights.”

Promising words on media freedom—but those promises have not become reality. CPJ research shows that China currently imprisons at least 29 journalists because of their work. That number, though down...
China uses the law as a tool to punish the press for reporting on issues that might embarrass the government or challenge its public officials.

has been in jail since September 2004, was arrested less than two weeks after the Times ran a report that seemed to embarrass national leaders by correctly predicting the retirement of former President Jiang Zemin from his post as chairman of the Central Military Commission.

In each case—and in the cases of more than two dozen other journalists—China used the law as a tool to punish the press for reporting on issues that might embarrass the government or challenge its public officials. The imprisonments of journalists who work for foreign media, chilling as they are, are far outnumbered by the cases of local journalists, who have few allies once they are caught in the government’s legal snare.

Given that these harsh media realities still exist six years after the Games were awarded to China, the IOC’s interest in addressing these problems should be more full-throated.

In May 2006, Hein Verbruggen, head of the IOC’s coordination commission for the Beijing Games, sent a decidedly mixed message when the media issue was raised at a press conference in the capital. “In this country there are laws and they have to be respected—that is something we have to accept and everybody has to accept,” Verbruggen told reporters. “As long as the media behaves in the normal way, then I’m sure there will be no problems. ... If it’s in the law, then it is in the law.” When pressed for clarification, he said, “We have a guarantee in the host city contract that journalists would be able to operate as they do in other Games in other countries. ... It has been repeated several times. It was guaranteed by [Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games president] Mr. Liu Qi himself and we have no reason to believe that will not be the case.”

Concerned by such weak assurances and conflicting signals, CPJ met with IOC Olympic Games Executive Director Gilbert Felli and his staff at their headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland, on November 15, 2006. The meeting was unpromising—the IOC said it would look into the matter but left CPJ unsure of how hard it would push the issue with the Chinese government. “It is not within our mandate to act as an agent for concerned groups,” Felli told CPJ. He added that it was not the IOC’s responsibility to bring specific examples of media repression to the table. “Journalists are imprisoned all over the world, sometimes for good reasons, sometimes for bad reasons,” he said. And, while the IOC representatives said that they would consider CPJ’s concerns, their subsequent statements were equivocal, and on the whole, not encouraging. At a press conference in April 2007, Verbruggen, pressed on the broader question of China’s human rights offenses, repeated the IOC’s stock response that the Games have brought “positive change” to China. IOC President Jacques Rogge would say only that the Games are “a force for good wherever they are staged”—a vague formula the committee has stuck to whenever media issues have been raised.

In China, the government continued to send its own mixed messages as it appeared to experiment with approaches to media control. In 2005, it added to an already long series of restrictions on Internet news...
What They Said

“There will be no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games.”
—Beijing Olympics organizers in their official bid to host the 2008 Games, filed on January 17, 2001.

“We will give the media complete freedom to report when they come to China.”
—Wang Wei, a vice president of the Beijing organizing committee, at a press conference on July 12, 2001, the day before the International Olympic Committee (IOC) named the city as host.

“But one day after the Chinese promised press freedom in reporting from this country as a key part of the bid, CBS News got a taste of a very different and very repressive reality.”
—Barry Petersen, reporting from Beijing on the “CBS Evening News” of July 13, 2001, the day Chinese censors blocked the network from sending footage of the Falun Gong.

“Sites are prohibited from spreading news and information that go against state security and public interest.”
—The official Xinhua News Agency in announcing new restrictions on Internet content on September 25, 2005. Stories about “illegal” demonstrations and organizations are among the barred content.

“If our existing regulations and practice conflict with Olympic norms and our promise, we will make changes to conform with the International Olympic Committee’s requirements and Games norms. But all the reporters will have to abide by China’s laws.”
—Jiang Xiaoyu, a vice president of the Beijing organizing committee, at a press conference on August 8, 2006.

On January 1, 2007, China did relax rules for the foreign press. In a nine-point statement issued through Xinhua, Premier Wen Jiabao announced that some restrictions on foreign journalists conducting interviews with Chinese sources would be lifted, and that foreign correspondents would be allowed to travel around the country more freely. The new regulations are temporary—they will expire in October 2008—and apply only to foreign journalists working in China, not their local counterparts. The new guidelines allow foreigners to cover the Beijing Games and “related matters in China.” Which “related matters” has not been made clear.

Foreign journalists in China have reported less harassment since the new

Committee to Protect Journalists
regulations were handed down, although most still operate under the assumption that their phones are tapped and their e-mail is monitored. Local Chinese journalists report that the conditions under which they work have not changed. Many remain wary of working too closely with their foreign colleagues, and many tell CPJ they are cautious about taking advantage of the freedoms that might open up during the Games. What will happen to them once the spotlight has moved on from the Games and the foreign media have packed up and gone home?

CPJ prepared this report to confront these problems. In pointing out China’s shortfalls in meeting its international promises, CPJ wants to bring visiting journalists’ attention to the conditions under which their Chinese colleagues are working. And, for their own knowledge, visiting journalists covering the Beijing Games, and their editors, should be aware of the realities of reporting in China. Most reporters will be concerned about covering the competition between the world’s best athletes. But for those who venture beyond the sports venues to capture a wider view of China, and who rely on local journalists to help them, a different set of rules applies. And, if non-Olympic events suddenly become newsworthy during the Games, every journalist should be prepared to work in an environment that has been traditionally unfriendly and sometimes hostile to the media, no matter how economically and technically advanced China has become.

“No one in China has been arrested simply because he or she said something on the Internet.”

—Liu Zhengrong, deputy chief of the Internet Affairs Bureau of the State Council Information Office, to the official China Daily on February 15, 2006. At the time, at least 15 journalists were jailed for online writings.

“In this country there are laws and they have to be respected. ... As long as the media behaves in the normal way, then I’m sure there will be no problems. ... If it’s in the law, then it is in the law.”

—Hein Verbruggen, head of the IOC coordination commission for the Beijing Games, at a May 18, 2006, press conference in Beijing.

“China will live up to its words and will turn its words into deeds ... The government will honor the promises and commitments made during our bid to host the Games.”

—Liu Qi, president of the Beijing organizing committee, at a press briefing on September 27, 2006.

“We should all remember that the Games are not judged solely by the technical proficiency of the project, but also through the perception that the world has of the Games.”

—IOC President Jacques Rogge, addressing an IOC coordination commission meeting on October 24, 2006.

“It is not within our mandate to act as an agent for concerned groups. Journalists are imprisoned all over the world, sometimes for good reasons, sometimes for bad reasons.”

—IOC Olympic Games Executive Director Gilbert Felli to a CPJ delegation on November 15, 2006.
The story of Chinese media since the 1990s is one of commercial growth and political control. This uneasy policy alliance is critical to understanding the domestic press today.

The massacre of demonstrators in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, marked a violent interruption to the many hopes cherished by Chinese reformers. Substantive press reform was among the casualties.

In the early 1980s, as supreme leader Deng Xiaoping propelled China along the path of economic reform and opening, a changing political climate brought a general revitalization of Chinese media. Reacting against the falsehood and emptiness of the Cultural Revolution, during which newspapers were effectively house organs of the Communist Party under Chairman Mao Zedong, media trended away from their former role as propaganda “mouthpieces” and sought greater public relevance. A more formal effort at media reform began in the mid-1980s, as a number of liberal senior officials, including former People’s Daily editor-in-chief Hu Jiwei, spearheaded an effort to create a press law that, according to key drafters, would have sought to safeguard press freedom and to protect journalists.

The political events of spring 1989 brought to a swift end any attempts to forge a new, more independent role for the media. In the aftermath of June 4, ousted Premier Zhao Ziyang, a reformist, was faulted for failing to rein in news media, which had voiced support for demonstrators, and for letting the situation get out of hand. China’s leader ascendant, Jiang Zemin, crafted a new supreme principle for party media control: “guidance of public opinion,” the idea that the party would strictly control messages to the public in order to maintain its hold on power and achieve social stability.

When the notion of “media reform” re-emerged in the 1990s, it had a different character altogether. Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” of 1992, in which he visited key economic bases in south China, gave a shot of adrenaline to commercial reform nationwide. Media, too, began to commercialize, albeit more slowly because of their central role in party politics. By the mid-1990s, a host of new commercial newspapers, magazines, and television programs was coming onto the market. The notion of the media as an “industry” was itself a rather revolutionary change for China.

In many ways, the story of Chinese media since the 1990s is the story of commercialization. While political controls on the news remained tight after June 1989, media were swept up in the changes of the day. The country’s priorities lay with economic reform, and it was as politically important to encourage change as it was to maintain control. In other words, controlling the message in an era of social and economic transition required a new approach that retained the principle of party “guidance” while allowing the changes necessary for strategic competitiveness. Understanding this uneasy policy alliance is critical to understanding the state of Chinese media since 1989, and especially today.

In the 1990s, as China enhanced its trade ties with the outside world, it had to ready itself for the “coming of the wolves,” as competition from outside media was sometimes branded. This was done by the creation of domestic media conglomerates that could turn out modern, commercially savvy media products even as the party controlled the message under the banner of “guidance.” Change happened from within the existing media structure. Provincial-level party newspapers, for example, which were chock-full of propaganda about official goings-on among senior cadres, began launching commercial spin-offs that could rake in sizable advertising revenue by commanding larger circulations.

The winning formula was to offer content relevant to China’s growing population of urban consumers, who were willing to pay at the newsstand. Metropolitan newspapers were the most representative of this change in the 1990s. By mid-decade, Chutian Metropolis Daily, a metro daily launched in the Yangtze River
city of Wuhan, was reaching more than one in 10 local residents, with a total circulation surpassing one million. But the changes were happening almost everywhere. Even China Central Television, the broadcast network controlled by party leaders in Beijing, developed programs such as “News Probe,” an investigative newsmagazine styled after “60 Minutes” and launched in 1996.

Direct political motivations were also behind media commercialization in the 1990s. One systemic problem had become clear: Government offices that held publishing licenses and received central government subsidies for licensed periodicals were using their publications to squeeze money from local governments by requiring them to subscribe to this or that official pamphlet. The claim of these publications on central government coffers was burdensome in itself. Even more troubling, though, was the way they sapped the fiscal resources of local governments and residents. By 1996, more than 50 percent of China’s 2,100 registered newspapers relied almost exclusively on public-fund subscriptions. In effect, newspaper subscriptions amounted to a form of indirect taxation.

On July 15, 2003, an official order known as Document 19 pulled the plug on dicey official publications by eliminating the unpopular practice of forced subscriptions. While the purpose of the order was to relieve the “peasants and the grassroots,” it served the further purpose of clearing the propaganda field of unessential noise and, in the view of senior party officials, increasing the effectiveness of key party mouthpieces. As early as the mid-1990s, some members of the party leadership had expressed alarm at the sharp decline in circulation for core media such as the People’s Daily, whose circulation had dropped roughly 70 percent from 1979 to 1996. By pulling funding from nonessential publications, party leaders could reduce both the national and the local burden, and at the same time invigorate the market by making media a contributor to the economy.

While media control remained the number one priority for the party leadership, commercialization did result in a number of developments for the press. Generally speaking, the reorientation of media toward the consumer meant content had to become more relevant and attractive. This brought a burst of lifestyle content, local news stories, and other consumer-oriented fare—a far cry from the official party papers. Even as control persists in Chinese media—most directly evidenced by crackdowns against particular publications seen to have made errors of “guidance”—an important gap has opened between coverage in the official party newspapers and that offered by commercial publications.

Breakthrough news coverage, commentary, and analysis are most often found in commercial outlets such as China Newsweekly, a magazine published by the state-run China News Service, and Nanfang Dushi Bao, a newspaper spun off from Guangdong province’s major party paper. The seeming irony is the development of a kind of nascent journalistic independence at the intersection of politics and the press. More relevant lifestyle and consumer-oriented content has burst onto the scene.
commercialization and professionalism (a product of China’s pre-Communist journalistic tradition and increased contact with the Western media), but still within the context of the party media apparatus.

The 1990s also saw a relative surge in watchdog journalism, or what the Chinese call “supervision by public opinion” (yulan jianandu). While many cases of press supervision involved little more than party-sanctioned monitoring of low-level officials—“supervision by public opinion” had been listed in official documents as a recognized form of monitoring by the late 1980s—some of the best investigative reports of the past decade have been on par with Western standards. Chinese investigative reporting made important breakthroughs on a variety of topics—the rural AIDS epidemic for one—even when officials weren’t ready to address the issues.

The flip side of commercialization is a profit-driven mindset that, combined with limitations imposed by state media control, has led to a crisis of ethics in Chinese media, involving phenomena such as “news extortion” (forcing advertising contracts by threatening “watchdog” journalism), paid-for content, and the manufacturing of news stories. In 2005, for example, a regional newspaper in western China persuaded a young woman to donate her liver so it would have a news exclusive. These problems seem to be worsening in China, presenting new challenges and temptations for journalists.

Political conditions remain the biggest obstacle to healthy journalism. When President Hu Jintao came to power in 2002, there were many, including some journalists, who hoped he would deal more tolerantly with the press. Hu’s media policy, introduced early in his tenure, was called the “three closenesses”—closeness to reality, to the masses, and to true life. It boiled down to less staid and more enjoyable content, and was a reaffirmation of the commercialization efforts that had promoted media relevant to the public but still under party control. Hopes for fundamental change, which crested during the brief period of openness that followed the cover-up of the SARS epidemic were dashed in subsequent press crackdowns: against a group of 10 publications in the summer of 2003, against *Xin Jing Bao* (The Beijing News) in December 2005, and against the weekly *Bing Dian* (Freezing Point) in January 2006.

In the *Xin Jing Bao* case, Chief Editor Yang Bin and two other senior editors were removed after the newspaper reported on a crackdown against protesting farmers in which six people were killed. The next month, the two top editors at *Freezing Point* were removed and the paper briefly suspended after it ran an essay by historian Yuan Weishi criticizing the nationalist bent of Chinese history textbooks.

Many journalists say that investigative reporting has regressed under Hu, and that even the media-produced internal party memos, or “internal references,” have been censored more vigorously. These memos are essentially compilations of news stories circulated among party leaders after having been deemed too sensitive for public consumption. Hu and core leaders have lately tweaked
Political power, and not the rule of law, still holds sway in China. But the primacy of the Tiananmen legacy of “guidance” remains, and the principle is regularly instilled through the propaganda apparatus.

While the official policy of control and commercialization continues to complicate the media environment in China, there is so far little sign within the party of a return to the kind of discussion of media reform that began in the mid-to-late 1980s. Discussions along these lines—for example, the need for a press law (which some free press supporters see as dangerous and others as promising)—are confined mostly to academic and professional circles.

Within China’s government (as opposed to the party), a number of notable moves have been made to improve access to state information. The State Council, the country’s chief administrative body, this year passed a kind of freedom of information law outlining procedures by which citizens may gain access to government information in a range of areas. The legislation is due to take effect in May 2008. Officials see the legislation as an important part in building transparent government, but major questions remain as to whether the ordinance can be enforced at a local level—and to what degree journalists will be allowed to take advantage of it. As the text of the legislation was released in April 2007, there were already hints that journalists would be treated as special cases, unable to use the law to obtain government information for news stories. Zhou Hanhua, an expert on freedom of information laws who played a key role in drafting the ordinance, told one Chinese newspaper in April that “the media’s right to interview and the citizen’s right to know are different.”

While some experts within China remain optimistic about the new legislation, there are already examples of similar ordinances failing at the local level because they are not backed up by political will. When a journalist in Shanghai, Ma Cheng, attempted in June 2006 to sue the City Planning Bureau for failing to release information despite a similar local ordinance, his case was dropped, and he was later dismissed by his newspaper under pressure from city officials. The Ma case serves as a reminder that political power, and not the rule of law, still holds sway in China, and that more fundamental political reform is necessary for journalism to thrive, professionally as well as commercially.

November 15, 2002 Hu Jintao is elected Communist Party general secretary.

November 2002-May 2004 The government attempts to downplay the SARS outbreak and suppress media coverage. The effort backfires under a storm of international criticism.

March 15, 2003 Hu Jintao becomes president.

2004 Three top journalists with Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis News) are imprisoned after the paper reports on controversial issues, including SARS and the death of a suspect in police custody. One, Yu Huafeng, is still in prison on a trumped-up corruption charge.

September 17, 2004 Zhao Yan, a researcher at the Beijing bureau of The New York Times, is imprisoned on suspicion of leaking state secrets. His detention fuels an international outcry. He is later sentenced to three years in prison on a specious fraud charge.

November 24, 2004 Journalist Shi Tao is imprisoned for leaking state secrets after e-mailing notes from an official document instructing the media how to cover the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown. Now serving a 10-year sentence, Shi was awarded CPJ's International Press Freedom Award in 2005.

January 24, 2006 The government suspends Freezing Point, a well-regarded weekly supplement to the China Youth Daily. Editors Li Datong and Lu Yuegang are reassigned. The moves come after Freezing Point publishes an article criticizing official interpretation of Chinese historical events.

January 1, 2007 Regulations take effect that ease travel and reporting restrictions for foreign journalists in the run-up to the Olympics. The new policy guidelines are set to expire October 17, 2008.
Even as rules for foreign journalists have been relaxed, restrictions on the domestic press have tightened. The administration of President Hu Jintao uses administrative measures, ideological mandates, and punitive actions such as imprisonment.

In July 2001, crowds rushed into the streets of Beijing in celebration. The Chinese capital’s massive advertising campaign in support of its bid to host the Summer Olympic Games in 2008 had resonated deeply among its citizens. The International Olympic Committee’s decision, telecast live from Moscow, brought a flood of collective joy—even the police dispatched to control the crowds couldn’t keep themselves from grinning.

If you asked a Beijinger then about the Olympics, you were likely to hear the word *kaifang*, or open. Open to reform, open to change, open to competition, and open to joining the international community. The last time that so many people had flooded the streets may well have been during the protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989. For the few whose memories weren’t dulled by time and censorship, the events there had come to symbolize the closing of possibility. But in 2001, well into a transformative economic boom that would lead to its accession to the World Trade Organization, China seemed poised to open its arms to the world.

But six years later, in the place of real change for the Chinese public, an expression of frustration has settled in. *Wai song nei jin*. Outwardly relaxed, inwardly restricted. Nowhere is this point made clearer than in the new regulations that came into effect for foreign journalists on January 1, 2007. The new rules state that foreign reporters no longer need to request official permission for travel or interviews, making it easier for journalists to do their jobs. Though foreign correspondents largely ignored the old rules, their existence had nonetheless led to brief detentions, harassment, and official interference when reporters got too close to a politically inconvenient story. The regulations, which expire after the Games end, send the message that in hosting the Olympics, China is opening its doors to the scrutiny of the international community. But this right of scrutiny has not been extended to China’s own press. Even as rules for foreign journalists are relaxed, restrictions on the domestic press have tightened.

China’s domestic press situation is a paradox. In an increasingly rich media environment, ordinary people transmit their digital recordings of news events before censors have time to act, bloggers argue against the Communist Party line, and commercial news outlets compete for readers. At the same time, the administration of President Hu Jintao has boosted efforts to keep the news under its control through administrative measures and party-driven ideological mandates, hiring and firing heads of news outlets and jailing journalists. Chinese reporters face more threats than their foreign colleagues at the local level, where government officials and businesses hire thugs to quiet negative coverage.

Accounts of physical attacks against journalists appear regularly in the Chinese press. In September 2006, eight television reporters covering a car crash in Guangzhou waited for more than an hour for police to arrive after being badly beaten by unidentified men, some wearing security uniforms. In January of this year, a Nanfang Daily journalist was hospitalized after five unidentified men attacked him outside his home. And in February, a group of men beat two Guangxi cameramen and seized their cameras as the journalists tried to report on workers’ efforts to get back wages.

The contrast between the official treatment of the foreign media and its treatment of domestic journalists has not been lost on reporters in China. In Beijing and elsewhere, there is broad awareness among
Chinese reporters of the improved conditions for foreign reporters.

“If the Olympic Games will bring more openness to the media, I’d like to hold them every year,” said a Beijing-based reporter who asked not to be identified. “Even if only foreign journalists have this freedom, it’s a good thing.” Yet he wondered if the same freedoms would reach the domestic media, and what would happen after 2008, particularly if foreign coverage irritated authorities in the interim.

Guangzhou’s Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis News) published an editorial on January 5 praising the new guidelines but calling for their expansion. “If this brilliance shines in all directions, extending to the domestic media, it could promote the role of the Chinese media to a position of international respect.” Extending the government’s new “partnership” to the Chinese media would also allow the press to take a more active and professional role in society, the editorial argued.

Nanfang Dushi Bao has had a bitter taste of official retribution, precisely for taking on such a role. In 2004, three of its staff members were jailed after the paper reported the death of a young college graduate in police custody, an exposé that led to a change in national laws for detention and custody. Editor-in-Chief Cheng Yizhong was detained for five months—and he was the lucky one. Former Editor Li Minying was released in 2007 after spending three years in jail; General Manager Yu Huafeng is still serving an eight-year sentence on trumped-up corruption charges.

The jailings of Nanfang Dushi Bao staff illustrate the prevailing tension in the Chinese media. The popular commercial newspaper has genuine sway; its exposés and editorials have informed its readers, changed laws, and transformed the consciousness of the Chinese public more than any foreign news outlet could do. But the imprisonment of its staff members—two of whom, Li and Yu, were not even involved in the reporting of sensitive stories—stand as a warning to those who would offend powerful Communist Party officials.

In June 2006, a brief Xinhua News Agency report announced that Beijing Vice Mayor Liu Zhihua, who oversaw building for the Olympics, had been removed from his post for “corruption and dissoluteness.” The dispatch did not provide information about the specific wrongdoings of which Liu was accused, and Chinese party-run and commercial newspapers were ordered to carry only the official report. Though commercial papers outside of Beijing drew attention to the news with large headlines and additional information culled from official Web sites, Chinese journalists were forbidden from conducting their own interviews or investigations into the case.

The accusation of corruption raised serious questions about the 300 billion yuan (US$40 billion) allocated for construction and infrastructure development in Beijing ahead of the Games. International Olympic Committee representatives assured reporters that they had been told the case was unrelated to Olympics construction. But even foreign reporters faced a wall of silence when they attempted to investigate the case.

“Anything involving construction or development for the Olympics involves high-level officials,” said Charles Hutzler, Beijing bureau chief for The Associated Press, who has reported extensively on the city’s preparations for the Games. “It’s impenetrable.”

The propaganda machine is designed to support those in power. Crucial information goes unexamined. Any restriction on reporting can be traced back to this objective. Along the way, a flurry of crucial information has been lost, hidden, or unexamined.

Li Datong, former chief editor of the progressive China Youth Daily supplement Freezing Point, said the last decade has seen far too many important issues go unreported until too late: corruption within the Politburo; AIDS transmission in Henan caused by official greed and missteps; huge and potentially catastrophic mistakes in the building of the Three Gorges Dam; and the ambitious and costly South-to-North Water Diversion Project—approved in 2002, it has yet to deliver a drop of potable water to Beijing.
Journalists are forced to tread carefully on issues of major public interest, or lose their jobs. Li himself became a vocal critic of official control over the media after he was demoted from his editorial position in 2006.

The level of risk facing individual writers, intellectuals, and journalists is a function of personal connections, professional status, and the tone and context of his or her critique. Direct criticism of national leadership or the current system of governance is sure to bring trouble, but the extent varies. Beijing University law professor He Weifang, who has written frequent editorials for newspapers such as Xin Jing Bao (Beijing News), has not been able to publish his writings since April 2006, when his calls for multiparty reform and his praise of the Taiwanese model of democracy, made during a closed government meeting, became public. But, protected by his employers and his reputation, He continues to teach classes, post his writings in a blog (one that is occasionally deleted by its hosting service), and speak to the foreign media.

Writers without such protection face more severe consequences. In these ranks are people like Yang Tianshui, a dissident writer who spent the entire decade of the 1990s in prison on a charge of “counter-revolution.” After his release, he became a frequent contributor to the banned U.S.-based Web sites Boxun News and Dajiyuan (Epoch Times), the latter an outlet that authorities particularly revile for its connection with the anti-Communist spiritual movement Falun Gong. Yang came under surveillance by state security agents in connection with his work and was frequently detained. In 2005, a group of overseas Chinese elected him (without his knowledge, he said) as “secretariat” of a fictional “democratic Chinese transitional government” in a fantasy online exercise. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison on charges of “subverting state power.”

For writers like Yang with a history of activism or a perceived connection to anti-Communist groups, authorities seem to read criticism of the party as a call to action. The merciless punishments in these cases reflect the ruling party’s mandate to suppress any organized opposition.

Daily journalists are less likely to face prison because they are blanketed by layers of censorship. Party-run news outlets must please their masters at local and central party committees, and content is under the oversight of an in-house official hierarchy. At commercial news outlets, where editors may steer clear of straight propaganda in an attempt to solicit increasingly discerning audiences, a mandatory affiliation with a state agency nonetheless forestalls complete independence. No specific orders need to be given to journalists to remind them not to offend the Communist Party leadership, and matters of greater nuance are handled by communiqués from local propaganda departments to the relevant officials connected to each outlet.

“The government doesn’t want to harm journalists,” said Li, the former Freezing Point editor. “It controls them.”

In the nearly 30 years that have passed since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reform in China, there have been many occasions to hope for press freedom. Commercialization, technology, and an apparent desire by the public for more and better information have pushed the press to be increasingly liberal and consumer-friendly. But each sign of a door’s opening seems to trigger the instinctive slamming of it by Beijing authorities.

While the scope of topics available to Chinese media consumers today is greater than in the past, criticism of the national leadership remains a largely unchallenged taboo. In this aspect, the media has yet to reach the level of serious political debate with which it engaged the public in the 1980s, the early years of reform that some journalists still see as a golden age for the press.

The Tiananmen Square crackdown was the turning point for the press, and even those journalists who merely covered the events there were condemned and “re-educated.” A 1993 CPJ publication, Don’t Force Us to Lie: The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era, documented the demoralizing process of re-education that faced the journalists not jailed or relocated after 1989. In that book, a China Daily journalist described the aftermath of the crackdown: “Writing self-criticisms. Attending a lot of meetings to read aloud my self-criticisms so other people could criticize my self-criticisms. Really terrible.”

Direct criticism of national leadership or the current system of governance is sure to bring trouble.
An Editor’s View: Tunneling Through Stone

“Chinese media are evolving. They are in the process, as we say in Chinese, of ‘tunneling through stone drip by drip.’”

Li Datong has been a critic of media controls in China since January 2006, when he was removed from his position as chief editor of Freezing Point, a supplement to the national China Youth Daily. His demotion was triggered by publication of an essay that alleged ideological bias in textbook accounts of Chinese history, but it followed a career of struggle against official censorship. In May 2007 in Hong Kong, he addressed the Society of Publishers in Asia on the future of Chinese news media. Here are translated excerpts.

“China has a vast media industry. We are a country of 1.3 billion people in the midst of an historic period of transition, and the relationship between media and China’s social development is growing ever closer. That this is happening under an autocratic system goes without saying. Unavoidably, progress is punctuated by setbacks. It is a game of wits between the media and the system. ...

“If we dwell on the setbacks, we are sure to despair at the prospects for Chinese media. And yet, the solid ice is melting, the layers are beginning to soften and split apart, and beneath the crushing of this ice of autocracy, the Chinese people are demanding democracy and freedom. ...

“I began working as a journalist in 1979, just as China began its path of opening and reform. Over the course of 29 years, we have poured our energy into changing Chinese journalism and have seen it for ourselves. Judging from the depth and breadth of news reports today, Chinese media have already made epochal progress. We’re not remiss in saying these changes have already lodged in the hearts of the people and that they cannot be reversed. ...

“In point of fact, there has never been a loosening of controls. The censorship system has never undergone substantive change, even if its methods have become more nuanced and concealed. But in spite of this fact, change is unavoidable. ...

“Chinese media are evolving. They are in the process, as we say in Chinese, of ‘tunneling through stone drip by drip.’ This evolution may, perhaps, lack dramatic action. It may not command attention. But as someone who has participated in and observed this evolution, I know it is real, and that it cannot easily be reversed. Don’t get me wrong. The traditional system of media controls in China grinds on. Many of the most important political topics in contemporary China cannot be talked about openly. News that authorities deem harmful to the legitimacy of their rule is suppressed.

“In realizing their right to freedom of expression, as set down in the constitution, Chinese citizens have a long road ahead. That road will be winding and cursed with setbacks. But the seed of freedom of speech has been planted already. Chinese have awakened to a consciousness of their legal rights and the need to defend them. Their fear is ebbing away.

“The power and legitimacy of China’s censors have already been questioned publicly, and actions to close newspapers or ban books have met with an unprecedented degree of public resistance, forcing compromise on the part of authorities. This should make us feel encouraged. I believe the yearning for freedom of speech in China has never been more powerful than it is today. If journalists in China persist in upholding their professional conscience, if they work tenaciously to expand the space for truth, I believe the day when we truly enjoy freedom of expression in China, as guaranteed in our constitution, will not tarry much longer.”
In the 1990s, central authorities reimagined the news media as a commercially viable entity tied financially and legally to the government and the Communist Party. The contradictory forces of this new arrangement seemed to come to a head in the SARS crisis.

At the end of 2002, a deadly pneumonia-like virus spread quietly throughout southern China. It was months before the Ministry of Health made its first report about SARS, and another two weeks before Guangzhou media reported it. Coverage was then shut down by orders of the Central Propaganda Department. In the early months of 2003, Chinese authorities systematically covered up new cases of the virus before vocal international concern at the global spread of SARS prompted a change in policy.

For a moment, the freshly installed administration of President Hu seemed to take this lesson to heart. Health Minister Zhang Wenkang was sacked along with several other high-level officials, including the mayor of Beijing, and the government pledged to boost transparency. In the spring of 2003, one former newspaper editor told CPJ, “We realized that we could break the rules.” Despite propaganda department orders to play down the spread of SARS, the Chinese press sent reporters into hospitals and reported new cases of the disease. The moves by Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao to penalize officials responsible for the cover-up encouraged hopes for media reform.

The opening was short-lived. “There was a three-month spring,” said He, the Beijing University professor, “but it wasn’t followed by summer. It went straight to winter.” President Hu, still an enigmatic figure both in and out of China, proved disappointing to those who had him pegged as a reformist. The next four years saw increased restrictions on the press, the prosecution of several high-profile journalists, and a string of progressive editors removed from their posts.

One of the chief ways that authorities have limited investigative reporting during Hu’s tenure is empowering provincial officials to cooperate with their counterparts in other regions to block coverage of sensitive local issues. For years, each local propaganda department minded only its own media, allowing reporters from outside the region to parachute in and do some real reporting. But now, through the support of the party’s Central Committee, the lines of communication between officials in each region have opened—and the reporting opportunities have closed. There is now less of what reporters call yidi jiandu, or cross-territorial reporting, which had become a common way for commercial news outlets to keep their stories interesting without angering authorities in their home region.

In addition, provincial and city-level officials often collude with local businesses to suppress potentially embarrassing information. Ideology becomes a stick used by businesses to protect their own commercial interests; propaganda authorities are easily influenced by businessmen who claim that critical reports will threaten stability. As an increasingly common line of defense for public figures and corporations, civil libel cases against media outlets and journalists have created a further disincentive to critical reporting. These cases are usually decided against the press, according to separate research by professor Benjamin Liebman at Columbia University Law School and professor Chen Zhiwu of the Yale School of Management.

Here is a line you are unlikely to read in a Chinese newspaper today: Full press freedom will only follow serious political reform. As long as the party’s department of propaganda has authority over media content, journalists will not be free or safe. As long as the government maintains the right to decide who can publish or broadcast news to a mass audience, the press will always have strict limits. And without an independent judiciary, journalists will remain at risk of arrest and prosecution in connection with their reporting.

Public debate over press conditions in China stops at the point of mentioning the underlying political causes. Up to that point, the press has been vocal in defending its rights to report the news safely and without interference. The domestic media’s interest in their own working conditions was illustrated earlier this year by two very different cases. The first involved a well-known reporter for a state-run news outlet who had just been released after eight years in jail. The second, which occurred in the same coal-mining province of Shanxi, involved a young man bludgeoned to death in a case that raised questions about the ethics of the Chinese press.

Gao Qinrong, an established reporter for the official Xinhua News Agency, was imprisoned in 1998 after doing what any good investigative journalist is supposed to do. Suspecting that something was awry in the
A reporter who exposed corruption ends up jailed for eight years.

Construction of a costly public irrigation project in his home province, he discovered that not one of the thousands of tanks was connected to a water source. Xinhua wouldn’t publish his report, but it ended up in the internal edition of the People’s Daily, which is distributed to those with top-security clearance only. It wasn’t long, however, before other news outlets had caught on to the extraordinary scoop, and national TV cameras flocked to cover the corruption scandal.

Local authorities held Gao responsible for the embarrassment, and he was sentenced to 12 years in prison on charges that included fraud, pimping, and embezzlement. Gao spent eight of those years in jail and was finally released in December 2006.

Gao went to the media, giving interview after interview to domestic and international news outlets describing his ordeal and calling for his conviction to be vacated. The regional Chinese newspapers Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend) and Nanfang Dushi Bao published lengthy interviews with Gao in which he described his reporting, his imprisonment, and his efforts to get the charges dismissed. By the time the Central Propaganda Department acted to shut down coverage of the case, Gao had again become national news, a high-profile example of what seemed to be the worst fate that could befall an enterprising journalist in China.

A few weeks after Gao’s release, another Shanxi media employee was in the news. This one, a young man named Lan Chengzhang, was a former coal miner who had been working for a Beijing-based newspaper for just a few days when he was killed. Chinese news reports on his death debated whether or not to call Lan a journalist; like many reporters, he didn’t hold official journalist accreditation. Too, when he arrived at the site of an illegal coal mine, Lan may have been looking for what dozens of other reporters, accredited or not, had also been seeking: hush money from an owner of a mine that should not have been operating. Men hired by the mine boss brutally beat him in full view of a colleague.

The case sparked public outrage, and President Hu called for an investigation. Six men were quickly brought to trial and convicted. It remains unclear whether Lan was soliciting a bribe.

Chinese media used these two cases as a platform to draw attention to their own rights. Gao was presented as a hero, a journalist whose dedication to the truth had stolen him from his wife and young daughter. The press presented his attempt to restore his name as a fight for justice. In the coverage of Lan, the news articles debating his status as a journalist clearly placed a premium on this distinction. Obviously, his killing was wrong. If he was a journalist, then his killing indicates something larger—an obstruction of the right and duty of the press to seek and publicize the truth. If he was not a journalist, or if he was an unethical one, then his death takes on a much different meaning.

Together, coverage of these two cases points to an awareness among the domestic media about their circumstances, their obligations to the public, and their limitations. Yet Chinese journalists are unable to speak in concert.

Unlike foreign reporters in China, who presented a united case to the International Olympic Committee and the Foreign Ministry for improving their working conditions in the run-up to the Games, mainland Chinese journalists do not have the right to organize independently. The official All-China Journalists Association has failed to address their needs, and Chinese journalists lack an official venue for making specific recommendations for reform. The press has so far been unable to take advantage of the hosting of the Olympic Games to further its own right to report the news.

Political reform—however likely or unlikely it is in the long run—will not happen before the opening ceremony on August 8, 2008. But China could make significant improvements in press conditions by reforming its libel laws to allow for criticism of public figures, by narrowing the terms of national security legislation, and by ensuring that local officials who punish journalists for their reporting are held accountable. Even within a year, Chinese authorities could take several important steps to promote a freer press.
Censorship at Work: The Newsroom in China

The state has weaned the media from subsidies and pushed outlets to rely on advertising revenue, all while keeping control over news content through financial incentives, administrative measures, and the threat of punishment.

June to September is recruitment season at Nanfang Daily Newspaper Group, which runs some of the nation’s most commercially successful newspapers. An astounding 40,000 résumés flooded its offices in 2006, according to news reports, though only about 100 applicants were hired to work at Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis News), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), Ershiyi Shiji Jingji Baodao (21st Century Business Herald), and the group’s other publications. The thousands who applied to these top papers did so for all sorts of reasons, and money was among them. Reporters at Nanfang Zhoumo say that their average monthly income is around 5,000 yuan (US$660)—nearly twice the average monthly salary for urban workers, according to Ministry of Labor and Social Security statistics. Performance-based bonuses can double or triple the base salaries.

Publishing and broadcasting have been growth industries in China. Since 1979, when the sale of advertisements in state-controlled newspapers became legal, the media industry has undergone a dramatic commercial reform. In 2006, advertising revenue in China shot up 22 percent, to 386.6 billion yuan (US$51 billion), as income from newspaper and especially television and magazine advertising grew dramatically, according to figures from Nielsen Media Research. Even as Chinese authorities have shut down hundreds of television stations and newspapers for publishing internal news, offending the Communist Party’s propaganda authorities, or violating the byzantine rules governing the media, the overall trend of growth over nearly three decades is unmistakable.

The state has weaned the media from subsidies and pushed outlets to rely on advertising revenue, all while keeping control over news content through financial incentives, administrative measures, and the threat of punishment. Since Hu Jintao became president in 2003, journalists say, these restrictions have become more stringent.

Though the Chinese constitution protects freedom of the press, speech, and expression, there are institutional barriers to the free distribution of news in China. All news outlets must be authorized by the State Council and must comply with specific media regulations guarding almost every aspect of operation: hiring and training practices, amount of registered capital, location of premises, ties to any sponsoring state agency, and number of news bureaus. By law, a journalist must hold a government-issued press card, which requires a minimum junior college education. The card must be renewed every five years and can be revoked for failing to “respect and follow government-issued laws, regulations, and professional journalist ethics.”

Regulations for operating broadcast, print, and Internet news outlets also list broad categories of unacceptable content, including anything that “disrupts the social order or undermines social stability” or is “detrimental to social morality or to the finer cultural traditions of the nation.” Outlets that violate regulations can be punished with fines or shutdowns.

By law, all news outlets must be affiliated with a state entity, but the degree of direct party oversight, the level of financial pressure, and the influence of reporters and editors vary across regions and types of media. National state-controlled media such as the Xinhua News Agency, Guangming Daily, People’s Daily, and China Central Television, for instance, enjoy the backing of the central party leadership, and are known to do critical reporting at the local level even as they praise the Beijing elite. Print and Internet media tend to have more leeway than broadcast news outlets. Authorities in Shanghai have a reputation for tolerating little politi-
cal criticism from the city’s media, while those in Guangzhou preside over an aggressively commercial press. Liberal management can make a difference, as can the kinds of topics that a news outlet focuses on; because of the official desire to promote commercial growth and foreign investment, financial reporting is given a wider berth by propaganda authorities and media owners.

The most significant distinction, however, is the one between news outlets directly controlled by the state and those with a largely commercial aim. At the national level, Xinhua, China Radio International, China Central Television, Guangming Daily, and People’s Daily are controlled by ranking party cadres in the government and the Central Propaganda Department; their expressed aim is to communicate the official line. Provincial and municipal authorities, too, run their own newspapers and television stations. At the same time, all levels of government also oversee commercial spin-offs, like the Guangdong provincial party committee’s Nanfang Daily Group, that are intended to bring in revenue. Journalists’ experiences with censorship, and the extent of official control in their daily work, depend greatly on whether they work for the commercial or party-run media.

For a successful example of a market-oriented news outlet, look no further than Caijing. A financial magazine based in Beijing, it has grown under the leadership of Editor-in-Chief Hu Shuli into a publication with a solid reputation for well-researched journalism. Its reports on SARS, avian influenza, pharmaceutical scams, corruption, and other crucial issues have won it an affluent readership and wide admiration.

Yang Daming, Caijing’s deputy editor-in-chief, attributes the magazine’s success to its coming of age during a time of market reform in China, when professional reporting on financial news became both necessary and commercially viable. In addition, Yang notes that Caijing has avoided one pitfall that traps other media outlets competing for advertising revenue. “From the beginning, there has been a clear line between editorial and advertising at Caijing,” Yang said. “The advertising department is in a separate building. They give us the independence we need to work.”

The profitability of the magazine also gives it leverage in its inevitable tussles with authorities. Caijing is owned by the SEEC Media Group, a firm with mainly commercial interests, and is under the oversight of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), an official organization that describes its political aims, in part, as “to hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping’s theory.” When two articles in the March 2007 issue—one of them about controversial legislation to protect private property—alarmed propaganda officials, the ACFIC acted. The issue was pulled from the printer, but Caijing journalists succeeded in revising the copy and publishing the work the next week.

For chief editors, though, miscalculating official reaction carries significant risk. No case illustrates this more clearly than the crackdown at Nanfang Dushi Bao in 2004. Cheng Yizhong, a young party member who was appointed to bring in profits, led the newspaper as it investigated the death in police custody of college graduate Sun Zhigang. The newspaper’s powerful reporting resonated with the public, forcing the government to make nationwide changes in detention policies. Yet the very same reporting caused the newspaper itself to come under investigation. Cheng was subsequently held in police custody for five months, and two of his colleagues were sentenced to prison terms of several years on corruption charges.

All news outlets are subject to orders from the party’s Central Propaganda Department. These directives range from relatively broad guidance to mentions of specific cases and issues in the news. An office at the Nanfang Daily Group receives the orders from local party officials—often by telephone—and then relays them to the editors-in-chief of the group’s various newspapers. Editors are told they should carry only Xinhua’s reports of a corruption trial, for example; that they should cease coverage of anti-Japanese demonstrations; or that they should emphasize positive aspects of newly proposed legislation. Municipal and provincial media like those in the Nanfang Daily Group are also subject to orders from the propaganda departments of the local Communist Party committees, whose members may wish to silence coverage of a nearby mining accident or a land dispute.

In addition to the specific orders, journalists understand they have to stay away from stories about the military, ethnic conflict, and religion (particularly Falun Gong and underground churches), along with articles...
The Media Managers

An array of committees and agencies collaborate to promote the official line. For party officials, ‘propaganda’ is no dirty word.

Among party officials responsible for media content, the word xuanchuan, or “propaganda,” does not have a negative connotation. In recognition of the discomfort it evokes among foreigners, however, the department overseeing China’s media was renamed in 1998—in English only—from Central Propaganda Department to Central Publicity Department. (CPJ uses the Chinese translation elsewhere in this report.)

Under the leadership of Politburo Standing Committee Member Li Changchun and Publicity Department Director Liu Yunshan, the Central Publicity Department (CPD) and its local branch offices scrutinize appointments of media managers and keep media abreast of issues to stress in reports, informing managers via telephone conversations or facsimiles of topics to avoid. Groups of senior cadres working in yueping xiaozu or “monthly evaluation small groups” critique news coverage seen as inaccurate or politically undesirable, providing a written rationale for how news content should conform to the wishes of the party. News content is also monitored by media employees with close ties to the Publicity Department whose charge is to protect their organizations from making political “mistakes.”

The CPD’s hold on the media is strengthened by intimate collaboration with state institutions such as the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), which frequently issue regulations, reminders, and reprimands restricting the conditions under which Chinese journalists can report the news. For example, in November 2006 the CPD and GAPP criticized the Beijing-based weekly Lifeweek for running a cover story on the 30th anniversary of the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, along with a photo of Mao Zedong’s last wife, Jiang Qing, on trial for persecuting Communist leaders and attempting to seize power. (She eventually committed suicide while serving a commuted death sentence.) In January, according to the South China Morning Post, the CPD issued an internal regulation requiring media to seek permission prior to reporting on major historic events involving revolutionary leaders or controversial political figures. Chinese media were later instructed, at a meeting held by SARFT, to avoid reporting on 20 specific historical events and issues, including the 1957 antirightist campaign affecting as many as one million people, the Cultural Revolution, anticorruption campaigns, and debate over media freedom. Openly flouting CPD directives can lead to immediate closure of a media outlet or precipitate an investigation of editors or journalists, leading to imprisonment on charges that, in recent years, have included corruption, leaking state secrets, false reporting, inciting unrest, and political subversion. Relatively few journalists (as a proportion of the country’s total number) experience repression directly, which is due in large part to financial incentives for self-censorship, or performance-based salary schemes in which journalists receive payment only for reports deemed politically acceptable. Many Chinese reporters steer clear of controversy to receive higher financial compensation.

Areas of the media industry that party leaders admit have been difficult to “manage” effectively are privately owned Internet sites and blogs that feature content related to political matters, military affairs, economics, and foreign relations. By 2007, some 137 million Chinese were Internet users, with nearly eight million bloggers actively posting material, according to the China Internet Network Information Center. To monitor content, Internet portals in China employ computerized “filters” based on regularly updated lists of politically sensitive terms. In-house censors, some of whom work for state organizations, delete undesirable content and shut down blogs that display pornography, directly challenge party ideology, or advocate political activism. Despite repeated attempts to tighten control over chat forums, Web portals, and blogs, the Internet has made political information more accessible to a rapidly growing number of Chinese. In the blogosphere, particularly, there is unprecedented room for subtle critiques that slip underneath the radar of state detection.
on the inner workings of the party and, to a lesser extent, the government. Savvy journalists carry their own internal compasses for issues like these. They openly admit that self-censorship is just as stringent a master as the Central Propaganda Department.

The penalties for crossing the censors’ line are mostly administrative. Serious infractions are noted in a journalist’s employment record. Seeing a pattern of controversial reports, propaganda authorities may close down a publication or “reorganize” its personnel. These are not uncommon practices: Each year, several high-profile publications disappear, or have offending staff demoted and shuttled off to publications where they can have less impact. In early 2007, Huang Liangtian, editor-in-chief of the Beijing-based magazine *Baixing* (Ordinary People), was removed from his post after the publication ran one too many news reports about corruption and official land grabs. His magazine was reconfigured as a cultural affairs publication, carrying reprints of innocuous material and no original news reports. Huang was transferred to a position at *Agricultural Products Weekly*, taking much of the staff with him.

Another example: In June 2007, after the *Chengdu Evening News* published a small classified ad in support of “the strong mothers of 6/4 victims”—referring to the events of June 4, 1989, at Tiananmen Square, a subject that is strictly off-limits to the Chinese media—the paper’s deputy editor-in-chief and two others on the editorial staff were fired, according to news reports. Sources at the newspaper told reporters that the young staff members simply had no idea what “6/4” referred to, a plausible explanation since reporting on the 1989 military crackdown has been officially suppressed.

In China’s commercial press, the payment system for journalists has emerged as a central method of content control. At most papers, reporters receive bonuses when their articles are published, and those bonuses make up the bulk of their income. The end result is that staff reporters are more likely to go after stories that will make it into print, or at least cover them in a way that will not offend the censors.

The impact of such a system is clear. Most reporters with the Nanfang Daily Group are better paid than their colleagues elsewhere in the country, and they can better afford to lose some income when editors spike their stories for political or business-related reasons, or by orders of propaganda authorities. It is no coincidence that Nanfang’s newspapers, like the profitable and well-paying *Caijing*, have developed a reputation for aggressive news coverage. But for reporters at provincial newspapers, who can expect to earn less than 50 yuan (US$6.60) per article, loss of income can be devastating. Journalists at these news outlets have an extra incentive to avoid work that might anger propaganda authorities.

Another defining feature of the payment system is the ratings scale. At many publications, there is no set payment for an article; instead, internal committees rate each article to determine how much the reporter will be paid. An article’s rating is sometimes determined by its popularity, but is more often decided on its political merits.

In August 2005, Li Datong, who was then editor-in-chief of the *China Youth Daily* supplement *Freezing Point*, created a stir when he wrote a furious memo to the paper’s editor-in-chief, Li Erlang, excoriating a newly proposed ratings system. Under this system, 50 points would be awarded to articles with the highest readership, and up to 300 points would be awarded to those praised by officials. Party or government criticism would lead to deductions. Though it was posted on the newspaper’s internal network, the memo quickly found its way online.

“No matter how strongly readers praise an article, if it makes some official unhappy, and receives a couple sentences of ‘criticism,’ then not only is all your labor for naught, but the prestige of the paper is for naught, and it goes without saying that the opinion of the readers is worth less than a fart,” Li wrote, according to The Washington Post’s translation of the memo.

“Under this arbitrary and meaningless arrangement, what sane journalist would choose to write public interest reports?” Li asked.

Li won the battle, and the proposed ratings system at *China Youth Daily* was scrapped. (Li survived as *Freezing Point* editor only a few more months before being demoted for publishing a controversial essay on Chinese history.) But across China, similar systems are the norm, and investigative journalism in particular suffers under them. With a good chance of attracting the negative attention of businesspeople or officials, exposés are likely to be rejected by propaganda authorities. Add the time commitment of researching and
investigating each report, and the economics of investigative reporting becomes bleak.

While editorials at Nanfang Dushi Bao, China Youth Daily, and other newspapers have continued to break new ground, media observers note that, partly as a result of these commercial pressures, investigative reporting remains limited to a small number of journalists sporadically taking on projects at a handful of major newspapers.

Zhou Kai, a reporter at China Youth Daily, gave a devastating online account of his frustrations in pursuing an investigative piece. When Zhou published an essay on counterfeit medicine, he recounted, a reader in northern China’s Shandong province called him with a real-life example. The reader’s mother was on the brink of death after doctors gave her a counterfeit medication intravenously.

Zhou went after the story. In the course of writing a 7,000-word investigative piece, he interviewed the deputy director of the municipal food and drug administration in the provincial town of Laiyang, who brought along a representative from the party’s local propaganda department. When Zhou returned to Beijing, he was informed by his boss that the newspaper had decided to do a joint project with Laiyang officials on “One Hundred Great Counties.” He was advised to file his investigative report as an “internal reference”—distributed only to those officials with high-level security clearance.

Even as he posted his account of censorship in April 2007, Zhou couldn’t help thinking his career would suffer. “As I write this essay, I am wondering how many people I am going to offend. Will I be able to work at the newspaper anymore? Will I be allowed to write news reports? Will I ever get a good rating for my reports? Will I ever get a good rating for job performance? Will I ever be rated excellent again?”

His judgment of his bosses’ actions was equally direct: They were simply responding to the pressures of the media market when they accepted an offer from the officials in Laiyang, Zhou said. “The newspaper … needs money to satisfy its workers,” he wrote. “If the state won’t provide the money, the newspaper has to earn money on its own. It needs advertisements, it needs marketing, it needs distribution, and it is that simple.”

While pushing commercial news agencies to adhere to political exigencies, the state has kept tight control over its flagship: the Xinhua News Agency. Xinhua, which means “New China,” is a branch of the State Council and answers directly to the Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department. It functions both as a sanctioned mouthpiece of the central government and as a source of internal information for senior officials. A great deal of the content provided by Chinese news outlets is composed of Xinhua reports, often by order of propaganda authorities.

At the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Xinhua’s foreign bureaus, celebrated on May 31, 2007, Central Propaganda Department Director Liu Yunshan extolled Xinhua for the special role it plays both within China and abroad.

“As a state news agency, Xinhua is in a pivotal position in the party’s news and propaganda work,” said Liu, according to a Xinhua report. “In the last 60 years, Xinhua has earnestly carried out the party’s line, principle, and policy; has actively carried out propaganda abroad making use of its overseas organ; has endeavored to create an objective and friendly international public opinion environment; and has made important contributions to pressing ahead China’s revolution, socialist construction, and reform and opening up.”

Liu encouraged Xinhua to maintain its role as a disseminator of propaganda overseas: “It should forcefully propagandize China’s policy and advocacy of adhering to scientific development, harmonious development, and peaceful development; should fully present China’s brand new outlook of economic development, social progress, ethnic solidarity, and the people living and working in peace and contentment; should fully reflect the Chinese people’s good wish to pursue world harmony and to promote peace of mankind; and should create an image of China as being civilized, just, democratic, and progressive.”

To make this happen, Xinhua hires recent college graduates who undergo an ideological training session of several weeks before they begin work. Departmental leaders introduce them to the structure, function, and discipline of the Xinhua model of reporting, and even offer training on how to protect national secrets. “In
**Directing the News**

The flow from censors was daily, unrelenting, and covered every conceivable topic, from the serious to the banal.

Between April 2005 and August 2006, an editor in Beijing saw hundreds of coverage directives cross the internal network of state-run China Radio International (CRI), his employer. Each day, several directives came down from the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council Information Office to editors and frontline reporters at CRI, aimed at controlling the information posted on the news outlet’s Chinese and foreign language Web sites. During particularly sensitive occasions—such as the anniversaries of the horrific Tangshan earthquake and the military crackdown at Tiananmen Square—dozens of instructions appeared.

At great personal risk, this editor collected more than 100 of these orders and allowed CPJ to review them. He does not wish to be identified, knowing well that reporter Shi Tao is serving a 10-year jail sentence on charges of “providing state secrets to foreigners” for e-mailing just one of these propaganda department instructions.

The orders are quite specific, even when dealing with mundane topics. CRI’s Web sites were ordered not to repost an article on a railway police dispute that had appeared in the Beijing-based newspaper *Xin Jing Bao* (The Beijing News) because it was “suspected of leaking secrets.” Web sites were ordered to de-emphasize news of a fatal hospital fire in Jilin in December 2005, and to strictly monitor online forums to delete “harmful information.” Web sites were forbidden from reporting on the closing of *China Youth Daily* supplement *Freezing Point*, and were instructed to delete all existing postings.

The flow from censors was daily, unrelenting, and covered every conceivable topic, from the serious to the banal. Here are a few:

- “All press inquiries and correspondence regarding the Shanwei City Honghaiwang 12/6 incident [in which police killed several protesters] ... On December 18, major media in Guangdong province will publish the Shanwei news office representative’s response to press inquiries regarding the Honghaiwang 12/6 incident. All reporting on news Web sites in Guangdong on this subject will be arranged by the Guangdong government news office. All other Web sites without exception are prohibited from posting information in connection with the matter. Internet Office, December 18, 2005”

- “To all local and foreign propaganda offices and news Web sites: Please do not report on the suspension from teaching of Jilin Art Institute Teaching and Research Section professor Lu Xuesong. Anything found on Internet forums related to the incident must be removed. Central External Propaganda Department Internet Office, August 8, 2005”

- “Regarding information on the article headlined, “Surgeon spoke on the phone during surgery and paralyzed a patient’s face, 180,000 RMB damages sought from military general hospital” [Beijing Evening News, November 30, 2005]. All Web sites must cease reporting on this incident. Do not inflame this situation, disable all related news threads, and swiftly tone it down. Internet Office, December 1, 2005”

- “Regarding the Tangshan coal mining accident news, each site should only use Xinhua News Agency dispatches. It is forbidden to use any other reports. Do not post news threads, do not post headlines, discussion forums are also out of the question. Each Web site should strictly monitor content, using only Xinhua dispatches for related breaking news and removing harmful information. Internet Office, December 7, 2005”
a word, we’re expected to be brainwashed,” said one Xinhua editor, who asked not to be named for fear of retribution.

Xinhua employs thousands of people in its domestic and international bureaus. Reporters are viewed as government employees and enjoy special access to officials at the local level. Agency managers, from department directors to top editors, enjoy all the privileges of the ruling elite. Xinhua’s president, Tian Congming, operates at the ministerial level and is a member of the party’s Central Committee. In this role, he undertakes diplomatic missions abroad and hosts foreign delegations in Beijing; in 2006 and 2007, he met separately with representatives of state news agencies from North Korea, Venezuela, and Cambodia to promote “bilateral cooperation.”

In the newsroom, Xinhua reporters enjoy enviable access, but their reporting is slowed by the agency’s prepublication censorship system. As in many news organizations, dispatches must flow through headquarters for review before release. But at Xinhua, stories that deal with the party’s upper leadership must also go to the Central Office of the party’s Central Committee and the State Council Office for approval. Particularly sensitive stories are sent to Xinhua’s chief editorial office or, on occasion, to the president of the agency for a final decision, according to CPJ sources. Because it is the flagship, Xinhua receives special and direct attention from the Central Propaganda Department in the form of orders to suppress or to cover specific news. These directives can be contradictory and are often confounding, Xinhua staffers say, in some cases instructing journalists to report a story they were ordered to stay away from just hours earlier.

Authorities approach online news providers in much the same manner as they do traditional media: by dictating the kinds of outlets that can post news and by controlling the management of those outlets—in sum, they lean on hosting services and search portals to help censor content.

While authorities effectively keep unwanted news from reaching mass audiences, journalists know they can troll the Web for hidden treasures. Thus, they say, the scope of news and commentary has broadened over nearly three decades of commercial reform and information revolution.

That the government’s system of media control has effectively stayed the same is a source of optimism for some journalists.

“The media management system is like a balloon,” said media critic Li. “Thirty years ago, there wasn’t much for the balloon to hold. But over the years it has been expanding and expanding with the Internet—new ideas, more reporting. But the framework hasn’t changed.”

Li pauses, then grins: “Pop!”
Local Threats: The Bureaucrat’s Tyranny

Violence, criminal prosecution, and censorship are often local affairs, initiated not by central authorities but by low-level bureaucrats, businessmen, or criminal gangs.

Less than a hundred years after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, proximity to the seat of power still makes all the difference in political and cultural affairs. As in imperial days, edicts from the central government look different when they’re carried out in places like Guangzhou, in southern China’s wealthy and rapidly developing Guangdong province. The media in that city remain stubbornly independent of their masters in Beijing despite repeated attempts to draw them under official control.

But just as regional variation accounts for some of the best Chinese reporting and writing, in many other instances it allows local officials to suppress news coverage for their own parochial reasons, using weapons more brutal than those the central government employs. Violence, criminal prosecution, and censorship are often local affairs, initiated not by central authorities but by low-level bureaucrats, businessmen, or criminal gangs. Journalists who face reprisal at the local level are unlikely to get help from the capital city.

“In terms of personal safety, what investigative journalists fear most is the local mafia, hooligans, and thugs, and also the police,” said prominent Beijing-based journalist Wang Keqin at a May 2007 lecture at Princeton University. Wang said that he is regularly threatened for his investigative work around the country. In 2001, mobsters in the western province of Gansu put a 5 million yuan (US$650,000) price on his head after he exposed a securities scam. More recently, in March 2007, he was beaten with an iron rod while reporting in Shanxi province.

And while the actions of the central government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party are often predictable, the whims of the lower-level official are not. In the case of a 41-year-old Taizhou newspaper editor named Wu Xianghu, it was traffic police who killed him.

Wu was deputy editor-in-chief of Taizhou Wanbao (Taizhou Evening News), in the eastern coastal province of Zhejiang, south of Shanghai. In fall 2005, the newspaper—with the approval of city authorities—reported that traffic police had been demanding unreasonable fees for the licensing of electric bikes. As many as 50 police officers descended on the paper’s offices while Wu’s colleagues shot photographs. The men beat Wu on the head and body, dragged him into an elevator, and lifted him into a police van as he cried out for help. He was in and out of the hospital for several months, but he never fully recovered from his internal injuries, his wife told reporters. He died in February 2006 of liver and kidney failure, and no criminal charges were reported in his case.

Violent attacks, though relatively infrequent in Beijing, are an increasingly common risk elsewhere. Online reporting forums such as Xici Hutong post regular accounts of assaults by irate businesspeople, police, or young men hired by local officials to scare off reporters. City and provincial authorities protect their own, and they are unlikely to prosecute attacks on reporters unless higher-level officials demand it. With no law explicitly protecting the rights of journalists to investigate and report the news, central government intervention is rare.

Physical threats are only one tool at the disposal of provincial and county officials. Local courts often do the bidding of party bosses, so a criminal prosecution initiated at the behest of local authorities is likely to result in a conviction. This was the fate of Gao Qinrong, a Shanxi-based reporter who served eight...
Common Sense as a Weapon

“Using common sense as a weapon, we will surely destroy the nightmare woven with fear and lies.”

Cheng Yizhong, former editor-in-chief of Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis News), was detained for five months in 2004 after the Guangzhou paper’s investigative reporting embarrassed local officials. The newspaper broke news that a young graphic designer, Sun Zhigang, was beaten to death in police custody in March 2003. Yu Huafeng, the paper’s general manager, and Li Minying, the former editor, were rounded up at the same time. Li was released this year, but Yu remains in jail.

In recognition of the newspaper’s courageous reporting, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) awarded Cheng its 2005 Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize. Cheng could not attend UNESCO’s award ceremony in Dakar, Senegal, but sent prepared remarks dated April 28, 2005. Here are translated excerpts:

“I thank my friends, relatives, and colleagues. ... Your cries have swept away obstacles and blown down layers of dark curtains and towering walls. I must also thank the politicians who undid this mischief after making such mischief in the first place. Without your savagery and stupidity, I would not have received this honor, and cases of injustice on a greater scale would have continued as if the accusations were real. In a society where the system of law is unsound, any type of injustice can be pulled off, and cases of injustice always seem so solemn and extraordinarily perfect. I would like all the more to thank my comrades-in-arms and fellow inmates, Mr. Yu Huafeng and Mr. Li Minying. Your sufferings are the shame of all of China. ...“

“Using common sense as a weapon, we will surely destroy the nightmare woven with fear and lies. Do not go against common sense. Do not go against conscience. Be on guard against despicable politicians who attack the truth in the name of the truth, who give vent to their own anger and seek their personal gains in the name of political correctness. ... For us, the first priority is to expand the public’s right to know and improve political transparency.

“We have been lost in fear and lies for too long. Fear is omnipresent and lies are omnipresent—we are going farther and farther on the road of deceiving ourselves and others. ... If we become used to the prevailing evil, then we are accomplices in persecuting ourselves. Bei Dao’s poem says: ‘We are not innocent, and a long time ago we became accomplices with history in the mirror.’ ...“

“I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to make this appeal: Let the truth return to our lives, just like the earth returning to under our feet! In 1975, [Václav] Havel said these words in an open letter to [Vladislav] Husák, Czech president and Communist Party general secretary: ‘If life cannot be eliminated forever, then similarly, history cannot be fully stopped, either. Beneath the deep layer of inertia and falsehood, a secret river still flows slowly; slowly and unnoticeably, it erodes the deep layer: This may be a very long process, but one day, it will happen: that deep layer begins to crack.’“

“This will also surely be our future.”
years in jail; Li Changqing, a Fujian editor currently serving a three-year sentence; Jiang Weiping, jailed for five years in the northeastern province of Dalian; and three Nanfang Dushi Bao journalists jailed in Guangzhou. All of these journalists offended provincial officials by exposing corruption or misdeeds; all found themselves accused of crimes such as leaking state secrets, corruption, spreading alarmist information, embezzlement, and even pimping.

Complicating this picture are unethical practices by the press itself. In 2005, central authorities issued new regulations that steepened punishments for journalists found to be taking bribes or seeking “illicit benefits,” according to the state-run Xinhua News Agency. This was a response to rampant corruption in the media industry.

“Reporters are subject to many tortures,” said Wang, the investigative journalist. “And they are also subject to many seductions.”

Unethical activities are by no means limited to provincial journalists, and one of the highest-profile news extortion cases involved Xinhua reporters. But low pay among provincial reporters—and an unclear line between editorial and advertising content—provides an extra incentive to make money through soliciting “subscriptions” and advertising revenue, and by accepting cash-filled “red envelopes” for positive coverage, or hush money to suppress bad news.

In the northern coal-mining province of Shanxi, where thousands have died in work accidents and mine bosses collude with the government to keep the news quiet, an industry has emerged in which fake reporters fabricate press cards simply to reap the kickbacks. (The government-issued cards, which all journalists are required to have by law, are designed to monitor and vet the ranks of media workers; many reporters manage without them, however, or purchase them on the black market.) In one of the best reports to emerge on the kickback phenomenon, Henan Shang Bao (Henan Business News) published a detailed exposé of a city official in the central Chinese town of Ruzhou who paid 200,000 yuan (US $26,000) in hush money to dozens of real and fake reporters who arrived at the scene of a fatal mine flood. Reporters from national and provincial news services were paid on a sliding scale of 100 to 1,000 yuan (US $13 to $130); more money was paid to the national news reporters, less to those who covered local beats.

“Compared to other cities, these are tiny amounts,” the city official told the reporter. “But Ruzhou is poor; it is all we can afford.”

Henan Shang Bao, whose operations are supervised by Henan provincial authorities, was suspended for publishing the exposé. The article appeared briefly on the popular news portal Sina before it was removed, according to Hong Kong blogger Roland Soong. Sina operates under instructions from propaganda authorities in Beijing.

Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to see why so many press workers choose to take the money.

At the same time, the policies of President Hu Jintao have further empowered local authorities. The censorship system long placed all provincial and county-level news outlets under the oversight of local agencies, subject to the orders of both the local and central propaganda departments. For that reason, the practice of yidi jiandu, or reporting across regions, emerged as an effective method of investigative reporting. Journalists traveling from Guangzhou or Beijing, for example, could get in and out of Shanxi or Fujian province before local propaganda officials had time to alert the Central Propaganda Department to shut down coverage. If not detained or physically attacked, or if they did not succumb to the temptation of bribes, these outside journalists could break news that their local counterparts could not.

But under Hu, and with the support of central authorities, local propaganda departments have improved their system of cooperation and communication. Guidelines that came into effect in 2005 prohibit provincial media from reporting outside their own region. Though some news agencies choose to break the rules, police and others use them as a basis to detain, harass, or attack journalists. As a result, local officials have more power than ever to influence coverage of their affairs.

For foreign journalists reporting outside of Beijing during the Olympic Games, new rules instituted in early 2007 may ease a pattern of government-sanctioned harassment at the local level. In the past, foreign journalists were required to seek permission for reporting in each locality, a law sometimes used
as a club against reporters. In October 2005, when men apparently hired by the local government beat two
foreign reporters and viciously attacked a Chinese activist in the southern town of Taishi, the response of the
Foreign Ministry was to berate the foreign media for failing to obey reporting guidelines.

“We express regret over these journalists repeatedly breaching relevant rules to carry out such report-
ing activities, especially when some media are always criticizing China for the lack of laws,” said Foreign
Ministry spokesman Kong Quan, according to Agence France-Presse.

Chinese sources, especially dissidents and activists, remain at risk of crossing local criminal groups
or police. But at least through the Games, foreign journalists no longer need to ask local permission to do
their jobs. The lifting of this restriction affects not only those reporters covering Olympic events in the cities
of Qingdao, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Qinhuangdao (or in Hong Kong), but also reporters traveling
anywhere within mainland China, government officials said.

How well this order filters down to the county and city levels is still an open question. In the northern
city of Pingdu, in Shandong province, officials cited the new rules when directing all local departments to
avoid leaks to foreign reporters; annual evaluations would hinge partly on their success in inhibiting nega-
tive coverage, according to the South China Morning Post. In Zhushan, a town in the central province of
Hunan, two BBC journalists reported being detained and interrogated in March 2007 when they tried to
cover a riot. As is often the case, local police had a different interpretation of the rules than the central gov-
ernment. The Zhushan version won, and the reporters were ejected.

Local officials can themselves be ineffectual when a lucrative industry is involved, as New York Times
business reporter David Barboza discovered when he, a translator, and a photographer were detained at
a factory in June. While reporting on a supplier of toys said to contain lead paint, the journalists were kept
inside a factory complex in the southern city of Dongguan by a team of private security officers. Police and
government officials who arrived at the scene were able to secure their release only after hours of negotia-
tions with the factory bosses.

“We noticed that while our translator was giving an account of the day to the police,” Barboza wrote
in the Times, “the factory bosses were laughing and dining in another room, making the nexus of power in
these parts and in this age ever more clear.” ■
Chinese journalists see the widening use of civil libel suits as an attempt to inhibit critical coverage of corporations and powerful local figures.

Pu Zhiqiang is a hulk of a man who wears the wry smile of a country boy taking on the big city. An attorney who has represented authors, journalists, and news media in civil defamation suits filed by officials and corporations, Pu is at the forefront of legal efforts to defend the right of journalists to write critically without fear of crippling financial reprisal.

“When officials and rich corporations file these cases, they usually win,” Pu told CPJ. With local courts generally protecting powerful local interests, he noted, “the media doesn’t have a chance.”

One of his defining cases was in defense of Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao, a husband-and-wife team who coauthored a book examining rural life in China. Published in 2004 and later translated into English under the title *Will the Boat Sink the Water? The Life of China’s Peasants*, the book was a surprise bestseller in China, but it didn’t enrich its authors. Though the book shied away from criticizing central party or government officials, its appraisal of corruption among party officials, its appraisal of corruption among party officials at the local level was enough to get it banned from distribution. The bulk of its sales involved pirated copies.

But the more direct challenge came from Zhang Xide, the former party secretary of the county of Linquan, in central China’s Anhui province. Accusing the pair of defaming him in their representations of abuse and extortion, Zhang brought them to court in Linquan, where his son worked as a judge, to sue for damages of around 200,000 yuan (US$26,000). Pu presented a forceful argument in defense of their right to present well-researched documentation of official abuse, but the attorney could not win a decisive victory. After the trial ended, the judge simply failed to deliver a verdict. According to a 2007 interview that Chen and Wu gave to Radio Free Asia, the book’s publisher privately paid Zhang 50,000 yuan (US$6,500) to stop pursuing the case.

With more space and incentive for reporting on financial issues and local corruption, the press has had more chances to anger local officials and businesses since media commercialization began in the 1990s.

The number of civil defamation cases began to rise as a result. A study by Yale University professor Chen Zhiwu showed a dramatic increase in civil defamation suits filed against the media from 1999 until the end of 2002, with a corresponding increase in the amount of damages sought. In 2006, Columbia University law professor Benjamin Liebman published a study of civil libel cases filed between 1995 and 2004. Liebman noted that, while documentation of these cases is incomplete, those reported by the media are most often decided against the press.

Chinese journalists see the widening use of civil libel suits as an attempt to inhibit critical coverage of corporations and powerful local figures. (Central party and state officials do not file libel suits because they do not need to: Official restrictions on the press ensure that national leaders are not targets of media criticism.)

A suit filed in Shenzhen in 2006 pointed up the potential for abuse of libel laws. The case ended positively for the news media, but foreign pressure played a role in the resolution. In July 2006, the Shenzhen subsidiary of Taiwan-based electronics manufacturer Foxconn sued a reporter and an editor of the daily *Diyi Caijing Ribao* (China Business News) for a total of 30 million yuan (US$3.9 million), and a local court froze the journalists’ personal assets—including real estate, cars, and bank accounts—pending a hearing. Reporter Wang You and editor Weng Bao had angered the company when they reported allegations that work-
Waiting for a Verdict

In a July 11, 2005, letter to the chief judge of the Fuyang City Intermediate People’s Court, attorney Pu Zhiqiang rejected a proposed settlement in the civil libel case against Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao, authors of Will the Boat Sink the Water? The Life of China’s Peasants. The attorney urged Judge Qian Huiquang to render a verdict that would set a precedent in the interpretation of defamation law in China. Translated excerpts are below. To this day, no verdict has been issued in the case.

“In our opinion, freedom of the press and freedom of speech are constitutional rights of the people. The normal distribution of creative works not only represents the interests of the publisher, they also represent the principal venue of realizing the intellectual property rights of the authors. The Fuyang City Intermediate People’s Court illegally prohibited the distribution of the books and violated the legal rights of the publisher, the authors, and the readers. This is an abuse of judicial power ...

“Although the publisher and the authors suffered tremendous losses in intellectual property rights, millions of pirated copies were sold, so that the work of our authors did not go to waste. The lawsuit filed by Zhang Xide gave us the opportunity to test the judicial capability of the Chinese legal system. There is no reason why the Fuyang Court, upon which the expectations of the world hang, should be so hesitant and concerned and leave behind a footnote of shame for the feeble judicial system ...

“When the government is completely unmonitored, it will be the ruin of China. When there is no freedom of speech and criticism, it would be fantasy to talk about building a harmonious society. The verdict in this case will offer the opportunity to answer the question about whether citizens have the right to criticize the party and the public policies of the government, and about whether government officials as public figures can be criticized for their professional conduct. If the case of New York Times vs. Sullivan established the grounds for libel of public figures and thus created the public space for social commentary, the case of Zhang Xide vs. Chen Guidi will also set up the foundation for the development of Chinese society. Everything depends on the judicial power in your hands. In short, we and all the principals have the opportunity to create history.

“We are not trained legally at all,” said Chen, the Yale University scholar whose studies of defamation law helped start the debate. “This adds another layer of difficulty for any reform to be implemented.”

“Dear respected Chief Judge: It is the decision of you and your colleagues to write a new glorious page in history or continue the state of confusion. ... You can choose the glory of defending freedom, or you can choose the shame of oppression. Countless writers, reporters, and citizens are watching you, and waiting for your verdict. We believe that no matter what the outcome of this case is, the names of those who appear in the verdict sheet will be remembered forever. You can decide whether you want to be the warrior and sage who defends freedom, or the accomplice who oppresses freedom of speech.”

Committee to Protect Journalists
also used as a tool for ordinary citizens to fight against official reports accusing them of crimes. Defamation litigation can be a way of using the court system to challenge state authority, even by journalists. When Sheng Xueyou, a veteran freelance reporter based in Beijing, angered local officials in the city of Qitaihe by reporting on a coal mine ownership dispute, a municipal Web site accused him of bias and a lack of journalistic ethics, according to China Youth Daily. Disputing the Qitaihe officials' account, Sheng filed a civil defamation suit against them in March 2007. The case is pending.

Though rarely applied, defamation is also listed as a criminal offense in China. Article 246 of China’s criminal code states that, in serious cases, the crime of public humiliation or defamation can result in up to three years’ criminal detention, surveillance, or deprivation of political rights. State prosecutors do not initiate criminal defamation cases unless “serious harm is done to public order or to the interests of the state.”

The criminal charge was used in a 2004 case against Zhang Ruquan, who wrote a commemorative essay about Mao Zedong that was posted online and distributed in leaflets in the city of Zhengzhou. For an essay criticizing China’s current leaders for abandoning its workers and leaving them without access to education or health care, both the writer and the leafletter Zhang Zhengyao were accused of defaming former Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Though the court accepted the defense argument that, since Deng was no longer living, he could not be defamed, the two were sentenced to three years’ detention for defaming Jiang. Zhang Ruquan was released, ostensibly for health reasons, in May 2005, seven months after his arrest. The leafletter was not so lucky: Zhang Zhengyao was released in February 2007 after spending almost two and a half years in jail.

Foreign journalists and news organizations face little risk of defamation charges in China. Though clearly angered by some foreign coverage, Chinese officials at all levels have focused their efforts on controlling domestic coverage. This distinguishes it from a place like Singapore, where government leaders have filed lawsuits seeking exorbitant damages after criticism from international news organizations, including The Economist, the Far Eastern Economic Review, and the International Herald Tribune. But unlike Singapore, where foreign news outlets have a relatively large domestic readership, China has significant limits on the distribution of foreign media within its borders.

Although only institutional reform would ensure press freedom in China, CPJ has found that several steps could make the current system more just.

First, criminal defamation should be taken off the books. Like the overly broad national security laws that have been used to jail Chinese journalists for their work, criminal defamation charges present a clear threat to the right of journalists to report the news and criticize public officials. Second, the civil defamation law should be reformed to protect the rights of journalists to express their opinions and to report critically on public bodies, public figures, and powerful corporations. Civil courts are an appropriate venue for resolving disputes, but libel damages should be proportionate to the actual harm caused. Public figures, particularly in a country where they often have too much rather than too little control over media coverage, should have less recourse to damages under defamation laws. And truth should be an absolute defense.
Laws on secrets and subversion provide a catchall basis for punishing any citizen who disseminates information that is sensitive or embarrassing.

It took Chinese authorities several months to discover what happened on the night of April 20, 2004, and to determine that a national secret had been leaked. On a Tuesday night, an editor named Shi Tao stayed late in his newspaper office in a city in central China to send an e-mail to a man in Queens, New York. With the e-mail address huoyan-1989@yahoo.com.cm and the pen name 198964 flagging his political beliefs, Shi sent his notes from a routine meeting on propaganda orders during the run-up to the anniversary of the crackdown at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. In Queens, a Taiwanese expatriate named Hong Zhesheng immediately reposted the notes in his e-mail newsletter, Democracy News, and the posting found its way online.

It didn’t create much of a stir. It is common knowledge that the Chinese government censors the media, and that the 1989 crackdown remains a sensitive issue. Shi’s e-mail was hardly newsworthy, and certainly revealed no classified information. And yet, after tracking down the journalist (with the help of Yahoo) in his new home in Taiyuan, in northern China’s Shanxi province, authorities charged him with the crime of leaking state secrets abroad and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. He remains at a high-security prison in central China today, where he works cutting gems.

“What is the meaning of a state secret? How can a journalist hold a state secret?” wondered Mo Shaping, the attorney who represented Shi in his appeal. “These things did not involve state secrets or state security at all. It’s common sense. These are things that everyone ought to know about.”

China’s 1988 law on guarding state secrets provides a catchall basis for punishing any citizen—not just those who have access to classified information—for disseminating information deemed sensitive. It wasn’t until 2005 that the government declassified the death toll from natural disasters, leaving many other matters under wraps. Among the general categories it lists as secret, the law names major policy decisions on state affairs, national defense and military issues, diplomatic activities, national economic and social development, science and technology, investigation into criminal offenses, and “other matters that are classified as state secrets by the state secret-guarding department.” State secrets can be named as such after the fact, as they were in Shi Tao’s case. The State Secrecy Bureau can simply decree that given information is secret, even after it has entered the public domain.

The vague outlines of this law—bolstered by additional provisions on state secrets in news publications and online—are a stumbling block in efforts to build true watchdog journalism in China. For the press, the law is almost superfluous; there are enough social and administrative controls on online, broadcast, and print media to ensure that nothing very sensitive is leaked. And yet authorities have used it as a last resort to criminally prosecute journalists. The law carries its own particular barbs. It allows suspects to be held for months, or even years, without access to a lawyer. It allows extension after extension of pretrial detention. And it often brings steep jail terms.

CPJ has documented the prolonged jailing of more than a dozen journalists under this law. Jiang Weiping, a reporter based in the northern city of Dalian, spent five years in jail on the charge. He was punished in retribution for writing about official corruption in that city for a Hong Kong-based magazine. One of the officials he wrote about, Bo Xilai, was later named China’s trade minister. Xu Zerong, a U.K.-trained academic and freelance writer, remains in jail on a 13-year term for e-mailing to a colleague in South Korea.
information gleaned from a 1950s book about China’s involvement in the Korean War. New York Times researcher Zhao Yan was tracked down and imprisoned, initially on suspicion of leaking state secrets, apparently because of an article that predicted the retirement of Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. (Zhao was later convicted on a fraud charge widely seen as being trumped up.)

The liberal use of this and other national security-related charges makes China the world’s leading jailer of journalists. According to CPJ research, 24 of the 29 journalists known to be imprisoned in China are jailed for antistate crimes. Though all countries have laws safeguarding state security, Chinese authorities’ use of these accusations is overly broad, and has been used repeatedly to squelch free expression. Most of the jailed journalists on CPJ’s list are political prisoners, incarcerated for appearing to get too close to the corridors of power, for embarrassing top leaders, or for criticizing the Communist Party as it jealously guards its hegemony.

China hasn’t jailed anyone for “counter-revolution” since the charge was abolished in 1997. Originally deployed against communists before the revolution of 1949, the crime was used to punish political enemies of all stripes under the reign of Mao Zedong, throughout the Cultural Revolution, and in the aftermath of the military crackdown at Tiananmen Square. The push to eradicate this outdated charge was once hailed by outsiders as a sign of progress, and seemed at its inception to be a step toward the modernization of China’s criminal code. But instead, authorities simply shifted to imprisoning reporters under a list of offenses now called “endangering national security.” Tossed in with crimes that most countries would consider a threat—such as organizing an armed uprising against the state—the criminal code includes vaguely stated “crimes” that constitute mere expression. The charge of “inciting subversion of state authority,” for instance, has been lobbed with alarming regularity against writers who criticize the one-party state.

This use of national security charges to inhibit the expression of opinions and stanch the flow of information is in contravention of international standards set forth by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which China is a signatory. China signed the Covenant in October 1998, less than two months before Beijing announced its plan to bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. This was hardly a coincidence: The failure of its previous bid for the 2000 Olympic Games was widely attributed to concerns about China’s human rights record. But national leaders still have not ratified the international agreement, a step that would require significant legal reform.

Article 19 of the Covenant states that everyone “shall have the right to hold opinions without interference,” and that everyone “shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” The same article makes exceptions in the right to free expression for the protection of national security. But it states specifically that these restrictions apply only in cases that are “provided by law and are necessary.”

In 1995, the London-based anticensorship organization Article 19 convened a group of experts on international law, human rights, and national security to establish recommendations for interpreting exceptions to the free expression clauses. The resulting Johannesburg Principles, later endorsed by the U.N. special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, established a guideline that allows restriction of freedom of expression or information only in cases when a government can demonstrate that the restriction is lawful and is necessary to protect a legitimate national security interest in a democratic society. The principles place the burden on governments to define unambiguously their restrictions on expression.

China has yet to ratify the international covenant that guarantees the right to free expression.

China’s application of national security laws against journalists and writers for their peaceful expression of dissent or criticism fails to live up to these norms, CPJ research shows.

Instead, the ranks of its political prisoners have recently swelled with a new category of transgressor.
The Spy Trap

Ching Cheong, a Hong Kong-based correspondent for Singapore’s Straits Times, was arrested in Guangzhou in April 2005 while trying to obtain transcripts of interviews with the late Chinese leader Zhao Ziyang, who was ousted in 1989 for expressing sympathy with Tiananmen demonstrators. Ching was later sentenced to five years in prison for espionage, a charge he and his supporters deny. His family says he suffers from heart problems and abdominal pain. CPJ interviewed his wife, Mary Lau, about the case.

How did you learn about Cheong’s arrest?
From the peculiar tone of his voice. In the beginning I didn’t know that he had been arrested. At 1:30 a.m. on April 23 [2005], he gave me a ring and said he was sorry he wouldn’t be back and that he was staying in Guangzhou. I was just thinking that he had changed his plans. He was supposed to be reporting in Beijing for all of April and May. I think his employer had a suspicion earlier than me because my husband told him he was sick. I joked that he just had jet lag.

On the 27th, he gave me a ring and said, “Don’t tell other people my situation. After I settle the problem, I will be back.” So I said, “You are arrested.” He repeated, “Don’t tell other people my situation. After I settle the problem, I will be back.”

So I said again, “You are arrested.” He kept silent, so I knew he was in trouble.

What do you think your husband’s imprisonment had to do with his efforts to obtain the Zhao transcript?
It was a trap. He knew there was a manuscript and he was trying to make arrangements to get it. I think the state security people lured him there.

Why do you think they targeted him?
For writing articles that offended authorities. Later, friends told me he had been writing an analysis about a secret pact ceding to Russia land that had been under dispute since the Qing Dynasty. My husband felt very indignant about that pact because it was done without the knowledge of the Chinese people, and they gave up such vast territory to the Russians.

Soon after Cheong’s detention became public, authorities in China said he had confessed to espionage. How do you explain this?
He confessed that he wrote articles for a Taiwan think tank. He kept very detailed records of the titles of articles and the dates. It has nothing to do with classified information—there was no classified information.

How has public attention affected his case?
The authorities are more cautious in dealing with the case now. I think they felt they needed to charge him, however, to show the righteousness of their actions.

Can you describe your recent visit with your husband?
Smooth and brief. He was very thin, with very deep wrinkles in his forehead. Our family has applied for his early release via medical parole. We are still awaiting a reply from the authorities.

What more can the international media and organizations like CPJ do to speed Cheong’s release from prison?
Continue to raise the issue to the Chinese authorities, to remind them from time to time, and to ask for his early release.
Finding the Internet harder to control than traditional media, authorities have repeatedly jailed online writers on national security-related charges. One of the earliest prosecutions CPJ documented of an Internet publisher in China was that of Huang Qi, who founded the Tianwang Web site, initially intended as a means to search for missing persons. The site soon became a forum for people to post articles on other topics, including such taboo topics as Uighur nationalism, Falun Gong, and the crackdown at Tiananmen Square. Huang was detained in 2000 and sentenced much later to a term of five years in prison. In 2001, authorities in Beijing went after a group of four young university graduates, members of an informal discussion group they called Xin Qingnian Xuehui (New Youth Study Group). Citing their online articles on social and political reform as proof of their intent to overthrow the Communist Party, authorities accused them of “subverting state authority.” More than two years after their detention, two of the four were sentenced to jail terms of 10 years each, the others to eight-year terms.

These cases—and the many others that have followed—reflect China’s obsession with suppressing any hint of organized opposition to party rule, however embryonic or informal it may be. They also mark the brutal outside limit of any reporting or commentary on reform, elite politics, Falun Gong, Tibet, the autonomous region of Xinjiang, or other sensitive topics.

Since the beginning of this decade, Chinese authorities have tightened their administrative, technological, and social control over the Internet. At the same time, several overseas Chinese-language Web sites have developed an audience of readers in China who use proxy servers to access their banned content. These Web sites have become real targets of Chinese authorities. One of them, Dajiyuan (Epoch Times), is affiliated with Falun Gong, a spiritual movement that has grown political under the brutal repression of the state. Many of the site’s contributors in China are not themselves Falun Gong practitioners, but this doesn’t matter: Even the association is enough to cause suspicion. Another site, Boxun News, sees itself as a forum for citizen journalists. It has no stated religious or political goals, but its willingness to post even the harshest criticism of the one-party state has similarly angered authorities.

Li Yuanlong is one of the online reporters now jailed for “inciting subversion of state authority.” His crime was to write political commentary expressing his frustration with the local government and with Communist Party rule, which he posted on a number of banned overseas Web sites, including Dajiyuan, Boxun News, ChinaEWeekly, and New Century Net. But Li was hardly a political organizer, and his intention was not to start a revolution. Instead, he told his lawyer, he had simply become frustrated with the “lies and clichés” of his work for the local daily Bijie Ribao. His efforts to report on poverty, unemployment, and inequality in the rural and undeveloped province of Guizhou had been continuously thwarted by local officials.

“He was a regular reporter at the newspaper,” his locally hired lawyer told CPJ five months after Li was picked up in September 2005. “He reported news.”

As to what the journalist was arrested for, the lawyer couldn’t say: “They haven’t let me see the articles.”

Broad classifications, ambiguity, and a lack of transparency make China’s national security laws a threat to free expression. These aspects of the laws would have to be addressed if China were to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. That work should be done now.
Online journalists, especially those who file for overseas Web sites, can face great risk. Nineteen Internet writers are now imprisoned in China.

China is not the only country to manage public opinion by controlling the Internet—CPJ has documented Internet censorship in 22 countries worldwide—but it was the first to launch a comprehensive program to censor online speech and to monitor e-mail and text-messaging. Its censorship program is so expansive and technically sophisticated that countries such as Vietnam, Zimbabwe, and Thailand have adopted its practices.

Published estimates suggest that the Chinese government could have many thousands of people monitoring Internet activity. “The Ministry of Public Security will be dispatching virtual cops to China’s major Web sites,” boasted an April 24, 2007, article by the official Xinhua News Agency, one in a long string of such official pronouncements. “By the end of June, all major portals and online forums will be monitored.”

Such a massive effort means online journalists, especially those who file for overseas Web sites, can face great risk. Nineteen Internet writers are now imprisoned in China, accounting for about two-thirds of the journalists held in the country’s prisons, according to CPJ research.

Yet sheer numbers also offer potentially good news for free expression. An estimated 137 million people were online in China by 2007, and that is only about 10 percent of the mainland population. The China Internet Network Information Center said the raw total is up by almost 25 percent from the year before, and subscription rates are accelerating, unlike the trend in many Western countries where Internet penetration has leveled off. The government, for all its efforts, is fighting a rearguard action to keep up. Bloggers constantly pop up, change addresses, hide behind proxy servers, and use a full range of hit-and-run tactics to sidestep the government.

Zhao Jing, a former researcher for The New York Times and The Washington Post who blogs under the name Michael Anti, says many Chinese bloggers are journalists who work at mainstream outlets. He told CPJ that “a large number of the famous bloggers in China are journalists. They are an extension of the media. They blog because they can’t speak out at their newspapers.” Zhao, who worked for several Chinese papers and did a stint as a correspondent in Baghdad, said he wound up blogging because “I thought that I wouldn’t be allowed to write a political column. So I turned to the Internet.” Zhao’s work drew international attention in 2005 when U.S.-based Microsoft Corp. deleted his blog on the orders of the Chinese government. He feels free to speak now because he won a Wolfson Press Fellowship at Cambridge and then a Nieman Fellowship at Harvard. As in freer countries, he said, China’s online journalism is the tail that is starting to wag the dog: “Blogging has become mainstream. The blog has become the center of the media. It is the mainstream media that are following blogs.”

With the traditional press tightly controlled, bloggers break news in China. A 2006 CPJ report, “China’s Hidden Unrest,” found that the job of reporting on widespread rural protests and environmental degradation has been taken up increasingly by members of China’s emergent civil society, including activists, lawyers, and intellectuals whose work relies heavily on the Internet.

The government is clearly watching. In the five years after China first allowed private Internet accounts in 1995, it issued more than 60 sets of regulations to tighten its control of online content, Human Rights Watch reported—and the regulations continue to come. In January 2007, President Hu Jintao once again made a public call to “purify” the Web and said that the Internet, among other things, threatens the “stability of the
state.” China’s chief censor at the time, Long Xinmin, warned that more rules would be issued because “advanced network technologies such as blogging and Webcasting have been mounting new challenges to the government’s ability to supervise the Internet.”

The government’s first move following these remarks was a crackdown on Internet cafés. Realizing it couldn’t close the more than 113,000 smoke-filled gathering places already in operation, Beijing simply told local officials to stop issuing licenses for any new ones. Existing Internet cafés were required to register with the state and to take responsibility for material posted from their terminals. The government did back down, in the face of industry resistance, from its plan to require Chinese service providers to obtain verifiable personal details from all users. Instead, it is enlisting Chinese Internet companies to sign a pact promoting real-name registration.

This typifies a government approach that is both technological and regulatory. China relies on service providers to do much of its bidding—filtering searches, blocking critical Web sites, deleting objectionable content, and monitoring e-mail traffic. The details are closely held and ever-changing. China’s tactics are so dynamic that the Internet research group OpenNet Initiative said it is “very difficult to render a clear and accurate picture of Internet filtering in China at any given moment.” Blocking user access to Web sites is still a favorite tool, though, and search engines are routinely reconfigured to filter out taboo locations. For example, a Web search for “Falun Gong” or “Taiwan” or “Tiananmen” would not draw a blank, but it would yield carefully vetted sites that present the government-approved line.

Shifting tactics aside, OpenNet Initiative found, China engaged in “substantial” or “pervasive” filtering of political, social, and security-related content.

Technology’s partner in Internet censorship is an old-fashioned one—regulations, strict and thick, imposed on service providers. Bulletin-board systems, Web sites associated with search engines, and online text-messaging services are required to register as news organizations. Web sites that have not been established by an official news outlet such as a newspaper or broadcaster are forbidden from gathering or editing their own news or commentary; legally, they can only reproduce material that has passed through censors at approved media organizations—and all media in China are government-controlled.

The regulations outlaw the kind of self-generated news and commentary that had become a fixture of search portals such as Sina and Sohu and popular bulletin-board systems such as Xici Hutong. Administrators of these sites had long censored their own news content and monitored public discussions to avoid being shut down by authorities, but the new restrictions added a layer of direct government involvement while circumscribing the sites’ legitimate scope. Century China, which launched in 2000, was an outright casualty of the rule-tightening. A collaboration of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and a Beijing think tank, its eight online forums combining news and opinion were widely read by Chinese academics until the Beijing Communications Administration ordered it closed in July 2006.

Sites tied to publications were once more aggressive than their print versions, but they, too, have dialed back on their coverage. Baixing (Ordinary People) saw its online version shut down several times. After running exposés on corrupt land seizures, Baixing was finally reconfigured in print and online as a “youth lifestyle” magazine that reproduces nonobjectionable material that it finds online. Its former editor, Huang Liangtian, was fired and reportedly reassigned to Agricultural Products Weekly.

Denouncing the president, covering pro-democracy activities, mentioning Falun Gong, exposing corruption, reporting on the military, or even publishing photos of sleeping representatives at the National People’s Congress is off-limits online. If such material is posted domestically, authorities will move to delete it. If the postings find their way to international Web sites, which cannot be controlled, far more severe action is taken, as evidenced by the online journalists now imprisoned throughout the country. Many of those jailed wrote for U.S.-based Web sites such as Boxun News.

Yet videos of events embarrassing to the government, from village unrest to coal mine explosions, still find their way onto the Web. Given the viral nature of the Internet, even when such material is pulled down, it continues to live on in bulletin boards and e-mail trails within China, and on outside Web sites, many based in Hong Kong, that follow the mainland closely.

E-mail monitoring might be the loosest brick in China’s firewall, but users have learned to watch their backs. The most notorious case of e-mail repression was that of jailed Chinese journalist Shi Tao, who is
With double-digit economic growth and more than 130 million people online, China is a market that makes U.S. Internet companies salivate. But the political cost at home of grabbing a slice of the action overseas has curbed the appetite, if only temporarily, of California’s digital giants.

Yahoo was the first to feel the blast of domestic outrage after Chinese journalist Shi Tao was jailed thanks to e-mail account information supplied by the U.S. company. Microsoft was then hauled over the coals for taking down the blog of another outspoken journalist, Zhao Jing. Finally, Google was criticized for removing results from its Chinese search engine that could offend the authorities in Beijing.

The public relations fallout, together with the threat of Congressional legislation to control their business practices in foreign markets, prompted the companies to act. Yahoo, Microsoft, Google, and the U.K.-based communications firm Vodafone agreed to embark on a search for a voluntary code of principles to govern behavior in countries such as China and Vietnam, where Internet censorship is rampant.

Last year, the companies began meeting privately with nongovernmental organizations and human rights groups, socially responsible investment funds, and international legal experts. The aim was to draw up a code of conduct for technology companies in the spirit of the Sullivan Principles, which set socially responsible goals for companies in the 1970s at the height of international economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa.

CPJ joined the group in November 2006 and urged it to go public with its work. It did so in January 2007, although details of the discussions remain confidential. The forum has been organized by Business for Social Responsibility, a San Francisco-based association of leading corporations, and the Center for Democracy and Technology, a nonprofit public policy institution in Washington.

The companies argue that while they are committed to uphold free speech and safeguard the privacy of online users, they are bound by the national laws of the countries in which they operate. This argument has not convinced everyone in the international human rights and ethical investor community. Google and Yahoo have faced shareholder resolutions urging the companies to protect freedom of access to the Internet and stop self-censorship.

Google stockholders rejected in May 2007 a motion ordering the company to avoid complicity in human rights violations in China. But the issue overshadowed the corporation’s annual general meeting, an indication of just how far the controversy over China’s Internet censorship had grown in just two years. Google Chief Executive Officer Eric Schmidt found himself defending the company’s search engine filtering to reporters during the meeting.

“Without in any way defending their laws and policies,” Schmidt said of China, “the censored or omitted data comprise less than 1 percent of the answers. ...We believe that as a result, the Chinese citizen has more information and more choices than they would had we not been in the country.”

Other Internet companies take a similar line, arguing that they would have to pull out of the Chinese market if they were held to the standards of free expression demanded by some human rights advocates.

But those advocates believe that Internet companies can do much more to safeguard individuals’ rights short of pulling out of China. They have urged the companies not to self-censor or provide any information to
serving a 10-year sentence for “providing state secrets to foreigners.” Officials from the Changsha security bureau detained Shi near his home in Taiyuan, Shanxi province, on November 24, 2004, several months after he e-mailed notes detailing the propaganda department’s instructions to the media about coverage of the anniversary of the crackdown at Tiananmen Square. The U.S.-based Internet company Yahoo acknowledged that it helped Chinese authorities identify Shi through his e-mail account.

Rather than try to stay abreast of the flood of e-mail traffic crisscrossing the Internet, a 2005 study by OpenNet Initiative found, the government relies on individual service providers to monitor traffic, mostly through technology similar to that used for spam filters. In the case of an investigation or prosecution, providers are expected to make records of e-mail traffic available to the government—a system that is also used by courts in Western countries. OpenNet said its 2005 tests of China’s e-mail filtering system found sporadic blocking of messages with politically offensive subject lines or body text in both Chinese and English.

The current government’s drive to control not only online content but also e-mail traffic is stunningly contradictory. Successive administrations have recognized the economic benefits of digital communication and committed themselves to a wired China. “Never have so many lines of communication in the hands of so many people been met with such obsessive resistance from a central authority,” Ann Cooper, then CPJ executive director, said in written testimony to the U.S. Congress in 2006. “The Chinese government has merged its participation in the world market and political affairs with a throwback attachment to Mao-era principles of propaganda. By fostering technological and commercial growth, it has placed the media in the hands of ordinary citizens—and then used these same capabilities to block its citizens from blogging the word ‘democracy,’ publishing an independent analysis of relations with Taiwan, sending a text message about a protest, or reporting on the workings of the Propaganda Department.”

Although China’s efforts to control the Internet have met with much success, its “virtual cops” are rushing to stay ahead of its Web-using citizens. This pattern of commerce and control is bound to be repeated as officials, seeing that information flow is critical to economic growth, wire the countryside with ever-faster connections.
With interview and travel rules relaxed, foreign reporters find that conditions are better. The bad news: The looser rules are only temporary.

On top of redeveloping a quarter of the city, cleaning up the toilets, and cracking down on spitting, Beijing’s Olympic planners have released a new English phrasebook for police that gives some indication of the welcome that foreign journalists could receive when they arrive for the Games. In a section titled “How to Stop Illegal News Coverage,” the practice dialogue features a police officer confronting a reporter trying to cover a story on the outlawed religious group Falun Gong.

“Excuse me, sir. Stop, please,” says the officer politely but firmly, before explaining in impressively advanced English: “It’s beyond the limit of your coverage and illegal. As a foreign reporter in China you should obey China law and do nothing against your status.”

“Oh, I see,” says the visiting reporter, adding hopefully, “May I go now?” “No. Come with us,” the officer is told to reply at this point.

“What for?”

“To clear up this matter.”

How often this conversation occurs when an estimated 20,000 accredited journalists descend on Beijing in August 2008 will be one of the key factors in judging the success of the Olympics. If it occurs rarely or not at all, the organizers’ claim that the Games will promote a more open society in China will have been partly realized. But if reporters start getting hauled away to “clear up matters,” it will draw attention to the host country’s designation as the world’s leading jailer of journalists.

The good news—for foreign reporters at least—is that conditions are already better than they used to be. And the Games are part of the reason. After an intense lobbying campaign by the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC), along with advocacy by individual embassies and NGOs, the government has lifted many of the restrictions on the movements of visiting journalists.

Under temporary Olympic regulations introduced on January 1, 2007, foreign journalists no longer need to get advance permission from provincial authorities for each interview or visit outside Beijing. Instead, Article 6 of the new rulebook states: “To interview organizations or individuals in China, foreign journalists need only to obtain their prior consent.” A foreign reporter should learn this by heart. Should you get involved in a “misunderstanding” with the police, recite these important words, and note that they were approved by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.

The new set of rules—published as the “Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and their Preparatory Period”—will stand alongside the old, which date to 1990 and are more restrictive. But in the event of any clash between the two, the 2007 regulations, issued by the State Council, are supposed to take precedence. Exactly how this will work in practice has been the subject of some confusion. Although the wording of the new rules suggests they might apply to Olympic-related matters only, Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said they would be liberally interpreted to cover all topics, including politics and social issues, and all regions, even restive Tibet and the autonomous region of Xinjiang.

Not all local authorities appear to have gotten the message. In the first three months after the Olympic regulations were introduced, at least five foreign reporters were stopped by police while covering stories in the provinces. Encouragingly, almost all of these incidents were resolved by phone calls to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing.

It is a considerable improvement. A survey released in August 2006 by the FCCC found 72 cases of harassment in the previous two years. These included more than 30 police detentions of journalists, 21 incidents of reporting materials being destroyed, and 10 cases of physical harassment, including several
Guidelines for Reporters on the Ground

China sees the Beijing Olympics as an opportunity to promote a positive international image. Although authorities are making an unprecedented effort to be media-friendly, they still want to control information. Visiting journalists, especially those new to China’s uncertain media environment, should hire a savvy and trustworthy assistant.

Trends

- Major cities such as Beijing and Guangzhou are very open. You can pose politically sensitive questions and elicit responses.
- In some other areas, sources might be questioned or detained, especially if you’ve raised topics the central or local government considers taboo.
- In areas of unrest, notably Tibet and Xinjiang, you must assume you are being followed and that your sources could be at risk.
- Assume you will be monitored once you report on any issue the central government views as sensitive.
- Local governments may interfere if you try to report on embarrassing issues such as widespread pollution and forced relocations.

Sensitive issues

Here are some of the most sensitive issues and their implications for journalists and sources:

- Problems associated with the Olympics. Information is difficult to obtain.
- Protests and unrest linked to social problems, including pollution, the government’s forced acquisition of land, discrimination against HIV/AIDS patients, and crackdowns on North Korean refugees. Reporters have faced interference from local authorities when attempting to cover these issues. Some journalists have enlisted help from the Foreign Ministry media office, which has occasionally instructed local officials not to obstruct reporting.
- Tibet or Xinjiang activists, human rights lawyers, and other activists working on high-profile issues. Sources are at risk of intimidation and detention.
- Corruption cases or reports about internal party politics involving senior officials or other well-connected people. Information is difficult to obtain, even for cases that have been through the courts.
- Dissidents. High-profile dissidents typically know the risks and have made a conscious decision to provide information; some believe international exposure protects them. The lesser known are at risk of detention.
- Issues involving prisons and the police. Access is difficult to obtain.
- Reports based on internal documents, including information on censored historic eras or events, such as the bloody repression of student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Sources who provide such materials face risk.
- All issues involving the outlawed religious group Falun Gong. Web searches on the subject are censored.
beatings and a strip search, of reporters or their sources. This was by no means a comprehensive total. Less than half of the 543 foreign journalists in China at the time of the survey were members of the FCCC, and some correspondents were reluctant to provide details because they feared repercussions.

For many foreign journalists, detention is more inconvenience than hardship. The interrogators are generally polite, and freedom can usually be attained after two to six hours of questioning. But reporters who are ethnic Chinese or from other Asian nations can face much worse treatment. Ng Han Guan, an Associated Press photographer, was clubbed and his camera smashed by plainclothes security personnel when he took a picture of a colleague being manhandled by police after the 2004 Asian Cup final in Beijing. BBC producer Bessie Du and camera operator Al Go were strip-searched by police after they visited the scene of a riot in the village of Dingzhou in Hebei province last summer.

Chinese sources and assistants are especially vulnerable. It is as if there were a circle of fire around foreign correspondents in China—one that both protects the reporter and threatens anyone they come near. Those who speak out to the foreign media can face severe repercussions. Among the highest-profile victims in recent years have been peasants’ rights advocate Chen Guangcheng, legal rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, and AIDS advocate Hu Jia, all of whom are either in prison or intermittently in detention.

A worrying trend has been the rise in violent attacks against sources by thugs employed by developers or local governments. In October 2005, rural activist Lu Banglie was pulled from his car and beaten when he attempted to take a foreign reporter into Taishi village in Guangdong province, the site of a land dispute. Even harsher retribution appears to have been meted out to Fu Xiancai, a vocal opponent of the Three Gorges Dam, who was left paralyzed by a savage beating after he ignored police warnings not to speak to foreign journalists. On June 8, 2006, Fu was attacked by unknown assailants on his way home from the Zigui public security bureau in Hubei province, where he had been interrogated about an interview he granted with reporters from the German channel ARD. Relatives say a blow broke his neck, leaving him paralyzed from the neck down but able to speak. According to the U.S.-based advocacy group Human Rights in China, Fu was repeatedly warned by police and local officials that he would be severely punished for talking to the foreign press. A police investigation concluded that his injuries were suffered in a fall.

Reporters from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan have seen the government lift, at least for now, the requirement that they obtain prior permission from provincial authorities for reporting trips outside Beijing. Another recent change has relaxed the rules covering journalists from Taiwan, which is considered a renegade province by the mainland government. Work visas once granted for a month at a time have been extended to three months.

Reporters based in Hong Kong say they are still expected to get special approval from the central government or the official Xinhua News Agency to cover stories on the mainland, but nobody has paid heed to this stipulation for years. They foresee few problems for sports journalists in 2008, but say difficulties may arise if visiting reporters move on to sensitive news topics. The depth of that quandary is illustrated by the case of Ching Cheong, a Hong Kong resident and veteran correspondent with The Straits Times. Ching was sentenced to five years in prison in 2006 on spying charges—which he denies—and his court case was anything but transparent.

Under the Olympic guidelines, foreign news outlets operating in Beijing, Qingdao, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, and Qinhuangdao are supposed to hire local assistants through authorized service organizations. Elsewhere, reporters should contact the provincial foreign affairs office. Under the old rules, foreign correspondents were supposed to hire assistants only through the Diplomatic Service Bureau, which is part of the Foreign Ministry. Most employees from this source were inevitably considered spies, though close working relationships often overcame such suspicions. In recent years, many reporters have circumvented the rules to recruit assistants independently. Several news organizations have also used their Chinese assistants as de facto reporters, though they cannot be registered as such even under the Olympic rules.

The Diplomatic Service Bureau is increasingly willing to accept private hirings, but insists that foreign news agencies pay a “management fee” for each assistant hired, and it strongly encourages organizations to take out expensive social insurance policies offered through the bureau. Such schemes will be difficult to implement in 2008, when thousands of visiting reporters will need temporary assistants.
Some precautions:

- Keep trips to sensitive regions as short as possible. Turn off your mobile phone as it may allow authorities to locate you. Tell someone else—an editor, a friend—where you are going, along with your expected arrival and departure dates.
- If possible, avoid spending the night in sensitive regions. Hotels will report foreign guests to the police, so check in as late as possible and check out before morning business hours.
- Purchase plane tickets at the airport and as close to your departure time as possible to avoid alerting authorities where you are headed. Choose local transportation that makes you inconspicuous—for example, a taxi instead of a hired car.
- Assume your mobile phone and computer are monitored. Change your phone chip strategically. Use public phones when possible.
- Avoid talking to people in public areas, where you may be under observation. Arrange to meet sources in nearby towns.
- Use discreet cameras or recording equipment. Change your storage device often and hide any such device.
- Avoid naming or showing the faces of vulnerable sources. Conceal their contact information.
- In electronic communications, avoid using sensitive words or names authorities may be monitoring.
- Travel with a Chinese-language copy of the “Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and their Preparatory Period.”
- Install anti-virus software on your computer and ensure your hard drive and confidential files are password-protected. Change your passwords frequently.
- Discuss risks with your assistant and agree on contingency plans. Be aware that government agents may intimidate your assistant to get information about you.

Limited-access areas

China limits access to public areas that journalists might ordinarily expect to be unrestricted. The government occasionally arranges visits for groups of journalists, so it is worth making joint requests with other organizations. These areas are limited-access:

- Olympic sites under construction. If you apply for access, you need to follow up regularly on your request.
- Olympic training sites; this includes access to top athletes. Apply early and follow up. Media access has been very limited.
- Military areas, border regions, prisons, courts dealing with human rights issues, and space exploration facilities. Join with other news organizations to request access. Apply early and make frequent queries.

If your team is detained

- Be polite and avoid escalating the situation. Know your rights, and be a tough negotiator.
- Try to get name and contact information for detention officers.
- Phone the Foreign Ministry to complain.
- Phone your embassy. The U.S. Embassy human rights officer, for example, is willing to raise the case of any foreign journalist who is detained.
- If the authorities will not allow you to place a call, use your cell phone to discreetly send a preprogrammed text message naming your location.
The Committee to Protect Journalists makes the following recommendations to promote in China a level of press freedom that is in accordance with international norms.

To the International Olympic Committee (IOC):

✦ Insist that the Chinese government fully meet its promises of press freedom for the 2008 Olympic Games. Ensure that commitment is extended to domestic journalists.

To the government of China:

✦ Meet the pledge made to the IOC to remove media restrictions. In particular, eliminate restrictions on local journalists, who continue to face the same severe constraints they did before China was awarded the Games in 2001.

✦ Remove the expiration date for the liberalized travel and interview rules governing foreign media, which are due to lapse after the Games conclude in October 2008. Use those rules as a baseline from which to move forward in expanding media freedom as quickly as possible.

✦ Release all journalists currently imprisoned for their work. China is the world’s leading jailer of journalists, with at least 29 writers and editors in prison as of June 15, 2007. For them to be in jail when the Games begin on August 8, 2008, would make a travesty of China’s pledge of greater press freedom and the IOC’s acceptance of that pledge.

✦ In the broadest sense, stop censoring news. Dismantle the archaic system of media control that has evolved over several decades. Halt Internet censorship and monitoring activities and let information flow freely on every digital platform.

✦ Allow Chinese journalists to work as reporters for foreign news outlets. Chinese journalists may work only as assistants to foreign reporters now.

✦ End the pattern of violent retribution meted out by local officials and others angered by critical media coverage. Bring to justice all those responsible for such attacks. The privileged and powerful should not be able to use violence to cow journalists.

Committee to Protect Journalists
Narrow the use of state secret and national security laws, bringing them into compliance with the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression, and Access to Information. These principles, endorsed by the U.N. special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, allow restrictions only in cases of legitimate national security.

Decriminalize defamation laws. Reform civil defamation laws to prevent abuse by public figures and corporations.

Allow journalists to form an independent professional organization. The officially sanctioned All-China Journalists Association has failed to address their needs.

Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China signed in 1998. Article 19 of the Covenant states: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”

As a member of the United Nations, honor Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

To international media organizations covering the Games:

Use all means to insist that China honor its media pledges to the IOC and extend to Chinese journalists the same freedoms that visiting journalists enjoy.

Ensure that all employees are aware of the restrictions and threats that their Chinese colleagues face.
Constitution of the People's Republic of China *(Excerpt)*

Adopted on December 4, 1982

Article 35  Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights *(Excerpt)*

Adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of December 10, 1948

Article 19  Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights *(Excerpt)*

Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966. Entry into force March 23, 1976, in accordance with Article 49

Article 19  (1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

(3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
Regulations for the Administration of Publishing (Excerpts)

Promulgated on December 25, 2001, by the State Council as Decree No. 343. Effective February 1, 2002

Article 1 These regulations are enacted in accordance with the Constitution in order to strengthen the administration of publishing activities, promote the development and prosperity of socialist publishing activities with Chinese characteristics, guarantee the right of citizens to exercise the freedom to publish in accordance with the law, and promote the development of a socialist material and spiritual culture.

Article 3 Publishing shall adhere to the principle of serving the people and socialism, and shall continue to be guided by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory. Publishing shall disseminate and accumulate all scientific and cultural knowledge that is beneficial to the elevation of the national character, the development of the economy, and the improvement of society, and shall enhance the outstanding characteristics of the national culture, promote international cultural exchanges, and enrich and elevate the spiritual lives of the people.

Article 5 Citizens are legally entitled to exercise their right to freedom of publishing, and this right shall be guaranteed by the people’s government at all levels.

In exercising their right to freedom of publishing, citizens must abide by the Constitution and the law. No citizen may oppose the fundamental principles confirmed by the Constitution, or cause harm to state interests, societal collective interests, or the legal freedom and rights of other citizens.

Article 10 The State Council administrative department for publishing shall formulate a plan for the total number, structure, and distribution of publishing entities, and shall guide and regulate the development of the publishing industry.

Article 11 Those wishing to establish publishing units shall fulfill the following conditions:

(1) they shall possess a name and articles of association for a publishing entity;
(2) their sponsoring entity and its competent authority shall have been confirmed by the State Council administrative department for publishing;
(3) they shall possess a definite business scope;
(4) they shall possess a registered capital totaling at least RMB300,000 and permanent business premises;
(5) they shall possess an organizational structure appropriate to the needs of their business scope, and professional editorial personnel who meet the qualifications stipulated by the state; and
(6) other conditions stipulated by laws and administrative regulations.
In addition to the conditions set forth in the above clauses, approval for the establishment of publishing entities shall also conform to the plan for the total number, structure, and distribution of publishing entities.

**Article 24** Citizens may freely express in publications their opinions and wishes concerning the affairs of state, economic and cultural matters, and social matters in accordance with the stipulations of these regulations. Citizens may also freely publish their scientific research, literary and artistic creations, and the fruits of other cultural activities.

Publications that are lawful are protected by law. No organization or individual may illegally interfere with, obstruct, or disrupt the publishing of such publications.

**Article 26** No publication may contain content that:

1. opposes the basic principles set forth in the Constitution;
2. jeopardizes the unity, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of the state;
3. divulges state secrets, jeopardizes national security, or is detrimental to the dignity and interests of the state;
4. incites ethnic hatred or discrimination, disrupts ethnic unity, or violates the customs and habits of ethnic minorities;
5. advocates cults or superstition;
6. disrupts the social order or undermines social stability;
7. promulgates obscenity, gambling, or violence, or incites criminal activity;
8. insults or slanders others, or infringes upon the legitimate rights and interests of others;
9. is detrimental to social morality or to the finer cultural traditions of the nation; or
10. any other content that is prohibited by law, administrative regulations, or state rules.

**Article 27** Publications targeted at minors may not contain content that incites minors to emulate activities that run counter to social morality or that violate the law. Such publications shall not include depictions of terror or cruelty that are detrimental to the physical and mental health of minors.

**Article 56** Where any of the activities listed below constitutes a crime, criminal liabilities shall be pursued in accordance with criminal law. Where a crime has not been constituted, the administrative department of publishing shall order the suspension of operations pending rectification within a time limit, and shall confiscate the publications and illicit income; where the illegal turnover exceeds RMB10,000, a fine of between 5 and 10 times the total amount of such illegal turnover shall also be imposed; where the amount of legal turnover is less than RMB10,000, a fine of between RMB10,000 and 50,000 shall also be imposed; in serious cases, the permit shall also be revoked by its original issuing department. The activities in question are as follows:

1. publishing and importing publications containing content prohibited under Article 26 and 27 hereof;
2. printing or duplication, and distribution of publications containing content prohibited under Articles 26 and 27 hereof by entities that are fully aware or should be aware of such prohibition; and
sale or transfer by other means by a publishing entity of its name, book numbers, serial numbers, and page space, or lease of its name and serial numbers to others for the publishing of their publications, where the entity is fully aware or should be aware that the contents of such publications are prohibited under Articles 26 and 27 hereof.

Regulations for the Administration of Radio and Television (Excerpts)

(Translation provided by TransAsia Lawyers, a firm that specializes in media law in China, from its publication China’s Media and Entertainment Law, Vol. 11, 2006)

Promulgated on August 11, 1997, by the State Council as Decree No. 228. Effective September 1, 1997

Article 1 These regulations are enacted in order to strengthen the administration of radio and television, to develop radio and television activities, and to promote socialist spiritual and material civilization.

Article 31 Radio and television programs shall be produced by radio stations, television stations, and radio and television production business entities approved by the administrative departments for radio and television of people's governments at or above the provincial level. Radio stations and television stations may not broadcast radio or television programs produced by entities which have not secured an operating permit for radio and television program production.

Article 32 Radio stations and television stations shall raise the quality of radio and television programs and increase the number of high-quality programs produced domestically; the production and broadcast of programs containing the following material is prohibited:

(1) that which is harmful to national unity, sovereignty, or territorial integrity;
(2) that which is harmful to national security, honor, or interest;
(3) that which incites ethnic division or damages ethnic unity;
(4) that which divulges state secrets;
(5) that which defames or insults other persons;
(6) that which is obscene or superstitious or is graphically violent; or
(7) other materials which are prohibited by laws and administrative rules and regulations.

Article 33 Radio stations and television stations shall carry out the pre-broadcast censorship of the contents of radio and television programs they broadcast and shall re-censor the contents of repeat broadcasts in accordance with Article 32 of these regulations.

Article 49 Where programs containing content prohibited by Article 32 of these regulations are produced, broadcast, or supplied to overseas parties, the administrative departments for radio and television of people's governments at or above the county level will order the cessation of such production, broadcast, or overseas supply, confiscate their carriage medium, and impose a fine of between RMB10,000 and 50,000. In serious cases, the original approval authority will revoke the offender’s permit. Where regulations for the administration of public order are violated, public security authorities will impose public order administration penalties in accordance with the law. Where the act in question constitutes a crime, criminal liability will be pursued in accordance with the law.

Falling Short: China Falters on Press Freedom
Committee to Protect Journalists

Provisional Rules for the Administration of Online Publishing (Excerpts)

(Translation provided by TransAsia Lawyers, a firm that specializes in media law in China, from its publication China’s Media and Entertainment Law, Vol. 11, 2006)

Promulgated on June 27, 2002, by the General Administration of Press and Publication and Ministry of Information Industry as Decree No. 17. Effective August 1, 2002

Article 2 Those entities engaged in online publishing activities shall abide by the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations and shall adhere to the principles of socialism and serving the people. Online publishing shall disseminate and accumulate all scientific and cultural knowledge conducive to the elevation of the national character the development of the economy and the improvement of society, so as to enrich and elevate the spiritual lives of the people.

Article 4 The General Administration of Press and Publication is responsible for the nationwide supervision and administration of online publishing. Its main responsibilities include:

(1) formulating a nationwide plan for online publishing and organizing the implementation of the same;
(2) formulating guidelines, policies, and rules for the administration of online publishing;
(3) formulating a nationwide plan for the total number, structure, and distribution of online publishing entities and organizing the implementation of the same;
(4) implementing the preliminary examination process for online publishing entities; and
(5) monitoring and supervising the content of online publications and administering penalties to those entities in violation of national publishing laws according to relevant laws and regulations.

The press and publication administrations of provinces, autonomous regions, and directly-administered municipalities are responsible within their respective administrative areas for the day-to-day administration of online publishing, the examination and verification of entities applying to engage in online publishing, and the imposition of penalties on entities in violation of national publishing laws.

Article 6 Any entity engaged in online publishing must be approved to do so. Entities or individuals that do not have approval may not engage in online publishing activities.

No organization or individual may interfere with, obstruct, or sabotage online publishing institutions lawfully engaging in online publishing activities.

Article 16 Where online publishing entities publish works related to important topics such as national security and social stability, they must file the same for the record with the General Administration of Press and Publication according to the relevant stipulations for filing important topics. Publications which have not been filed in this manner must not be published.

Article 17 No online publication may contain content that:
Article 18 Online publications that target minors shall not contain content that incites minors to engage in activities that run counter to social morality or that violate the law, nor shall such publications include terrifying or cruel content detrimental to the physical and mental health of minors.

Article 20 In the event that an online information service provider discovers that information transmitted by its Web site clearly falls under one of the categories listed under Articles 17 and 18 hereof, it shall immediately stop the said transmission, retain the relevant records, and report the situation to the press and publication administration of the relevant province, autonomous region, or directly-administered municipality and at the same time report the incident to the General Administration of Press and Publication.

Article 21 Online publishing entities shall implement an editorial responsibility system, and must designate editors for examining the content of publications to ensure the legality of the same. Editors shall be trained before commencing their jobs.

Article 22 Online publishing entities shall record the content, corresponding publication time, and Web site address or domain name for all published or transmitted works and retain copies of the same for 60 days. Such records shall be made available to the relevant state authorities when they make inquiries in accordance with the law.

Article 26 Entities that violate the stipulations of Article 16 of these rules shall be ordered to cease the publication or transmission of such publications, and shall receive a warning from the General Administration of Press and Publication or the press and publication administration of the relevant province, autonomous region, or directly-administered municipality. In addition, they shall be fined between RMB10,000 and 50,000. In serious cases, the online publishing entity may be ordered to suspend operations and rectify the violation within a specified time limit or may have its approval revoked.

Article 27 Entities that violate the stipulations of Article 17 or 18 of these rules shall have their illicit income confiscated by the General Administration of Press and Publication or the press and publication administration of the relevant province, autonomous region, or directly-administered municipality. In addition, where the amount of such illicit revenue exceeds RMB10,000, a fine of between 5 and 10 times the amount of such illicit revenue shall be imposed simultaneously; where the amount of illicit revenue is less than RMB10,000, a fine of between RMB10,000 and 50,000 shall be imposed simultaneously.
In serious cases, the online publishing entity may be ordered to suspend operations and rectify the violation within a specific time or may have its approval revoked.

**Article 28**  Entities that violate the stipulations of Article 22 of these rules will be ordered by the telecommunications administration of the relevant province, autonomous region, and directly-administered municipality to rectify this violation. In serious cases, the online publishing entity may be ordered to suspend operations and rectify the violation or temporarily shut down its Web sites.

---

**Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services** *(Excerpts)*

(Translation provided by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China)

Promulgated by the State Council Information Office and the Ministry of Information Industry on September 25, 2005

**Article 3**  Internet News Information Service Work Units that engage in Internet News Information Service shall abide by the Constitution, laws, and regulations, persist in being oriented toward serving the people and serving socialism, persist in correctly guiding public opinion, and safeguard the nation’s interests and the public interest.

The nation encourages Internet News Information Service work units to disseminate healthy and civilized News Information that is conducive to raising the quality of the nation, promoting economic development, and spurring social progress.

**Article 19**  Neither the News Information posted or transmitted, nor the current event electronic bulletin service provided, by Internet News Information Service Work Units may include any of the following content:

1. violating the basic principles as they are confirmed in the Constitution;
2. jeopardizing the security of the nation, divulging state secrets, subverting of the national regime, or jeopardizing the integrity of the nation's unity;
3. harming the honor or the interest of the nation;
4. inciting hatred against peoples, racism against peoples, or disrupting the solidarity of peoples;
5. disrupting national policies on religion, or propagating evil cults and feudal superstitions;
6. spreading rumors, disturbing social order, or disrupting social stability;
7. spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, or terror, or abetting the commission of a crime;
8. insulting or defaming third parties, or infringing on the legal rights and interests of third parties;
9. inciting illegal assemblies, associations, marches, demonstrations, or gatherings that disturb social order;
10. conducting activities in the name of an illegal civil organization; and
11. any other content prohibited by law or rules.

**Article 20**  Internet News Information Service Work Units shall establish a News Information con-
tent administration responsibility system. They may not post or transmit News Information with contents that violate clause 1 of Article 3 or Article 19 of these Rules; and if they discover that a current event electronic service has provided any content that violates Article 3, clause 1, or Article 19 of these Rules, they shall immediately delete it, retain relevant records, and provide them to relevant departments upon an inquiry made in accordance with the law.

Article 21 Internet News Information Service Work Units shall record the contents and the time and Internet address of all News Information they post and transmit, and record backups shall be maintained for at least 60 days, and shall be provided to relevant departments upon an inquiry made in accordance with the law.

Article 23 The State Council Information Office and the People’s Government information offices in the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government shall carry out supervision of Internet News Information Service; if they discover an Internet News Information Service Work Unit has posted or transmitted News Information, or provided a current event electronic bulletin service with contents that violate clause 1 of Article 3 or Article 19 of these Rules, they shall notify it to delete it. The Internet News Information Service Work Unit shall immediately delete it, retain relevant records, and provide them to relevant departments upon an inquiry made in accordance with the law.

Article 26 Anyone who, in violation of clause 2, Article 5 of these Rules, engages in Internet News Information Service without authorization, or who, in violation of Article 15 of these Rules, exceeds the scope of the service items for which they have been checked and ratified and engages in Internet News Information Service, shall be ordered to cease all illegal activities and fined more than 10,000 yuan and less than 30,000 yuan by the State Council Information Office or the People’s Government information office in the province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the central government, in accordance with their respective official powers; if the circumstances are severe, the department responsible for telecommunications shall, in accordance with a written determination of the State Council Information Office or the People’s Government information office in the province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the central government, on the basis of the stipulations of relevant Internet information service supervision administrative regulations, terminate the Internet information service or order the Internet access service to terminate access services.

Article 27 If the News Information an Internet News Information Service Work Unit posts or transmits includes contents prohibited under Article 19 of these Rules, or if they refuse to carry out their duty to delete, they shall be given a warning by the State Council Information Office or the People’s Government information office in the province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the central government, and may be subject to a fine of more than 10,000 yuan and less than 30,000 yuan; if the circumstances are severe, the department responsible for telecommunications shall, in accordance with written determination of the State Council Information Office or the People’s Government information office in the province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the central government, on the basis of the stipulations of relevant Internet information service supervision administrative regulations, terminate the Internet information service or order the Internet access service to terminate access services.

If the News Information an Internet News Information Service Work Unit posts or transmits includes contents prohibited under clause 1, Article 3 of these Rules, the
State Council Information Office or the People’s Government information office in the province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the central government shall, in accordance with their respective official powers, impose sanctions of the kind and scope stipulated in the foregoing clause.

Secrecy Rules in Respect of News Publishing (Excerpts)

(Translation provided by TransAsia Lawyers, a firm that specializes in media law in China, from its publication China’s Media and Entertainment Law, Vol. 11, 2006)


Article 5 News publishing entities and entities supplying information shall establish sound systems for the censorship of secrets in news publishing in accordance with the state laws and regulations regarding secrecy.

Article 6 Systems for the censorship of secrets in news publishing shall implement a combination of self-censorship and external censorship.

Article 7 In respect of information which they intend to make public, news publishing entities and entities supplying information shall undertake self-censorship in accordance with the relevant secrecy regulations; where it is unclear whether the information in question involves state secrets, they shall submit such information to the relevant departments in charge or to their higher-level authorities or entities for review and approval.

Article 8 Where information involving state secrets needs to be reported or circulated to relevant departments by news publishing entities and their reporters or editors, this shall be undertaken via internal channels, and the information being reported or circulated shall be marked as state secrets in accordance with the relevant regulations.

Article 10 News publishing entities which conduct interviews at meetings or other activities involving state secrets shall obtain prior approval from the organizing entity. The organizing entity shall verify the identities of the interviewers, indicate what content may not be openly reported or published, and review and approve that content which is intended for publication.

Article 12 Relevant authorities and entities shall designate certain censorship bodies or censors as being authorized to represent them. Such bodies or persons shall be responsible for reviewing and determining whether draft articles submitted by news publishing entities involve state secrets. Where it is unclear whether the contents of such involve state secrets, the draft article in question shall be submitted to a higher-level authority or entity for review and approval. If the contents involve state secrets pertaining to the work of other entities, the censorship bodies or censors shall be responsible for seeking the opinions of the relevant entities.

Article 15 Where an individual intends to supply content relating to national politics, the economy, diplomacy, science and technology, or military affairs to foreign news publishing entities for public reporting or publication, then such content shall be reviewed and approved in advance by that individual’s employer or its higher-level authority. The
submission of draft articles outside the country shall be handled in accordance with the relevant state regulations.

Article 22 The State Secrecy Bureau shall be responsible for the interpretation of these rules.

**Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets** *(Full text)*

*(Translation by the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic of China)*

Effective May 1, 1989

Chapter I: General Provisions

**Article 1** This Law is formulated for the purpose of guarding state secrets, safeguarding state security and national interests, and ensuring the smooth progress of reform, of opening to the outside world, and of socialist construction.

**Article 2** State secrets shall be matters that have a vital bearing on state security and national interests and, as specified by legal procedure, are entrusted to a limited number of people for a given period of time.

**Article 3** All state organs, armed forces, political parties, public organizations, enterprises, institutions, and citizens shall have the obligation to guard state secrets.

**Article 4** The work of guarding state secrets shall be carried out in line with the principle of actively preventing their leak and laying emphasis on priorities so that state secrets are kept while work in all other fields is facilitated.

**Article 5** The state secret-guarding department shall be responsible for the guarding of state secrets throughout the country.

The local secret-guarding departments at or above the county level shall, within the scope of their functions and powers, be responsible for the guarding of state secrets in the administrative areas under their jurisdiction.

The central state organs shall, within the scope of their functions and powers, be responsible for and guide the work of guarding state secrets in their own organs and in the departments subordinate to them.

**Article 6** State organs at or above the county level and units involving state secrets shall, in the light of their actual conditions, set up bodies or designate personnel to administer the day-to-day work of guarding state secrets within their own organs or units.

**Article 7** Units or individuals that have rendered meritorious services in guarding and protecting state secrets and improving techniques and measures in this field of work shall be awarded.

Chapter II: Scopes and Categories Of State Secrets

**Article 8** In accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of this Law, state secrets shall include the following:
(1) secrets concerning major policy decisions on state affairs;
(2) secrets in the building of national defense and in the activities of the armed forces;
(3) secrets in diplomatic activities and in activities related to foreign countries as well as secrets to be maintained as commitments to foreign countries;
(4) secrets in national economic and social development;
(5) secrets concerning science and technology;
(6) secrets concerning activities for safeguarding state security and the investigation of criminal offenses; and
(7) other matters that are classified as state secrets by the state secret-guarding department.

Matters that do not conform with the provisions of Article 2 of this Law shall not be state secrets.

Secrets of political parties that conform with the provisions of Article 2 of this Law shall be state secrets.

Article 9 State secrets shall fall into three categories: most confidential, classified, and confidential.

The most confidential information refers to vital state secrets, the divulgence of which will cause extremely serious harm to state security and national interests; classified information refers to important state secrets, the divulgence of which will cause serious harm to state security and national interests; and confidential information refers to ordinary state secrets, the divulgence of which will cause harm to state security and national interests.

Article 10 The specific scopes and categories of state secrets shall be stipulated by the state secret-guarding department together with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Security, and State Security and other central organs concerned.

The specific scopes and categories of state secrets related to national defence shall be stipulated by the Central Military Commission.

Stipulations on the specific scopes and categories of state secrets shall be made known within relevant quarters.

Article 11 State organs and units at various levels shall, in accordance with the stipulations on the specific scopes and categories of state secrets, classify the state secrets arising in these organs and units.

When people are not sure whether a certain matter is a state secret or which category of state secrets it should be classified into, the question shall be determined by the state secret-guarding department, the secret-guarding department of a province, an autonomous region, or a municipality directly under the Central Government, the secret-guarding department of a city where the government of a province or an autonomous region is located, the secret-guarding department of a larger city approved by the State Council, or an organ examined and approved by the state secret-guarding department. Pending the classification of the secret, the state organ or unit where the matter has arisen shall initially take security measures in conformity with the category proposed for its classification.
Article 12 The categories of secrecy shall, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 9, 10, and 11 of this Law, be marked on documents and other material that are determined as state secrets. Documents and other material that are not determined as state secrets shall not be marked as such.

Article 13 When differences arise as to whether a matter is a state secret or which category it should be classified into, the question shall be determined by the state secret-guarding department or the secret-guarding department of a province, an autonomous region or a municipality directly under the Central Government.

Article 14 While classifying state secrets, state organs and units shall, in the light of each case, determine the periods for guarding these secrets. Specific measures for determining the periods shall be formulated by the state secret-guarding department.

Article 15 The categories of state secrets and the periods for guarding them shall be altered in the light of changing circumstances. Such alterations shall be decided on by the state organs or units that determined the categories of the secrets and the periods for guarding them, or by superior departments.

Article 16 A state secret shall be automatically declassified upon the expiration of the period for guarding it; in cases where it is necessary to extend the period, the matter shall be decided on by the state organ or unit that determined the category of the secret and the period for guarding it, or by a superior department.

When it is found before the expiration of the period for guarding a state secret that it is no longer necessary to guard it as such, it should be declassified without delay by the state organ or unit that determined its category and defined the period for guarding it, or by a superior department.

Chapter III: Security Rules

Article 17 The state secret-guarding department shall formulate security measures regarding the making, receiving, dispatching, transmitting, use, copying, extracting, preservation, and destruction of documents and other material and objects that are state secrets.

Measures for storing, drawing, processing, and transmitting state secrets by electronic information and other technical means shall be formulated by the state secret-guarding department together with the central organs concerned.

Article 18 Documents and other material and objects that are classified as “most confidential” state secrets must be guarded by the following security measures:

(1) They shall not be copied or extracted without approval by the state organ or unit that determined their categories or by superior departments;
(2) People shall be specially designated and necessary security measures taken for their dispatch, reception, delivery, and carrying; and
(3) They shall be kept in perfectly equipped safes.

Security measures shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, for approved copies or extracts of documents and other material and objects classified as “most confidential” state secrets.
Article 19 Security measures shall be formulated by the state secret-guarding department, together with the central organs concerned, for the trial manufacture, production, transportation, use, preservation, maintenance, and destruction of equipment or goods classified as state secrets.

Article 20 In the publication and distribution of newspapers, journals, books, maps, material with illustrations and captions, and audio and video products and in the production and broadcast of radio and television programs and films, the relevant security regulations shall be complied with and no state secrets shall be divulged.

Article 21 When state secrets have to be furnished for the benefits of contacts and co-operation with foreign countries, approval must be obtained beforehand in line with the prescribed procedures.

Article 22 With regard to meetings and other activities that involve state secrets, the sponsor units shall take security measures, explain to the participants the need to guard secrets, and set specific requirements for the purpose.

Article 23 Military forbidden zones and places and locations that are state secrets not open to the public shall be protected by security measures; no one may decide to open them to the public or enlarge the area that is open to the public without approval obtained in accordance with the relevant state regulations.

Article 24 No state secrets shall be divulged in private contacts or correspondence.

When carrying documents and other material and objects classified as state secrets on official tours, no one shall go against the relevant security regulations.

No state secrets shall be discussed in public places.

Article 25 Transmission of state secrets through wire or wireless communications shall be protected by security measures.

No state secrets shall be transmitted by plain code or by a secret code that has not been examined and approved by the central organs concerned.

No documents or other material and objects classified as state secrets shall be transmitted by ordinary mail.

Article 26 Without approval by competent departments, no documents or any other material or objects classified as state secret shall be carried, transmitted, posted, or transported out of the country's territory.

Article 27 State secrets shall, depending on the circumstances, be accessible only to a certain number of people. The most confidential state secrets shall be accessible only to people who have obtained approval.

Article 28 Personnel to be placed specially in charge of state secrets shall be examined and approved in accordance with the provisions of the state secret-guarding department and the competent personnel department.

Exit from the country's territory by personnel specially in charge of state secrets shall be approved by the organ that approved their appointment. If the competent depart-
ment under the State Council holds that the exit of any one of them from the country’s territory will endanger state security or cause serious damage to national interests, no approval shall be granted for his exit.

Article 29 State organs and units shall conduct education among their personnel in the need to guard secrets and check up on secret-guarding work regularly.

Article 30 State functionaries and other citizens should, upon discovering that state secrets have been divulged or are in danger of being divulged, take remedial measures immediately and promptly report the matter to the state organs and units concerned, which shall, upon receiving such reports, deal with the matter without delay.

Chapter IV: Legal Responsibility

Article 31 Persons who, in violation of the provisions of this Law, divulge state secrets intentionally or through negligence, if the consequences are serious, shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with the provisions of Article 186 of the Criminal Law.

Persons who, in violation of the provisions of this Law, divulge state secrets, if the consequences are not serious enough for criminal punishment, may be given disciplinary sanction in the light of the specific circumstances of each case.

Article 32 Persons who steal, spy on, buy, or illegally provide state secrets for institutions, organizations, and people outside the country shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with law.

Chapter V: Supplementary Provisions

Article 33 The state secret-guarding department shall, in accordance with this Law, formulate measures for its implementation, which shall come into force after being submitted to and approved by the State Council.

Article 34 The Central Military Commission shall, in accordance with this Law, formulate the Regulations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army on the Guarding of Secrets.

Article 35 This Law shall come into force as of May 1, 1989. The Provisional Regulations on Guarding State Secrets promulgated in June 1951 shall be annulled as of the same date.

Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (Excerpts)

(Translation by the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic of China)

Adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress, July 1, 1979.
Revised at the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on March 14, 1997

Part II: Special Provisions
Chapter I: Crimes of Endangering National Security

Article 102 Whoever colludes with a foreign state to endanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the People’s Republic of China shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
Committee to Protect Journalists

Whoever commits the crime prescribed in the preceding paragraph in collusion with any organ, organization, or individual outside the territory of China shall be punished according to the provisions in the preceding paragraph.

Article 103 Among those who organize, plot, or carry out the scheme of splitting the state or undermining unity of the country, the ringleaders and the others who commit major crimes shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years; the ones who take an active part in it shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years; and the other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights.

Whoever incites others to split the state or undermine unity of the country shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights; the ringleaders and the ones who commit major crimes shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years.

Article 104 Among those who organize, plot, or carry out armed rebellion or armed riot, the ringleaders and the others who commit major crimes shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years; the ones who take an active part in it shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years; and the other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights.

Whoever instigates, coerces, lures, or bribes state functionaries or members of the armed forces, the people's police, or the people's militia to commit armed rebellion or armed riot shall be given a heavier punishment according to the provisions in the preceding paragraph.

Article 105 Among those who organize, plot, or carry out the scheme of subverting the state power or overthrowing the socialist system, the ringleaders and the others who commit major crimes shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years; the ones who take an active part in it shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years; and the other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights.

Whoever incites others by spreading rumors or slanders or any other means to subvert the State power or overthrow the socialist system shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights; and the ringleaders and the others who commit major crimes shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years.

Article 106 Whoever commits the crime as prescribed in Article 103, 104, or 105 of this chapter in collusion with any organ, organization, or individual outside the territory of China shall be given a heavier punishment according to the provisions stipulated in these articles respectively.

Article 107 Where an organ, organization, or individual inside or outside of the territory of China provides funds to any organization or individual within the territory of China to commit the crime as prescribed in Article 102, 103, 104, or 105, the person who is directly responsible for the crime shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more
than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights; if the circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years.

Article 108 Whoever defects to the enemy and turns traitor shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years; if the circumstances are serious or if he leads members of the armed forces, the people’s police, or the people’s militia to defect to the enemy and turn traitor, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment.

Article 109 Any state functionary who, while discharging his official duties at home or abroad, leaves his post without permission and defects to another country, which endangers the security of the People’s Republic of China, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights; if the circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than 10 years.

Any state functionary who has state secrets [and] commits the crime as prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be given a heavier punishment according to the provisions in the preceding paragraph.

Article 110 Whoever endangers national security by committing any of the following acts of espionage shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment; if the circumstances are minor, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years:

(1) joining an espionage organization or accepting a mission assigned by the organization or its agent; or

(2) directing the enemy to any bombing or shelling target.

Article 111 Whoever steals, spies into, buys, or unlawfully supplies state secrets or intelligence for an organ, organization, or individual outside the territory of China shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than 10 years; if the circumstances are especially serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment; if the circumstances are minor, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights.

Article 112 Whoever aids the enemy during wartime by providing him with weapons and equipment or military materials shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment; if the circumstances are minor, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years.

Article 113 Whoever commits any of the crimes of endangering national security as mentioned above in this chapter, with the exception of those provided for in paragraph 2 of article 103 and in articles 105, 107, and 109, if the crime causes particularly grave harm to the state and the people or if the circumstances are especially serious, may be sentenced to death.

Whoever commits any of the crimes mentioned in this chapter may concurrently be sentenced to confiscation of property.
Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and their Preparatory Period *(Full text)*

(Translation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China)

Article 1  These regulations are formulated to facilitate reporting activities carried out in accordance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China by foreign journalists in China to advance and promote the Olympic spirit during the Beijing Olympic Games and the preparatory period.

Article 2  These regulations apply to reporting activities carried out by foreign journalists covering the Beijing Olympic Games and related matters in China during the Beijing Olympic Games and the preparatory period.

The Beijing Olympic Games mentioned in the regulations refer to the 29th Olympic Games and the 13th Paralympic Games.

Article 3  Foreign journalists who intend to come to China for reporting should apply for visas at Chinese embassies, consulates or other visa-issuing institutions authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.

Foreign journalists who hold valid Olympic Identity and Accreditation Cards and Paralympic Identity and Accreditation Cards are entitled to multiple entries into the territory of the People’s Republic of China with visa exemption by presenting Olympic Identity and Accreditation Cards, together with valid passports or other travel documents.

Article 4  Foreign journalists may bring a reasonable quantity of reporting equipment into China duty free for their own use. The aforementioned equipment should be shipped out of China’s territory at the end of their reporting activities.

To bring into China reporting equipment duty free for their own use, foreign journalists should apply for the Equipment Confirmation Letter at Chinese embassies or consulates and present the Equipment Confirmation Letter together with a J-2 visa when going through customs inspection. Foreign journalists who hold Olympic Identity and Accreditation Cards and Paralympic Identity and Accreditation Cards may present the Equipment Confirmation Letter issued by the Organizing Committee of the 29th Olympic Games when going through customs inspection.

Article 5  For reporting needs, foreign journalists may, on a temporary basis, bring in, install, and use radio communication equipment after completing the required application and approval procedures.

Article 6  To interview organizations or individuals in China, foreign journalists need only to obtain their prior consent.

Article 7  Foreign journalists may, through organizations providing services to foreign nationals, hire Chinese citizens to assist them in their reporting activities.

Article 8  The media guide for foreign journalists of the Beijing Olympic Games shall be formulated by the Organizing Committee of the 29th Olympic Games in accordance with these regulations.

Article 9  These regulations shall come into force as of 1 January 2007 and expire on 17 October 2008.
Rules for Taiwan Reporters Reporting in the Mainland During the Beijing Olympic Games and their Preparatory Period (*Full text*)

(Translation by TransPerfect)

Article 1  To facilitate news reporting by Taiwan reporters reporting in the Mainland in accordance with law during the Beijing Olympic Games and their preparatory period and to spread and expand on the Olympic spirit, these rules have been made.

Article 2  News reporting on the Beijing Olympic Games by Taiwan reporters in the Mainland and related matters during the Beijing Olympic Games and their preparatory period shall be governed by these rules.

As used in these rules, the Beijing Olympic Games shall refer to the XXIX Olympic Games and the XIII Paralympic Games.

Article 3  When engaging in news reporting in the Mainland, Taiwan reporters shall apply with relevant agencies authorized by competent authorities for completion of issuance and notation procedures for their Mainland China passes.

Taiwan reporters who hold Olympic identification registration cards shall be exempt from issuance and notation requirements during the valid term of their Olympic identification registration cards and may enter and exit the Mainland multiple times by presenting Olympic identification registration cards and Taiwan resident passes for the Mainland.

Article 4  A reasonable amount of news reporting equipment carried by Taiwan reporters reporting in the Mainland for their own use may enter the country duty-free. Relevant equipment shall be transported out of the country after the news reporting activities end.

Taiwan reporters completing the procedures for duty-free entry of the news reporting equipment for their own use shall go to relevant agencies authorized by competent authorities for an equipment confirmation letter. When entering the country, they shall complete customs clearance procedures by presenting such an equipment confirmation letter and valid issuance and notations for their Taiwan resident passes for the Mainland; Taiwan reporters who hold Olympic identification registration cards may complete customs clearance procedures by presenting an equipment confirmation letter issued by the XXIX Olympic Games Organizing Committee.

Article 5  Taiwan reporters may temporarily import, set up, and use wireless communications equipment needed in their news reporting after completing routine procedures for approval.

Article 6  When reporting the news in the Mainland, Taiwan reporters shall only be required to obtain the consent of the organizations and individuals being reported on.

Article 7  Taiwan reporters may hire Mainland residents to assist in their news reporting work through relevant service organizations.

Article 8  The Beijing Olympic Games Reporter Service Guide shall be prepared by the XXIX Olympic Games Organizing Committee in accordance with these rules.

Article 9  These rules shall be implemented as of January 1, 2007, and shall be automatically abolished as of October 17, 2008.

Falling Short: China Falters on Press Freedom
Rules for Hong Kong and Macau Reporters Reporting Inland During the Beijing Olympic Games and their Preparatory Period *(Full text)*

(Translation by TransPerfect)

**Article 1**  To facilitate news reporting by Hong Kong and Macau reporters reporting inland in accordance with law during the Beijing Olympic Games and their preparatory period and to spread and expand on the Olympic spirit, these rules have been made.

**Article 2**  News reporting on the Beijing Olympic Games by Hong Kong and Macau reporters inland and related matters during the Beijing Olympic Games and their preparatory period shall be governed by these rules. As used in these rules, the Beijing Olympic Games shall refer to the XXIX Olympic Games and the XIII Paralympic Games.

**Article 3**  When engaging in news reporting inland, Hong Kong and Macau reporters may enter and exit inland multiple times by presenting inland passes, Olympics identification registration cards, or other valid certificates. Those who enter inland to engage in news reporting by presenting other valid certificates and who are required to complete visa procedures shall apply with the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong or the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Macau for visas.

**Article 4**  A reasonable amount of news reporting equipment carried by Hong Kong and Macau reporters reporting inland for their own use may enter the country duty-free. Relevant equipment shall be transported out of the country after the news reporting activities end. Hong Kong and Macau reporters completing the procedures for duty-free entry of the news reporting equipment for their own use shall go to the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong or the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Macau for an equipment confirmation letter. When entering the country, they shall complete customs clearance procedures by presenting such an equipment confirmation letter and inland passes for Hong Kong and Macau residents or other valid certificates; those who hold other valid certificates and who are required to complete visa procedures shall complete customs clearance procedures by presenting the equipment confirmation letter and a J-2 visa; Hong Kong and Macau reporters who hold Olympics identification registration cards may complete customs clearance procedures by presenting an equipment confirmation letter issued by the XXIX Olympic Games Organizing Committee.

**Article 5**  Hong Kong and Macau reporters may temporarily import, set up, and use wireless communications equipment needed in their news reporting after completing routine procedures for approval.

**Article 6**  When reporting the news inland, Hong Kong and Macau reporters shall only be required to obtain the consent of the organizations and individuals being reported on.

**Article 7**  Hong Kong and Macau reporters may hire inland residents to assist in their news reporting work through relevant service organizations.

**Article 8**  The Beijing Olympic Games Service Guide for Hong Kong and Macau Reporters shall be prepared by the XXIX Olympic Games Organizing Committee in accordance with these rules.

**Article 9**  These rules shall be implemented as of January 1, 2007, and shall be automatically abolished as of October 17, 2008.
Appendix III: Journalists Imprisoned in China

Compiled by the Committee to Protect Journalists as of June 15, 2007.

Chen Renjie, Ziyou Bao
IMPRISONED: July 1983

Twenty-four years after their imprisonment in the early days of China’s economic reform, Chen and Lin are the world’s longest-serving journalists, according to CPJ research. The two men, along with Chen Biling, wrote and published a pamphlet titled Ziyou Bao (Freedom Report). They distributed only 300 copies of the pamphlet in the southern Chinese city of Fuzhou, Fujian province, in September 1982.

The following July, they were arrested and accused of making contact with Taiwanese spy groups and publishing a counterrevolutionary tract. According to official government records of the case, the men used “propaganda and incitement to encourage the overthrow of the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist system.”

In August 1983, Chen Renjie was sentenced to life in prison, and Lin was sentenced to death with reprieve. Chen Biling was sentenced to death and later executed.

Hua Di, freelance
IMPRISONED: January 5, 1998

The imprisonment of Hua, a Stanford University scientist and permanent resident of the United States, raised objections from former U.S. President Bill Clinton, Hua’s colleagues at Stanford University, and others. But nine years later, he remained in jail.

While visiting China, Hua was arrested on allegations of revealing state secrets, a charge used frequently against journalists who write about controversial matters. Charges are believed to stem from articles that Hua had written in academic journals about China’s missile defense system.

On November 25, 1999, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court held a closed trial and sentenced Hua to 15 years in prison, according to the Hong Kong-based Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy.

In March 2000, the Beijing High People’s Court overturned Hua’s conviction and ordered that the case be retried. This judicial reversal was extraordinary, and it appeared to be a response to international pressure. But the decision did not mean that he was freed.

Instead, after a retrial, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court issued a modified verdict, sentencing Hua to 10 years in prison in November 2000. News of the sentence did not break until three months later, when a relative gave the information to foreign correspondents based in Beijing.

Hua suffers from a rare form of male breast cancer. Requests for his release on medical grounds have been denied.

Fan Yingshang, Remen Huati
CHARGED: October 16, 1995

In 1994, Fan and Yang Jianguo printed more than 60,000 copies of the magazine Remen Huati (Popular Topics). The men had allegedly purchased fake printing authorizations from an editor of the Journal of European Research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, according to official Chinese news sources. Printing authorizations are a prior restraint used to curtail independent publishing in China.

CPJ was unable to determine the date of Fan’s arrest, but on October 16, 1995, he was indicted on charges of profiteering. On January 31, 1996, the Chang’an District Court in Shijiazhuang City sentenced him to 13 years in prison, with three years’ subsequent deprivation of political rights, for publishing and distributing illegal “reactionary” publications. Yang escaped arrest and was not prosecuted.

Fan’s appeal was rejected on April 11, 1996, according to the Chinese government’s response to a query by the San Francisco-based Dui Hua Foundation, a prisoner advocacy group.

Yue Tianxiang, Zhongguo Gongren Guancha
IMPRISONED: January 1999

Along with his colleagues Wang Fengshan and Guo Xinmin, Yue started a journal campaigning for workers’ rights after they were unable to get compensation
from the Tianshui City Transport Agency (TCTA) following their dismissal by the agency in 1995. The first issue of Zhongguo Gongren Guancha (China Labor Watch) exposed extensive corruption among TCTA officials, according to international media reports. Only two issues were ever published.

On July 5, 1999, the Tianshui People’s Intermediate Court in Gansu province sentenced Yue to 10 years in prison on charges of “subverting state authority,” according to the Hong Kong-based Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy. Wang and Guo were sentenced to two years each and have since been released. All three men reportedly belonged to the outlawed China Democracy Party, a dissident group, and were forming an organization to protect the rights of laid-off workers.

In 2006, the U.S.-based Dui Hua Foundation, a prisoner advocacy group, reported that Yue’s sentence was reduced to nine years in March 2005. He turned 50 in Lanzhou Prison in December 2006.

Wu Yilong, Zaiye Dang
IMPRISONED: April 26, 1999

Mao Qingxiang, Zaiye Dang
IMPRISONED: June 1999

Wu and Mao, both organizers for the banned China Democracy Party (CDP), were detained in the run-up to the 10-year anniversary of the military crackdown on demonstrators at Tiananmen Square. A few months later, authorities detained two more leading CDP activists, Zhu Yufu and Xu Guang. The four were later convicted of subversion for, among other things, establishing a magazine called Zaiye Dang (Opposition Party) and circulating pro-democracy writings online.

On October 25, 1999, the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Zhejiang province conducted what The New York Times called a “sham trial.” On November 9, Wu was sentenced to 11 years in prison, Mao to eight; in each case, a three-year suspension of political rights follows their imprisonment. Xue received a five-year sentence and was later released. Zhu was sentenced to seven years. After his release in September 2006, Zhu told journalists that he had been abused and deprived of sleep while in prison.

“The guards would tell three or four criminals to beat me, saying it was a private matter between prisoners,” Zhu told The Associated Press.

Xu Zerong (David Tsui), freelance
IMPRISONED: June 24, 2000

Xu is serving a 13-year prison term on charges of “leaking state secrets” through his academic work on military history and of “economic crimes” related to unauthorized publishing on foreign policy issues. Some observers believe that his jailing may have been related to an article he wrote for the Hong Kong-based Yazhou Zhoukan (Asia Weekly) magazine revealing clandestine Chinese Communist Party support for a Malaysian insurgency in the 1950s and ’60s.

Xu, a permanent resident of Hong Kong, was arrested in Guangzhou and held incommunicado for 18 months until his trial before the Shenzhen Intermediate Court. He was convicted in December 2001, and his appeal to the Guangzhou Higher People’s Court was rejected in 2002.

According to court documents, the “state secrets” charges against Xu stemmed from his use of historical documents for academic research. Xu, also known as David Tsui, was an associate research professor at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. In 1992, he photocopied four books published in the 1950s about China’s role in the Korean War; he then sent the photocopies to a colleague in South Korea. The verdict stated that the Security Committee of the People’s Liberation Army of Guangzhou later determined that the books had not been declassified 40 years after being labeled “top secret.” After his arrest, St. Antony’s College at Oxford University, where Xu earned his doctorate and wrote his dissertation on the Korean War, became active in researching his case and calling for his release.

Xu was also co-founder and editor of the Hong Kong-based academic journal Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Jikan (China Social Sciences Quarterly). The “economic crimes” with which he was charged were related to the “illegal publication” of more than 60,000 copies of 25 books and periodicals, including several about Chinese politics and Beijing’s relations with Taiwan.

Xu was arrested just days before an article appeared in the June 26, 2000, issue of Yazhou Zhoukan in which he accused the Chinese Communist Party of hypocrisy by condemning other countries for interfering in its internal affairs by criticizing its human rights record.

Xu began his sentence in Dongguan Prison, outside of Guangzhou, but was later transferred to Guangzhou Prison, where it is easier for his family to visit him. He has been spared hard labor and is allowed to read, research, and teach English in prison, according to the U.S.-based Dui Hua Foundation, a prisoner advocacy group. He suffers from high blood pressure and diabetes.

In 2006, Xu’s family members were informed that he had received a nine-month reduction in his sentence,
Yang Zili, Yangzi de Sixiang Jiayuan
Xu Wei, Xiaofei Ribao
Jin Haike, freelance
Zhang Honghai, freelance
IMPRISONED: March 13, 2001

The four members of an informal discussion group called Xin Qingnian Xuehui (New Youth Study Group) were detained and accused of “subverting state authority.” Prosecutors cited online articles and essays on political and social reform as proof of their intent to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party leadership.

Yang, Xu, Jin, and Zhang were charged with subversion on April 20, 2001. More than two years later, on May 29, 2003, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Xu and Jin to 10 years in prison, Yang and Zhang to eight years. Each of the sentences is to be followed by two years’ deprivation of political rights.

At the time of their arrest, the four men were all students or recent university graduates who gathered occasionally to discuss politics and reform with four others, including an informant for the Ministry of State Security.

The most prominent in the group, Yang, posted his own opinion pieces and reports by the others on topics such as rural poverty and village elections, along with essays advocating democratic reform, on the popular Web site Yangzi de Sixiang Jiayuan (Yangzi’s Garden of Ideas).

Xu was a reporter at Xiaofei Ribao (Consumer’s Daily). Public security agents pressured the newspaper to fire him before his arrest, a friend, Wang Ying, reported online.

The court cited a handful of articles, including Jin’s “Be a New Citizen, Reform China” and Yang’s “Choose Liberalism,” in the verdict against them. In November 2003, the Beijing Higher People’s Court rejected their appeal without hearing defense witnesses. Three of the witnesses who testified against them at trial were fellow members of the group who sought later to retract their testimonies.

Yang, Xu, and Jin are being held at Beijing’s No. 2 Prison. Yang’s wife, Lu Kun, who was detained and questioned along with her husband but later released, told reporters in 2005 that she was unable to visit him for four years after he was first imprisoned. Zhang, who initially suffered from ill health in detention, is jailed at Lishui Prison in Zhejiang province, where he makes sweaters, his brother told CPJ.

Tao Haidong, freelance
IMPRISONED: July 9, 2002

Tao, an Internet essayist and pro-democracy activist, was arrested in Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and charged with “inciting subversion of state authority.” According to the Minzhu Luntan (Democracy Forum) Web site, which had published Tao’s articles, his writing focused on political and legal reform. In one essay, titled “Strategies for China’s Social Reforms,” he wrote that “the Chinese Communist Party and democracy activists throughout society should unite to push forward China’s freedom and democratic development or else stand condemned through the ages.”

Previously, in 1999, Tao was sentenced to three years of “re-education through labor” in Xi’an, Shaanxi province, according to the New York-based advocacy group Human Rights in China. The sentence was in connection with his essays and his work on a book titled Xin Renlei Shexiang (Imaginings of a New Human Race). After his early release in 2001, Tao began writing and posting articles on various domestic and overseas Web sites.

In January 2003, the Urumqi Intermediate Court sentenced Tao to seven years in prison. His subsequent appeal to the XUAR Higher Court was rejected.

Zhang Wei, Shishi Zixun and Redian Jiyou
IMPRISONED: July 19, 2002

Zhang was arrested and charged with illegal publishing after producing and selling two underground newspapers in Chongqing, central China. According to an account published on the Web site of the Chongqing Press and Publishing Administration, a provincial government body that oversees all local publications, beginning in April 2001, Zhang edited two newspapers, Shishi Zixun (Current Events) and Redian Jiyou (Summary of the Main Points), which included articles and graphics he had downloaded from the Internet.

Two of Zhang’s business associates, Zuo Shangwen and Ou Yan, were also arrested in July 2002 and indicted for their involvement with the publications. Zuo printed the publications in neighboring Sichuan province, while Ou managed the publications’ finances. At the time of their arrest, police confiscated 9,700 copies of Shishi Zixun.

The official account of the arrests stated that the two publications had “flooded” Chongqing’s publishing market. The government declared that “the political rumors, shocking ‘military reports,’ and other articles in
these illegal publications misled the public, poisoned the youth, negatively influenced society, and sparked public indignation.” Zhang, Zuo, and Ou printed more than 1.5 million copies of the publications and sold them in Chongqing, Chengdu, and other cities.

On December 25, 2002, the Yuzhong District Court in Chongqing sentenced Zhang to six years in prison and fined him 100,000 yuan (US$13,000), the amount that police said he had earned in profits from the publications. Zuo was sentenced to five years and fined 50,000 yuan (US$6,500), while Ou received a two-year sentence.

Abdulghani Memetemin
East Turkistan Information Center
IMPRISONED: July 26, 2002

Memetemin, a writer, teacher, and translator who had actively advocated for the Uighur ethnic group in the northwestern Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, was detained in Kashgar, a city in Xinjiang, on charges of “leaking state secrets.”

In June 2003, the Kashgar Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him to nine years in prison, plus a three-year suspension of political rights. Radio Free Asia provided CPJ with court documents listing 18 specific counts against Memetemin, including translating state news articles into Chinese from Uighur; forwarding official speeches to the Munich-based East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC), a news outlet that advocates for an independent state for the Uighur ethnic group; and conducting original reporting for the center. The court also accused him of recruiting additional reporters for ETIC, which is banned in China.

Memetemin did not have legal representation at his trial.

Huang Jinqiu, Boxun News
IMPRISONED: September 13, 2003

Huang, a columnist for the U.S.-based, citizen-journalist Web site Boxun News, was arrested in Jiangsu province. His family was not officially notified of his arrest for more than three months. On September 27, 2004, the Changzhou Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him to 12 years in prison on charges of “subversion of state power,” plus four years’ deprivation of political rights. The sentence was unusually harsh and appeared linked to Huang’s intention to form an opposition party.

Huang worked as a writer and editor in his native Shandong province, as well as in Guangdong province, before leaving China in 2000 to study journalism at the Central Academy of Art in Malaysia. While overseas, Huang began writing political commentary for Boxun News under the pen name Qing Shuijun. He also wrote articles on arts and entertainment under the name Huang Jin. Huang’s writings reportedly caught the attention of the government in 2001. According to Boxun News, Huang told a friend that authorities had contacted his family to warn them about his writing.

In January 2003, Huang wrote in his online column that he intended to form a new opposition party, the China Patriot Democracy Party. When he returned to China in August 2003, he eluded public security agents just long enough to visit his family in Shandong province. In the last article he posted on Boxun News, titled “Me and My Public Security Friends,” Huang described being followed and harassed by security agents.

Huang’s appeal was rejected in December 2004. His lawyer told CPJ in early 2005 that the journalist had been mistreated in prison and was in poor health. In late 2006, Huang’s family told Boxun News that his health appeared to have improved.

Kong Youping, freelance
IMPRISONED: December 13, 2003

Kong, an essayist and poet, was arrested in Anshan, Liaoning province. A former trade union official, he had written online articles that supported democratic reforms, appealed for the release of then-imprisoned Internet writer Liu Di, and called for a reversal of the government’s “counterrevolutionary” ruling on the pro-democracy demonstrations of 1989.

Kong’s essays included an appeal to democracy activists in China that stated, “In order to work well for democracy, we need a well-organized, strong, powerful, and effective organization. Otherwise, a mainland democracy movement will accomplish nothing.” Several of his articles and poems were posted on the Minzhu Luntan (Democracy Forum) Web site.

In 1998, Kong served time in prison after he became a member of the Liaoning province branch of the opposition China Democracy Party (CDP). In 2004, he was tried on subversion charges along with codefendant Ning Xianhua, who, according to the U.S. advocacy organization Human Rights in China and court documents obtained by the San Francisco-based Dui Hua Foundation, was accused of being the vice chairman of the CDP branch in Liaoning. On September 16, 2004, the Shenyang Intermediate People’s Court sentenced...
Falling Short: China Falters on Press Freedom

Kong to 15 years in prison, plus four years’ deprivation of political rights. Ning received a 12-year sentence. Kong’s family has never seen the verdict in the case, according to CPJ sources in China.

Kong suffers from hypertension and is imprisoned in the city of Lingyuan far from his family, making visits difficult. In a letter written to his family from prison, Kong said that his sentence had been reduced to 10 years on appeal, but that information could not be confirmed.

Yu Huafeng, Nanfang Dushi Bao
IMPRISONED: January 2004

Yu, deputy editor-in-chief and general manager of Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis News), and Li Minying, the newspaper’s former editor, were detained less than a month after the newspaper published an article about a suspected SARS case in Guangzhou, the first case reported since the epidemic ended in July 2003. Their imprisonment was followed in March 2004 by the jailing of former editor-in-chief Cheng Yizhong, who was held for five months. Li was released from prison in February 2007, but Yu remains behind bars.

The arrests appeared to be a part of a crackdown on the newspaper, which had become popular for its aggressive investigative reporting on social issues and wrongdoing by local officials. The paper broke news that a young graphic designer, Sun Zhigang, was beaten to death in March 2003 while being held in police custody in Guangzhou. The public outcry over Sun’s death led to the arrest of several local government and police officials, along with a change in national laws on detention.

On March 19, 2004, the Dongshan District Court in Guangzhou sentenced Yu to 12 years in prison on corruption charges. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, Yu was convicted of embezzling 580,000 yuan (US$76,000) and distributing the money to members of the paper’s editorial committee. The court also accused Yu of paying Li a total of 800,000 yuan (US$104,000) in bribes while Li was editor of Nanfang Dushi Bao. Yu’s sentence was reduced to eight years on appeal in 2004, and by a further year in 2007.

Both men maintained that the money was acquired legally and was distributed in routine bonus payments to the staff. Chinese journalists familiar with the case have told CPJ that evidence presented in court did not support the corruption charges.

In 2005, Cheng was named the recipient of the 2005 UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize. He was not permitted to attend, but in his acceptance statement he asked to share the honor with Li and Yu, whose suffering, Cheng said, was “the shame of all of China.” Later that year, more than 2,000 journalists in China signed an open letter to the Guangdong High People’s Court appealing for the release of Yu and Li. Observers could remember no precedent for this show of support.

Yu’s wife told CPJ that she travels monthly to Beijing to petition for the release of her husband.

Zhao, a news researcher in the Beijing bureau of The New York Times and a former investigative reporter for the Beijing-based China Reform magazine, was detained in Shanghai less than two weeks after the Times ran an article correctly predicting the retirement of President Jiang Zemin from his final leadership post.

Zhao was held under suspicion of “providing state secrets to foreigners,” a charge that denied him access to a lawyer for nine months after his initial detention, prolonged his pretrial detention, and cloaked his case in official secrecy. Leaked state security documents confirmed that Zhao was detained in connection with the September 7, 2004, article on Jiang’s retirement, but indicated that the sparse evidence against him comprised only a brief handwritten note taken through unknown means from the Beijing office of the Times. A fraud charge was added in April 2005. After a series of delays, Zhao was tried in June 2006 in closed proceedings, during which he was not permitted to call defense witnesses.

On August 25, 2006, the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court convicted Zhao of fraud charges. But in a very rare move for criminal cases brought to trial in China, the court acquitted him of the more serious state secrets charges due to “insufficient evidence.” Zhao was sentenced to three years in prison.

The fraud charge stemmed from an accusation that Zhao took 20,000 yuan (US$2,600) from a local official with the promise of helping to obtain his release from a work camp in 2001. Zhao was known as an aggressive investigative reporter and activist before joining the Times. Sources familiar with the situation told CPJ that the fraud allegation against him was unsubstantiated.

Zhao’s detention fueled an international outcry, and the issue was raised with high-ranking U.S. officials in talks with Chinese counterparts. The state secrets charge against Zhao was briefly dropped ahead of Chinese President Hu Jintao’s April 2006 visit to the White
House, prompting speculation that he would soon be released from prison. But all charges were reinstated after Hu’s visit.

After his sentencing, Zhao’s lawyers petitioned for a fully open appeal hearing with the right to call defense witnesses, something denied him at trial. But authorities denied this request as well, and rejected Zhao’s appeal after reviewing it behind closed doors in November 2006.

Zhao is due to be released from prison in September 2007.

Shi Tao, freelance
IMPRISONED: November 24, 2004

Shi, the former editorial director at the Changsha-based newspaper Dangdai Shang Bao (Contemporary Business News), was detained near his home in Taiyuan, Shanxi province.

He was formally arrested and charged with “providing state secrets to foreigners” for sending an e-mail on his Yahoo account to the U.S.-based editor of the Web site Minzhu Luntan (Democracy Forum). In the anonymous e-mail sent several months before his arrest, Shi transcribed his notes taken from local propaganda department instructions to his newspaper, which included directives on coverage of the banned religious movement Falun Gong and the upcoming 15th anniversary of the military crackdown on demonstrators at Tiananmen Square. The official Xinhua News Agency reported that the government later certified the contents of the e-mail as classified.

On April 27, 2005, the Changsha Intermediate People’s Court found Shi guilty and sentenced him to a 10-year prison term. In June, the Hunan Province High People’s Court rejected his appeal without granting a hearing.

Court documents in the case revealed that Yahoo had supplied information to Chinese authorities that helped identify Shi as the sender of the e-mail. Yahoo’s participation in the identification of Shi raised questions about the role that international Internet companies are playing in the repression of online speech in China and elsewhere.

In November 2005, CPJ honored Shi in absentia with its annual International Press Freedom Award for his courage in defending the ideals of free expression. Shi’s mother, Gao Qinsheng, was invited to attend the ceremony in New York but declined the invitation after police told her that her son’s conditions in high-security Chisan Prison would improve if she stayed home. Instead, Shi’s conditions stayed the same through 2006. He was forced to work cutting and polishing gems, he lost weight, and he was not allowed to read newspapers or write.

Zheng Yichun, freelance
IMPRISONED: December 3, 2004

Zheng, a former professor, was a regular contributor to overseas online news outlets, including the U.S.-based Web site Dajiyuan (Epoch Times), which is affiliated with the banned Falun Gong movement. Zheng wrote a series of editorials that directly criticized the Communist Party and its control of the media.

Because of police warnings, Zheng’s family remained silent about his detention in Yingkou, Liaoning province, until state media reported that he had been arrested on suspicion of inciting subversion. Zheng was initially tried by the Yingkou Intermediate People’s Court on April 26, 2005. No verdict was announced, and on July 21 he was tried again on the same charges. As in the April 26 trial, proceedings lasted just three hours. Though officially “open” to the public, the courtroom was closed to all observers except close family members and government officials. Zheng’s supporters and a journalist were prevented from entering, according to a local source.

Prosecutors cited dozens of articles written by the journalist, and listed the titles of several essays in which he called for political reform, increased capitalism in China, and an end to the practice of imprisoning writers.

On September 20, the court sentenced Zheng to seven years in prison, to be followed by three years’ deprivation of political rights.

Sources familiar with the case believe that Zheng’s harsh sentence may be linked to Chinese leaders’ objections to the Dajiyuan series “Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party,” which called the Chinese Communist Party an “evil cult” with a “history of killings” and predicted its demise.

Zheng is diabetic, and his health suffered a decline after his imprisonment. After his first appeal was rejected, he intended to pursue an appeal in a higher court, but his defense lawyer, Gao Zhisheng, was himself arrested in August 2006. Zheng’s family has been unable to find another lawyer willing to take the case.

Zhang Lin, freelance
IMPRISONED: January 29, 2005

A freelance writer and political essayist who made a living by writing for banned overseas Web sites, Zhang was convicted of “inciting subversion of state authority” and
misrepresenting national officials in his articles and in a radio interview.

Zhang, who spent years in jail in the 1990s for his pro-democracy activism and for organizing a labor union, was detained at a train station near his home in Bengbu, in central China’s Anhui province. Police apprehended him as he was returning from Beijing, where he had traveled to mourn the death of ousted Communist Party leader Zhao Ziyang. He was initially accused of “disturbing public order,” but police formally arrested him on charges of inciting subversion after confiscating the computer he was using.

The Bengbu Intermediate People’s Court tried him on June 21, 2005, in proceedings that lasted five hours, his lawyer, Mo Shaoping, told CPJ. The defense argued that the six articles and one interview cited by the prosecution were protected free expression. Zhang’s wife told reporters that his imprisonment was also connected to essays he wrote about protests by unemployed workers and official scandals. On July 28, 2005, the court convicted Zhang and sentenced him to five years in prison.

For 28 days in September 2005, Zhang waged a hunger strike to protest his unjust sentence and the harsh conditions at the Bengbu No. 1 Detention Center. Officials there subjected him to long hours of forced labor making Christmas ornaments and refused to allow him to read newspapers or other material, according to his lawyer. During his hunger strike, he was fed through his nose, and was hospitalized briefly before returning to the detention center.

Zhang’s appeals were rejected without a hearing, and he was moved to a prison in Anhui province. Zhang’s wife told CPJ that his health has suffered during his imprisonment. They have a young daughter.

**Li Changqing, Fuzhou Ribao**

IMPRISONED: February 2005

Li, deputy news director of *Fuzhou Ribao* (Fuzhou Daily), was arrested in southern China’s Fujian province in connection with an investigation of whistleblower Huang Jingao, a local Communist Party official who wrote an open letter to the state-run *People’s Daily* in 2004 denouncing corruption among local officials.

Huang won public support after describing death threats that he said forced him to wear a bulletproof vest. But in November 2005, he was convicted of accepting bribes and sentenced to life in prison. Supporters said that the charges against Huang were politically motivated.

Li was initially accused of inciting subversion. He told his lawyer that he was tortured in detention, and interrogated repeatedly about his defense of Huang in newspaper and online articles.

The unexplained subversion charge was later dropped, and Li was formally accused of “deliberately fabricating and spreading alarmist information.” The new charge was related to an October 13, 2004, report in the U.S.-based Chinese-language Web site *Boxun News* reporting an outbreak of dengue fever, a viral mosquito-borne disease, in Fuzhou.

The author, identified by his lawyer as Li, anonymously reported more than 20 cases, according to *Boxun News*. In seeking to confirm the information, the Web site did its own research, and updated the story to reflect 100 cases.

Li was tried in Fuzhou on January 19, 2006. On January 24, the Gulou District Court convicted Li and sentenced him to three years in prison. His appeal was rejected.

**Ching Cheong, The Straits Times**

IMPRISONED: April 22, 2005

Ching, a veteran Hong Kong reporter who was the China correspondent for the Singapore daily *The Straits Times*, was detained in Guangzhou while attempting to meet with a source to obtain transcripts of interviews with the late ousted leader Zhao Ziyang. He was held under house arrest in Beijing without access to a lawyer or his family until a formal arrest order, on espionage charges, was issued in August 2005.

Official Xinhua News Agency reports in 2005 accused Ching of collecting millions of Hong Kong dollars to spy for Taiwan. Specific charges against him were not made clear until after his closed hearing in Beijing on August 15, 2006. On August 31, the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court convicted Ching of espionage and sentenced him to five years in prison, plus an additional year’s deprivation of political rights.

The verdict in the case later appeared online and was published by several Hong Kong newspapers. The document accused Ching of accepting around 300,000 Hong Kong dollars (not “millions” as first reported by Xinhua) in fees to submit classified reports on political affairs, economics, and international relations for a Taiwan-based organization called the Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies, which authorities said was a cover for a Taiwan intelligence organization. Prosecutors said that Ching had met two representatives from the organization at a current events conference, and had done research for them.
In his defense, Ching argued that he had no knowledge that the organization was a front for Taiwan intelligence—a charge the foundation itself has strongly denied—and that he had provided no state secrets. Ching’s appeal was rejected in November 2006.

Ching suffers from heart disease and ulcers, and his family is appealing for his release on medical grounds. At his family’s request, he was transferred to a prison in Guangzhou.

**Li Yuanlong, Bijie Ribao**

**IMPRISONED: September 2005**

Li, a reporter for the news daily *Bijie Ribao* in Guizhou province, was tried on charges of “inciting subversion of state authority” for online articles criticizing the Chinese Communist Party. The five-hour hearing was held on May 11, 2006. The following July, the Bijie Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him to two years in prison.

Li’s articles about poverty and unemployment in his home province angered local officials, according to the U.S.-based advocacy group Human Rights in China. He told his lawyer that he had become increasingly frustrated with the “lies and clichés” he was writing for his state-controlled newspaper, and felt that it was his responsibility as a reporter to expose injustice and inequality. Li began writing articles that were very critical of Chinese Communist Party and local government actions. He then posted them, under the name Ye Lang (Night Wolf), on the banned U.S.-based Web sites *Boxun News*, *Dajiyuan* (*Epoch Times*), *Yi Bao* (*ChinaEWeekly*), and *New Century Net*.

Li is expected to be released from prison in September 2007.

**Yang Tongyan (Yang Tianshui), freelance**

**IMPRISONED: December 23, 2005**

Yang, commonly known by his pen name, Yang Tianshui, was detained along with a friend in Nanjing, eastern China. He was tried on charges of “subverting state authority” and on May 17, 2006, the Zhenjiang Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him to 12 years in prison.

Yang is a well-known writer and a member of the Independent Chinese PEN Center. He was a frequent contributor to U.S.-based Web sites banned in China, including *Boxun News* and *Dajiyuan* (*Epoch Times*). He often wrote critically about the ruling Communist Party, and he advocated the release of Internet writers Zheng Yichun and Zhang Lin.

According to the verdict in Yang’s case, which was translated into English by the San Francisco-based Dui Hua Foundation, the harsh sentence against him was related to a fictitious online election, established by overseas Chinese citizens, for a “democratic Chinese transitional government.” Yang’s colleagues say that without his prior knowledge, he was elected “secretariat” of the fictional government.

Yang later wrote an article in *Dajiyuan* in support of the model.

Prosecutors also accused Yang of transferring money from overseas to Wang Wenjiang, who had been convicted of endangering state security. Yang’s defense lawyer argued that this money was humanitarian assistance to the family of a jailed dissident and did not constitute a criminal act.

Yang had previously spent 10 years in prison for his opposition to the military crackdown on demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Believing that the recent proceedings against him were fundamentally unjust, he did not appeal.

Yang has been suffering from health problems as a result of ill treatment in prison, his sister told the Hong Kong-based *Apple Daily* newspaper.

**Guo Qizhen, freelance**

**IMPRISONED: May 12, 2006**

Guo was detained as he prepared to join a rolling hunger strike led by Gao Zhisheng, the lawyer for imprisoned Internet journalist Zheng Yichun. (The lawyer was himself jailed in August 2006.) Guo was formally charged with offenses related to his prolific writing for the U.S.-based Chinese-language Web sites *Minzhu Luntan* (*Democracy Forum*) and *Dajiyuan* (*Epoch Times*).

The Cangzhou Intermediate People’s Court tried Guo on charges of “inciting subversion of state authority” on September 12, 2006. He was convicted and sentenced to four years in prison, plus an additional two years’ deprivation of political rights.

In its opinion presented to the prosecutor on June 16, the Cangzhou Public Security Bureau cited several online essays as proof of Guo’s crimes, including one titled “Letting Some of the People First Get Rich While Others Cannot Make a Living,” in which he accused the Communist Party government of using its policies to support an “autocratic” and “despotic” regime. Guo was outspokenly critical of corruption and widespread poverty in the country.

In his defense, Guo argued that his criticism of the Communist Party was protected by the Chinese constitution. He
Zhang Jianhong, freelance
IMPRISONED: September 6, 2006

The founder and editor of the popular news and literary Web site Aiqinhai (Aegean Sea) was taken from his home in Ningbo, in eastern China’s Zhejiang province.

In March 2007, the Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court found Zhang guilty of writing 60 articles that “slandered the government and China’s social system to vent his discontent with the government,” according to the official Xinhua News Agency. He was sentenced to a prison term of six years for the crime of “inciting subversion of state authority,” to be followed by one year’s deprivation of political rights.

Zhang was an author, screenwriter, and reporter who served one and a half years of “re-education through labor” in 1989 on counter-revolutionary charges for his writing in support of protesters. He was dismissed from a position with the local writers association and began working as a freelance writer.

In March 2006, his Web site Aiqinhai was shut down for the unauthorized posting of international and domestic news. Zhang had also been a recent contributor to several U.S.-based Chinese-language Web sites, including Boxun News, the pro-democracy forum Minzhu Luntan, and Dajiyuan (Epoch Times).

The journalist had written commentary calling for political reform in China and had reported on allegations that the Chinese government illegally procured organs from living prisoners. An editorial he wrote two days before his detention called attention to international organizations’ criticism of the government’s human rights record and, in particular, the poor treatment of journalists and their sources two years before the start of the Olympics. Zhang referred to the situation as “Olympicgate.”

Police arrested Sun and his wife, He Fang, at their Nanjing home after the reporter angered authorities with his online video, audio, and written news reports. Following their arrest, police accused Sun (known by his pen name Jie Mu) of illegally possessing weapons and heading a criminal gang.

Sun began reporting for the U.S.-based, Chinese-language Boxun News in September 2006, the Web site’s founder, Watson Meng, told CPJ. He had recently reported on crime and public protests.

In online videos and audio recordings, Sun had documented apparent police harassment related to his work as a reporter. On March 21, police came to his house in Nanjing to warn him to stop reporting. They said that he was working for an illegal news organization and did not have an officially issued press card. Boxun, which posted a video of the police visit, is based in North Carolina and posts news from citizen contributors in China. The site is banned in China, and domestic access is blocked.

In one of his most recent reports, from Tiananmen Square on May 25, Sun and fellow reporter Guang Yuan discussed Boxun’s unsuccessful effort to gain accreditation to cover the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing.

On May 29, police raided the restaurant run by his wife, He, and arrested more than 20 people, mostly employees of the restaurant, Boxun reported. Sun interviewed 10 of them after their release. Plainclothes police seized Sun and He at their home at 7 p.m. the following day.

After the May 30 detention, the official Nanjing Daily reported that Sun was accused of heading a criminal gang that had extorted money from taxi drivers, and that police recovered guns and ammunition from his home. The official report did not mention Sun’s wife. Sun and He have a young daughter.